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History

The T est of D etente: Soviet-American Relations and the Yom Kippur W ar (232 pp.)
Director: Paul G ordon Lauren, Ph.D.
By the early 1970s, the detente, or relaxation of tensions, betw een the U nited States and the
Soviet U nion had reached its apex, heralded by the summits of 1972 and 1973. The shared
impetus for detente was strong. Moscow’s achievem ent of nuclear parity during the 1960s
effectively neutralized the Am erican nuclear deterrent. B oth countries agreed th a t the
confrontational tactics of the earlier Cold W ar period could serve neither the interests of world
peace, nor the objectives of either superpower in its drive for global supremacy. Additionally,
the leaders of each country found great political value in detente, which explains why neither
superpower held to a strict interpretation of the agreements each nation signed at the summits.
As the first major Cold W ar proxy conflict to follow the detente period, the Yom Kippur W ar
of 1973, fought between Israel (supported by the U nited States) and Egypt and Syria (supported
by the Soviet U nion), put detente to “the test.” Israel’s crushing victory in the June W ar of
1967, which resulted in the capture of surrounding Arab territories, polarized the Arab-Israeli
conflict along Cold W ar lines. T he Soviet Union attem pted to consolidate its position as patron
of its Arab clients through massive military support. Am erican foreign policy moved to “freeze”
Arab radicalization by guaranteeing Israeli hegemony until bo th sides would agree to negotiations
under U nited States auspices. The Arabs’ success in the first days of the Yom Kippur W ar
caused a revolution in Israel’s defense posture, and W ashington’s Middle East policy. W ith Israel
badly battered, and Egypt planted in the Sinai and eager to shed its dependence on Moscow, the
stage was thus set for H enry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, which resulted ultimately in a final
peace between the two arch-enemies. This major American victory had detente to thank, as
Kissinger took advantage of the wide diplomatic latitude created by relaxed superpower tensions.
The nuclear crisis at the end of the war dem onstrated both the limits and the ultimate success
of detente: neither superpower proved willing to abandon passively its Cold W ar policies, yet
each shared a fundam ental belief in the inadmissability of nuclear war.
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Chapter I
Introduction

The Yom Kippur W ar occupies a special place in the bloody landscape of Cold W ar proxy
conflicts. If the intensity of war could be measured as a ratio of firepower divided into the
duration over which it was expended, then Israel’s two-front battle against Syria and Egypt in
O ctober of 1973 claims the dubious distinction as the m ost intense conflict of the Cold W ar
system.
Unlike so many other sub-theater wars th a t invariably pitted American arms versus
Soviet arms w ith guerilla-oriented tactics, the Yom Kippur W ar was fought in the European
(even “old fashioned”) tradition of open confrontation betw een massive land armies. T he tank
war in the Sinai front alone rivaled the greatest battles betw een the Nazi and Soviet armies of
World W ar II. But this Arab-Israeli confrontation came w ith some Cold W ar accouterments
that were unknow n to the G reat Power rivalries in the European theater. T he Yom Kippur W ar
provided an environm ent where some of the most sophisticated weaponry in the world could be
tested in battlefield conditions. N either superpower was prepared to allow its rival to project a
more impressive show of force. This explains, in part, why th e fourth Arab-Israeli war saw the
largest weapons airlift in the history of conflict.
But superpower “flexing” was only a symptom of the larger political ramifications of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. By 1973, the northern tier of the Middle East had become split along bi
polar Cold W ar lines. Both the U nited States and the Soviet U nion had vied for political
dominance in th e M iddle East since the end of W orld W ar II. Its oil riches and geo-strategic
centrality would be im portant in the global competition.
1

Moscow had sought, since 1955, to increase its prestige in the area by presenting itself
to the Arabs as a fellow socialist, anti-Zionist, big brother of sorts. If the Arabs w anted to
challenge Israel - or even threaten its existence - they would need Soviet weapons to do so.
T he Arab-Soviet relationship, however, was a marriage of m utual convenience, nothing more.
For all of the inter-A rab rivalries in the postwar era, the A rab world found unity in antiCommunism at least as m uch as in anti-Zionism. The Soviets, for their part, claimed to support
the Arabs on anti-imperialist grounds, although the reality of their motives rested on simple
power politics. In Egypt, Moscow saw both its greatest coup w ith th e 1955 weapons deal to
Gamal Nasser, and its ignominious fall after the Yom Kippur W ar, w hen A nwar Sadat extricated
Egypt’s dependence on Soviet weapons by restoring diplomatic relations w ith the U nited States.
The U nited States never wanted to be the exclusive supporter of Israel th at it had
become by 1973. Like the Soviets, American Middle East policy courted Arab favor in the form
of weapon transfers and economic support. Yet, in the black-and-white world of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, W ashington increasingly found itself backing Israel’s interests. This relationship, too,
found its basis in amoral political expedience far more th an any ideological impetus to support
a fellow democratic nation. O ne of the most fascinating policy debates in W ashington during
the Cold W ar focused on w hether or n o t Israel facilitated or hindered America’s anti-Soviet
interests. By the end of the Yom Kippur W ar, the debate found a satisfactory answer. Egypt
chose American diplomacy over Soviet arms as a means to achieve its goals, once W ashington
found th at it could support Israel w ithout necessarily alienating the Arab enemies surrounding
it. A new problem th a t arose from the Yom Kippur W ar had more to do with economics than
power politics. T he Persian Gulf states saw in the war a convenient pretext to withhold oil from
the industrialized nations, thus putting a pan-Arab face on a prudent business decision. T he

ensuing energy shortages quickly replaced Soviet predominance as the most threatening security
issue to come from the A rab world.
The stakes, then, were extremely high for both superpowers by O ctober 1973, and as the
historical record indicates, bo th the U nited States and the Soviet U nion acted decisively to
prevent the other from gaining unilateral advantage. Yet, the situation was n o t like Cuba or
Berlin of the past decade. Strategic parity, achieved by Moscow as it caught up with the
American nuclear arsenal over the course of th e 1960s, and the excessively tense crises that had
pushed the superpowers to the brink of nuclear war, called for a new framework to mitigate the
superpower competition. T he Soviet-American detente did n o t seek to end the Cold W ar; it
merely rested on the shared assumption that the crises th at would inevitably develop in Third
World zones of com petition ought never to deteriorate to the point of direct nuclear
confrontation.
The Yom Kippur W ar - the first major proxy conflict to erupt after the Soviet-American
detente summits of 1972and 1973 - thus underscored the competing, and sometimes mutually
exclusive superpower impetuses of the Cold W ar.

As a war which bo th Moscow and

W ashington correctly perceived as crucial in the ongoing global com petition, the fourth ArabIsraeli confrontation brought a fundam ental Cold W ar question to a head: how far could the
superpowers go in furthering their own interests w ithout risking nuclear war?
This thesis seeks to answer th a t question in as comprehensive a m anner as possible. To
do so requires an exam ination of four unique international relationships, each of which serves
as the major topic of each chapter. T he author is most interested in how nations balance force
and diplomacy as a means to further their security interests. This interplay serves as a guide for
understanding bo th Cold W ar rivalry at the global level, and client-patron relations at the

regional level.
C hapter 1 broadly introduces the Soviet-American detente. It traces the shared goal of
relaxed tensions from the birth of the Soviet U nion through the Yom Kippur W ar. This chapter
seeks to create a framework for how “to think” about superpower behavior in the events leading
up to the Yom Kippur W ar. The seeming contradiction betw een the proclamations of the
Soviet-American detente, and the actions each took in its quest for Middle East predominance,
has led the author to examine detente beyond a superficial reading of the major summit
documents of 1972 and 1973. D etente, or the relaxation of tensions, and its Russian equivalent,
razyradka, was larger and richer than the ambivalent, and somewhat politically-driven
interpretations of it in the early 1970s. If the Yom Kippur W ar put d etente to “the test,” as the
title of this thesis suggests, th en detente must be understood in its proper, and full, historical
context. In this first chapter the author has attem pted to combine his training in both political
science and historical methodology, out of the belief th a t the two fields intersect at the sub
discipline of international relations. C hapter 1 combines analysis w ith historical narrative to
define detente both as a creator and product of superpower relations in the middle six decades
of the 20th century.
Chapters 2 and 3 (Soviet-Egyptian and American-Israeli relations, respectively)focus on
the client-patron relationships of the four actors, both of which began in the early Cold W ar
period, and culm inated in the diplomatic revolutions wrought during and after the Yom Kippur
W ar. These are “sister” chapters in more than one sense - they are organized in the same style,
but the content of each chapter, examining the particularities of the two client-patron
relationships, yields fascinating similarities in national behavior. Strategic self-interest emerges
as the dom inant consideration of each of the four nations’ security policies. Likewise, each

international relationship is characterized far more by conflict th a n harmony.
C hapter 4 examines A m erican policy in the immediate postwar period. In this final
chapter, the Soviet U nion receives only passing reference for the simple fact th a t its Middle East
standing was severely downgraded as a result of the Yom Kippur W ar. H enry Kissinger’s shuttle
diplomacy serves to combine basic truisms of client-patron relations and the superpower detente;
in a way, Kissinger’s performance shatters the myths discussed throughout the first three
chapters.

T he evolution of Soviet-Egyptian and American-Israeli relations were neither

inevitable nor unbreakable. Claims made to the contrary were generally ideological in nature,
and designed to obscure each nation’s actual motives. In short, the U nited States did not “have
to” become Israel’s guarantor to the exclusion of the Arabs - events leading up to th a t situation
were created either by chance or lack of choice.
Kissinger’s bold shuttle diplomacy emphasizes the basic m eaning of the Soviet-American
detente. Contrary to the warm personal relations between the leaders of the two superpowers
and the high-m inded agreements made between them, detente rem ained w hat it always had
been: an attem pt to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war so th a t the political nature of the global
Cold W ar com petition could continue. This fact was realized dram atically w hen the Soviet
U nion could only w atch passively as its major client in the Middle East effectively neutralized
Moscow’s influence of the previous twenty years.
Finally, a word of caution. This thesis avoids any grand conclusions on the larger
implications of the Yom Kippur W ar on detente. W hile the war did indeed test the efficacy of
detente, it did not necessarily produce a conclusive outcome by which to determ ine if detente
“failed” or “succeeded.” This is true for two reasons. First, while the Middle East was a major
theater of Cold W ar competition, it alone would not, and could n o t, serve as the basis of the

globally oriented Soviet-Am erican relationship. Second, the am bivalent nature of both detente
and the client-state relationships resists simple cause and effect analyses. There is no single and
authoritative definition of detente which can serve as a barom eter of superpower behavior, and
the Arabs and Israelis only concerned themselves w ith d eten te w hen it was in their direct
interest to do so. N eith er side preferred to be agents of their superpower interests, and their
actions - largely taken w ithout the consent of their patrons - do not fit into the already
imprecise nature of a d etente framework.
The task of this thesis, then, is not to find conclusive answers, but, rather, to elucidate
the complexity of a global and regional international framework.
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Chapter II
Detente: Global Peace, Local Conflict

Saki Dockrill, a political scientist, captured perfectly the essence of detente: it is “an elusive
concept, and, as it evolved during the Cold W ar, it was not about achieving ‘peace,’ if ‘peace’
m eant resolving the conflict itself.”1 In one sentence, Dockrill identified the three major
elements th a t constitute detente: its complexity; long history; and m ost im portant, its mitigating,
as opposed to curative, approach to the Soviet-American Cold W ar.
In order to examine the interplay of detente and the state of Arab-Israeli relations
surrounding the Yom Kippur W ar of 1973, it is necessary to frame the m ost intensive period of
relaxed tensions betw een the U nited States and the Soviet U nion in its proper historical context.
D etente, as it existed in the Richard Nixon-Leonid Brezhnev period of 1969-1973, emerged as
a moderate policy th at strove to ensure th at the ongoing superpower conflict would never
devolve to the point of nuclear war. Rooted in profound ideological, political, and economic
differences, the Cold W ar was a global competition th at by nature could n o t end until the
collapse of either the A m erican or the Soviet system. Beyond the fundam ental agreement that
nuclear war was an inadmissable m ethod of advancing the interests of either superpower, both
nations devised their strategy as a waiting game by which an eventual erosion of power would
be advanced by the accumulated global influence policies of one side over the other. Through
the auspices of improved communications, summit meetings, technological exchange, and the
like, detente merely codified the peaceful nature of this global waiting game.

!Saki Dockrill, “Introduction,” in W ilfried Loth, O vercom ing the C old War: A History o f
D etente. 1950-1991 (N ew York: Palgrave, 2002), vii.
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Extreme interpretations of detente - on one side, th a t N ixon and Brezhnev managed to
“end” the Cold W ar; on the other, th at detente was nothing more th an a mirage cynically
f

designed to consolidate the domestic base of both leaders - fail to explain the nature of
superpower action in T hird W orld conflicts, albeit betw een each other or involving their
respective clients in the region.
Contrary to some contemporary opinions, the Nixon-Brezhnev detente did not, then,
significantly alter the nature of the Cold War. The historian Ronald Steel, writing in 1972,
exemplifies the m ost inflated interpretation of detente:
T h e C old W ar is over b ecau se few serious people any lon ger b eliev e th a t it exists. A t a tim e
w h en th e n p resident o f th e U n ite d States renders h om age to th e C om m u n ist rulers o f C hina by
traveling to their cou rt in Peking, and w h en W a sh in g to n seek s M o sco w ’s help in th e onerous,
and increasingly tiresom e, burden o f d evelopin g the im poverished states o f th e T hird W orld, it
is ob vious th at the old faith has eroded and that the old vocab u lary is o b so lete.2

Steel based his argum ent on genuine geopolitical changes afoot in the early 1970s th a t would
have been unthinkable in the years immediately following W orld W ar II. Indeed, N ixon’s visit
to C hina in 1972 was historic, but Steel failed to couch the m eaning of the trip as a m ethod, in
part, of exploiting the Soviet fear of a possible Sino-Am erican entente. As for the supposedly
collaborative nature of dealing with the “onerous” and “tiresome” burden of th e Third W orld,
Steel presumably referred (he did not elaborate) to the Soviets’ hand in two areas: mediating
the Arab-Israeli conflict - which succeeded only in arming the Arabs to force levels sufficient
to launch a war against an intransigent Israel - and Moscow’s highly tentative offer to help end
the Vietnam W ar by putting pressure on its N o rth Vietnamese clients, who were also sufficiently
armed with Russian weapons to continue aggression.

Such actions hardly constituted a

2Ronald Steel, “Introduction,” in W alter Lippmann, T he Cold W ar (N ew York: Harper &. Row,
1974), vii.

meaningful relationship with the U nited States on the basis of managing a peaceful developing
world. Steel had nothing to say of the Indo-Pakistani war o f Decem ber 1971, and of course he
may be forgiven for writing w ithout the benefit of hindsight; whereas the Yom Kippur W ar of
1973 and the war in A ngola of 1975-1976 challenged the viability of detente, the war in
Afghanistan of 1979 collapsed the framework entirely. If the Cold W ar, as Steel claimed, was
over before each of these brutal wars occurred, the question is begged: if this was n o t Cold W ar,
what was?
In a similar vein, the scholars Charles Gati and Toby Trister G ati wrote, “compared to
the explicit antagonisms and relative simplicity of the Cold W ar era, Am erican-Soviet relations
entered a somewhat relaxed and certainly more complex phase in the 1970s.”3 Like Steel, Gati
and Gati viewed the 1970s detente as a distinct era succeeding (as opposed to being included
in) the old Cold W ar system. O ne is reminded of the critic Robert Kagan’s argument against the
nostalgia of alleged past simplicity. In a 1998 New Republic review of A Tangled Web, w ritten by
former Kennedy official W illiam Bundy, Kagan wrote, “T he historical fallacy th a t most pervades
discussion of A m erican foreign policy these days is th a t it was all so m uch simpler during the
Cold W ar....This, of course, is nonsense.”4 A lthough G ati and G ati were n o t romanticizing the
supposedly bygone Cold W ar era, they were certainly guilty of the oversimplified demarcations
Kagan warned against.
These “revolutionary” interpretations of detente were com m on among government
officials as well. In congressional testimony, David E. Mark, a State D epartm ent intelligence

3Charles Gati and Toby Trister Gati, The Debate Over D eten te (N ew York: Foreign Policy
A ssociation Press, 1977), 3.
4Robert Kagan, “Disestablishm ent,” The N ew Republic, August 17-24, 1998. A lthough Kagan’s
review is extrem ely negative, he did n ot specifically direct this argument against Bundy.
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officer, referred to “a new, if very imperfect, world order [that]...has laid the ground rules for
peaceful, if n o t always harmonious, intercourse betw een the Free W orld and the Soviet sphere.”5
M ark’s characterization reflected an honest ambiguity inherent in the concept of detente itself.
If, in 1971, detente was being hailed as a “new world order” (always a suspect phrase) this fact
was more a product of a politically charged domestic atmosphere th a n indicative of any geo
political reality. Furtherm ore, the concept of a “very imperfect” new world order defies logic; a
more cautious phrasing may have illustrated the strategy of detente more clearly.
O n the whole, contemporary characterizations th a t hailed detente as a comprehensive
shift past the Cold W ar were exceptions rather than the norm. M arshall Shulman, a scholar of
the Cold W ar, addressed w hat he called a “confusion” due to the
am biguities over the w ord d eten te. S om e had tak en it to m ea n a q u alitative ch a n g e from the
k ind o f relationship w h ich ex isted over th e C old W ar— a rapprochem ent; a co m m o n approach
to in tern ation al problem s based u pon co m m o n values, in terests, an d ob jectives. M y v iew is that
this is too broad a use o f th e word, and th a t it d oes n o t bear an y realistic resem b la n ce to the
relation ship th at exists. I b eliev e a more restricted d efin itio n is required, an d that it m ight m ake
m atters clearer to use th e term ‘lim ited D e te n te .’ T h e essen tia l ch aracteristic o f the present
S o v iet policy, w ether w e call it ‘lim ited d e te n te ’ or ‘p eaceful c o e x iste n c e ,’ is th a t it offers the
possibility o f a partial cod ification o f the terms o f co m p etitio n b etw e en the tw o cou n tries.6

If, somehow, the global superpower competition had indeed moved beyond the early Cold W ar,
as Shulman argued, th en the qualitative change in East-W est relations m ust be interpreted in
the most limited of terms. In this sense, detente did not usher in an end to the basis of an
ongoing Soviet-Am erican conflict; it simply recognized th at this conflict would continue without
resorting to nuclear force.

5David E. Mark, as cited in U nited States, Congress, H ouse, C om m ittee on Foreign Affairs,
Hearings: T he C old War: Origins and D evelopm ents (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office,
1971), 56-57.
6Marshall Shulm an, as cited in U nited States, Congress, H ouse, C om m ittee on Foreign Affairs,
Hearings: D eten te (W ashington, D.C.: Governm ent Printing Office, 1974), 3.
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The emphasis on avoiding nuclear war during the Nixon-Brezhnev era owed its existence
to a long history of advocates warning against the ghastly nature of such a conflict. If the basis
of characterizing the Cold W ar as past history by the early 1970s rested on shared nuclear fears,
it is a blurry one indeed. T h e real transition lay in a growing urgency to establish nuclear-free
tensions as a result of the Soviet-American nuclear parity w hich did n o t exist in the years
immediately following W orld W ar II, and the balance remained extremely lopsided in America’s
favor until the late 1960s. In the W estern perspective, the Nixon-Brezhnev detente formed as
the realization of a Soviet nuclear capability transformed from a hypothetical possibility to reality.
This long-standing fear was most powerfully enunciated by W inston S. C hurchill in his famous
“Iron C urtain” speech delivered in Fulton, Missouri, on M arch 5, 1946. H e declared,
It w ould n everth eless be w rong and im prudent to en tru st th e secret k now ledge or exp erience o f
th e atom ic bom b, w h ich th e U n ite d S tates, G reat Britain, and C anad a n o w share, to the world
organization, w hile it is still in its infancy. It w ould be crim inal m ad n ess to ca st it adrift in this
still agitated and u n -u n ited w orld. N o o n e in any cou n try has slept less w ell in their beds
b ecau se this k n ow led ge and th e m eth o d and the raw m aterials to apply it are at present largely
retained in A m erican hands.

I do n o t b eliev e w e sh ould all h a v e slept so sou nd ly had the

positions reversed and som e C om m u nist or n eo-F ascist state m on op olized , for th e tim e being,
those dread agen cies.7

If the intensity of the Nixon-Brezhnev detente, as measured by summitry and issuance of joint
Soviet-American communiques and agreements, somehow indicated a clear transition from the
earlier Cold W ar period, the backdrop of this entire framework m ust be measured in terms of the
urgent need to normalize relations between two roughly equal nuclear powers. D etente, then,
was the Nixon administration's pragmatic response to the traditional concerns as expressed by
Churchill. T he fact th a t Moscow became a major nuclear power did n o t diminish the real

7W inston Churchill, “T he Iron Curtain Dropped by Russia.” S peech reprinted in Thom as G.
Paterson, T h e Origins o f the C old W ar. 2d ed. (London: D .C . H eath and Company, 1974), 12-13.
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concerns of W estern leaders as compared to the imagined concerns of the first generation of
Cold W ar warriors - it simply necessitated a relaxation of tensions.
The detente period of the early 1970s made apparent the shared revulsion toward the
prospect of nuclear war, but it could not lay claim to monopolizing an anti-war atmosphere.
Even NSC-68, the classic American Cold W ar docum ent, deem ed a "preventative" war irrespective of the likelihood of military victory - as "morally corrosive," which "would [bring]
us little if at all closer to victory in the fundam ental ideological conflict."8 T he Soviet American
summits of 1972 and 1973 produced no more eloquent renunciation of war, nor did the leaders
of either country lay any claim th a t the ideological basis of their differences had abated in any
form. A nd of course, the very concept of desiring peace did n o t originate in the Nixon-Brezhnev
detente. The historian John Lewis Gaddis concluded in his classic study, The United States and
the Origins of the Cold War, th at bo th Soviet and A m erican leaders genuinely desired a peace,
but that proved to be incompatible with external situations "beyond the control of either power"
and internal situations th a t created the hostile character of the burgeoning Cold W ar.9 The
same case can be m ade for the Cold W ar as it existed by the early 1970s - especially in the areas
of arms control negotiations, the most significant area of detente.
Based on aspirations toward peace throughout the Cold W ar, both nations had to
grapple, on one hand, w ith the external and uncontrollable reality of the opposing country's
military; on the other, w ith the internal impetus to refuse conceding any meaningful offensive
capability. T o the ex ten t th at the 1970s detente leaders were charting new waters, they were

sN SC -68: U nited States Objectives and Programs o f N ational Security. 14 April 1950.
< http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm > (20 January 2004).
9John Lewis Gaddis, T he U nited States and the Origins o f the C old W ar. 1941-1947 (N ew York:
Columbia University Press, 1972), 361.
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dogged by the same basic contradiction th at defined the whole of Soviet-Am erican relations in
the post-war era. A nd, like the leaders of the late 1940s and early 1950s, eliminating the
atmosphere of hostility betw een the two nations was neither possible, nor particularly desirable.
The Soviet U nion and the U nited States both operated on the premise of waiting out the other's
eventual demise, b u t an im m inent national collapse in the detente period struck neither side as
likely. Beyond continuing measures to ensure the avoidance of nuclear war, the U nited States
and the Soviet U nion perceived detente as essentially a tool of self-interest; a framework to be
exploited and challenged, and, a means ultimately to further the conflict until one side collapsed
after the burden of the others' preponderance became too m uch to bear. W hat the Soviet
Ambassador to the U nited States, Anatoly Dobrynin, concluded of the Nixon/Kissinger strategy
was true of his own bosses as well: "Essentially, neither the president nor his closest aide proved
able (or wanted) to break out of the orbit of the Cold W ar...."10

D etente. Peaceful Coexistence: American and Soviet Perceptions
A policy of relaxed tensions, dictated largely by self-interest, and a com bination of bo th domestic
and foreign objectives,

was bound to result in highly divergent approaches among the

superpowers. As the theorist G. W arren N utter observed, Kissinger's detente strategy aimed to
create a "web of m utual involvem ent and vested interest," albeit in the economic or political
sphere.11 A lthough Kissinger recognized the Soviet U nion as the only nation capable of
threatening America's global position, he regarded the leading Com m unist country as essentially

10A natoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: T he Memoirs o f M oscow ’s Ambassador to Am erica’s Six
Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: Random H ouse, 1995), 195.
n G. W arren N utter, Kissinger’s Grand Design (W ashington, D.C .: A m erican Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1975), 13.
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a pariah among the com munity of nations. His plan was to afford the Soviet U nion more in the
way of economic and political integration (but never to the ex ten t th a t might challenge the
U nited States) so th a t Moscow would have more to lose, and, in turn, become less likely to take
adventurous risks. Richard N ixon recalled his strategy at the 1972 Sum m it in Moscow:
T h e first stage o f d eten te [was] to in volve S o v iet interests in ways th a t w ou ld increase their stake
in in tern ation al stability and th e status quo. T h ere was n o th o u g h t th a t su ch com m ercial,
tech n ical, and scien tific relationships cou ld by th em selves p rev en t co n fro n ta tio n s or wars, but
a t least th ey w ou ld h a v e to be co u n ted in a balance sh ee t o f gains and losses w h en ev er the
S oviets w ere tem p ted to indulge in in tern ational ad v en tu rism .12

In a conflict betw een ideological adversaries, Kissinger and N ixon sought victory over the Soviet
Union by making it more like the U nited States. John K enneth Galbraith, a prom inent scholar,
identified this strategy as "convergence," a policy th a t assumed the inherent rightness of the
industrialized dem ocratic system, which would eventually compel the Soviet U nion to abandon
its ideological pretensions in favor of the more comfortable trappings of capitalism.13
If Soviet leaders were receptive to this strategy, they certainly hid it from public view.
A t the 24th Congress of the CPSU, of M arch 1971, G eneral Secretary Brezhnev introduced his
summary report of the Soviet Union's foreign policy activity, w ith the following declaration:
S ocialism , w h ich is firmly estab lish ed in th e states n o w co n stitu tin g th e w orld socialist system ,
has proved its great viability in the h istorical c o n te st w ith ca p ita lism ....T h e w orld socialist system
has b een m aking a great con trib u tion to th e fulfillm ent o f a task o f su ch v ita l im portance for all
the peoples as th e p reven tion o f another w orld war. It is safe to say th a t m any o f the im perialist
aggressors' plans were frustrated thanks to the ex iste n c e o f the w orld socialist system and its firm
action .

H

12Richard M. N ixon , RN: T h e Memoirs o f Richard N ix o n . 2d ed. (N ew York: Simon & Schuster,
1990), 618.
13Robert C onquest referring to John K enneth Galbraith, as cited in U nited States, Congress,
Senate C om m ittee on G overnm ent Operations, Hearings: International N egotiation (W ashington, D.C.:
G overnment Printing Office, 1970), 19.
i4Leonid I. Brezhnev, speech reprinted in Soviet U nion, D ocum ents o f the 2 4 th Congress o f the
Communist Party of the Soviet U n ion (Moscow: N ovosti Press A gency Publishing House, 1971), 9.
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Brezhnev's statem ent, if taken at face value, offered little in the way of varying interpretations.
Moscow's view of itself at the helm of a global, rising Comm unist m ovem ent left slight, if any,
room for convergence of W estern interests, insofar as having the effect of dam pening the Soviet
ideological position.
In a clearly divergent view from the Americans, the Soviets interpreted the economic
aspect of detente (and, for th at m atter, detente as a whole) as a gamble.

As the political

scientist Lawrence T. Caldwell characterized Moscow’s perspective, detente “implies that
peaceful com petition betw een socialism and pluralist democracies will be resolved in favor of the
former.”15 A lthough the Brezhnev regime generally repudiated the bluster of the Khrushchev
era in favor of more businesslike relations with the W est, there is little evidence to suggest that
Moscow in the detente period lost sight of the fact th a t the Soviet U nion was, as Seweryn Bialer,
an academic specialist of Soviet domestic issues, observed, “C reated to fulfill a mission...to be
a refuge, a bastion, a base of revolution for the whole world.”16 This Soviet mission necessitated
a dynamic interpretation of global events whereby change toward Marxism-Leninism was the
norm. Such a framework stood starkly in contrast to the A m erican status quo vision, in which
nations were to be prevented from “falling” into the Com m unist orbit.

The oppositional

character of Soviet and A m erican foreign policy conceptions was most profoundly exemplified
in the area of arms lim itation. T he fact of nuclear parity left the Americans to advocate
“sufficiency,” or the m aintenance of equal force levels sufficient to ensure mutually assured
destruction, beyond which excess capabilities were considered pointless.

T he Soviets, in

15Lawrence T. Caldwell, Soviet-A m erican Relations: O ne H alf D ecade o f D eten te Problems and
Issues (Paris: A tlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1976), 56.
Seweryn Bialer, “Soviet Foreign Policy: Sources, Perceptions, Trends,” in Seweryn Bialer, ed.,
The Dom estic C ontext o f Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: W estview Press, 1981), 418-19.
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contrast, exhibited little interest in a static nuclear relationship. As one group of experts argued,
“Soviet leaders conceive of national power, including of course military power, mainly in terms
of class struggle, i.e. in terms of the dialectics of political com petition and conflict between
social-political ideologies and systems which are fundam entally and irreconcilably opposed to
each other.”17
The Soviet U nion’s self-perception as the leading custodian and exporter of Comm unist
ideology was n o t limited to its relations with the non-aligned T hird W orld. Vladimir Petrov, a
political scientist, observed th a t whereas the U nited States m aintained one d etente with the
Soviet U nion, Moscow managed several detentes concurrently w ith A m erica’s m ain allies,
including Germany, Canada, Iran, and Japan. Petrov identified this as a dual strategy, to
“accentuate the positive in bilateral relations and benefit from them economically and politically,
while taking full advantage of w hat they see as the existing and developing ‘contradictions in the
imperialist cam p.’”18 For a country th a t assumed an inevitable decay o f Canadian-A m erican
relations, belief in the efficacy of convergence required a leap of faith, indeed. After the fanfare
of the A merican-Soviet Summit of June 1973 had quieted, Pravda emphasized Moscow’s ongoing
foreign policy: “Peaceful coexistence between states w ith different social systems by no means
signifies a recognition of the immutability of capitalism.”19 In a study of Soviet propaganda
techniques, scholars Richard H. Schultz and Roy Godson conclude th a t “negative and
defamatory” characterizations of the U nited States were consistently disseminated, regardless

17Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, and Mose L. Harvey, T h e Role o f N uclear Forces in Current Soviet
Strategy (Miami: C enter for A dvanced International Studies, 1974), 40.
18Vladimir Petrov, U .S .-S o v iet Detente: Past and Future (W ashington, D.C.: American
Enterprise for Public Policy Research, 1975), 26-27.
,9Cited in U nited States, Congress, D etente. 1974, 85.
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of “w hether the W estern allies have perceived East-W est relations to be in a period of Cold W ar
or a period of ‘deten te.’”20
In sum, there is little ground for the argument th a t the Nixon-Brezhnev detente “ended”
the Cold W ar in a sense th a t a period of summitry and production of joint agreements resolved
the basis of the conflict itself. T o be sure, the cooperative framework of this era indicates a
transition from the more confrontational atmosphere in earlier Cold W ar periods. A t most, this
fact is rooted in an ongoing willingness between the superpowers to manage their differences
without resorting to nuclear war - the transition did n o t attem p t to solve the differences
themselves. As a m atter of simple pragmatism, the basic opposition of a status quo verses
revolutionary ideology was largely unresolvable. Each superpower’s d etente strategy reinforced
this fact.

D etente in Historical Perspective
Soviet and Am erican leaders in the early 1970s did n o t invent detente; it had existed in one
form or another since th en birth of the Soviet state. A brief review of the long East-W est
tradition of relaxed tensions emphasizes the importance of interpreting detente in limited terms
- it would be difficult to assess Soviet and American actions, and the Middle East conflict
leading to the Yom Kippur W ar, on the assumption th at detente was somehow a repudiation of
past conflict in favor of a peaceful “new world order”.

T he historical record suggests a

continuation of, rather th an revolution from, the pattern of Soviet-W estern relations from the
O ctober Revolution through the early 1970s.

20Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: A ctive Measures in Soviet Strategy
(W ashington, D.C.: Pergamon Press, 1984), 188.
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A State D epartm ent docum ent, published in 1974, identified the current U.S. policy of
detente, aiming to reduce the risk of war with the Soviet Union, as a “a central foreign policy for
over twenty years," thus dating the movem ent to normalize Soviet-Am erican tensions from the
death of Josef Stalin onward.21 But detente, in policy if not in name, m ust be traced back to V.I.
Lenin’s foreign policy, w hich served (or was at least claimed to have served) as the foundation
for all successive regimes.
Lenin treated the prospect of war with the bourgeois democracies - w hat he called “a
series of frightful collisions” - as a m atter-of-fact historical inevitability. In a report to the
Seventh Congress of the Comm unist Party in M arch 1918, Lenin declared:
In tern ation al im perialism , w ith th e entire m ight o f its capital, w ith its h ighly organized m ilitary
tec h n iq u e...co u ld n o t under any circum stances, or any co n d itio n , live side by sid e w ith the
S o v iet R ep u b lic...it cou ld n o t do so becau se o f com m ercial c o n n e c tio n s o f in tern a tio n a l financial
relations. In this sphere a co n flict is in ev ita b le.22

But Lenin, like his successors, was a pragm atist as well as an ideologue. A fter the Bolshevik
Revolution failed to spark similar proletarian revolutionary upheavals across Europe, Lenin
clarified th a t an inevitable war was n o t necessarily an im m inent one.23 A ccording the Soviet
writers H enry Trofimenko and Pavel Podlesny, Lenin, who understood English, was the first
leader to use the word “coexistence” in a September 1919 interview w ith the Christian Science
Monitor. T he following year, the Kremlin declared,

21U nited States, Departm ent o f State, The M eaning o f D eten te, Publication N o. 8766, 1974, 5.
V.I. Lenin, “Report on W ar and Peace.” Speech delivered to the Seventh Congress o f the
Comm unist Party on 7 March, 1918. Reprinted in Robert C. Tucker, T h e Lenin A nthology (N ew York:
W .W . N orton & Company, 1975), 542.
23Graham D. Vernon, “C ontrolled Conflict: Soviet Perceptions o f Peaceful C oexistence," in
Graham D. V em on , ed., Soviet Perceptions o f W ar and Peace (W ashington, D.C.: N ational Defense
University Press, 1981), 114-
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O ur slogan has b een and rem ains the same: p eaceful c o e x iste n c e w ith o th er g overn m en ts, n o
m atter w h at they are. R eality itself has led us an d o th er states to find it necessary to establish
lasting relations b etw e en th e w orker-and-peasant g o v ern m en t an d cap italist g overn m en ts.24

S tephen W hite, an historian, identified the G enoa Conference of 1922 as the first
attem pt to normalize W estern-Soviet relations. W estern opinion generally interpreted the
Soviets’ New Economic Policy, launched in 1921, as a sign “th a t a more moderate and
acceptable form of politics would gradually emerge in its place.”25 British Prime M inister David
Lloyd George predicted th a t the Russians would follow the course of the French Revolution.
Like the French, Lloyd George assumed that internal stability and a relaxation of tensions with
other nations would eventually replace the revolutionary fervor of a five-year-old government.
The United States, which would not establish diplomatic relations w ith Moscow until 1933, sent
Ambassador to Rome R.W. Child only as an unofficial observer. Georgy Vassilievich Chicherin,
the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, advocated industrial and agricultural cooperation
between Russian and other G reat Powers.26 Such cooperation was n o t a m atter of choice for the
Soviets, b u t a necessity. By 1922, world wide socialist revolution was proving to be a more
difficult process th an the Bolsheviks had anticipated. Peaceful coexistence with the W est not
only offset the “series of frightful collisions” th at Lenin had predicted - it was also used as an
essential prop to the Com m unist government, which had to worry about its own survival before
directing liberation movements elsewhere.

24V.I. Lenin, as cited in Henry Trofimenko and Pavel Podlesny, U S S R -U S A : Lessons o f Peaceful
Coexistence: Fifty-Five Years o f Soviet-A m erican Diplomatic Relations (Moscow: N ovosti Press Agency
Publishing, 1988), 11.
25Stephen W hite, T he Origins o f Detente: T h e G enoa C onference and Soviet-W estern Relations,
1921-1922 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 97.
26Evgeny Chossudovsky, “G enoa Revisited: Russia and C oexisten ce,” Foreign Affairs 50, April
1972, 557.
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Eugene V. Rostow, an Undersecretary of State in the Lyndon Johnson administration,
characterized President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s diplomatic recognition of the Soviet U nion as
the first detente betw een the two nations,27 although the years preceding the outbreak of W orld
W ar II failed to produce any significant normalization of relations which in fact became strained
to the point of collapse after the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. The AmericanSoviet alliance, a result of H itler’s attack on Russia and his declaration of war on the U nited
States following the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, clearly spoke to the ability of a common
enemy to bring adversaries together. The shared Nazi m enace was responsible for what was
arguably the warmest American-Soviet dialogue of the entire history of relations between the
two countries.
W endell Willkie, special representative to President Roosevelt during W orld W ar II,
issued a report on Soviet affairs, titled “O ur Ally, Russia,” which he included in his wartime
travelogue, One World. H e wrote admiringly of both the Soviet war m achine and the Russian
character. H e com m ented th a t all the authorities offered him full access to inspect schools,
farms, and factories, and allowed private interviews with randomly selected citizens. Willkie
empathized with the courageous plight of the Red Army, the survival instincts of the peasants,
and the efficiency of the collective farms. Stalin, whom Wilkie m et on two occasions, struck him
as “a hard man, perhaps even a cruel man, but a very able one.” Willkie concluded of the Soviet
leader, “There is no reason to be cautious. He is one of the significant m en of this generation.”
Willkie was genuinely moved by his experiences in Russia. Perhaps sensing a likely hostile
relationship betw een the U nited States and the Soviet U nion in the future, Willkie ended his

27

Eugene V . Rostow, as cited in American Bar A ssociation, D etente: A Law Professor W orkshop
(W ashington, D.C.: A m erican Bar A ssociation Press, 1976), 3-4.
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report: “No, we do not need to fear Russia. W e need to learn to work w ith her against our
common enemy: Hitler. W e need to learn to work w ith her in th e world after the war. For
Russia is a dynamic country, a vital new society, a force th a t cannot be bypassed in any future
world .” 28
The N ational Council of American-Soviet Friendship echoed Willkie’s sentiments at the
popular level. Two “friendship rallies,” held at a crowded M adison Square G arden in 1944 and
1945, hosted many speakers who delivered “peace speeches,” including one titled “N o Third
W orld W ar” from Soviet Ambassador to the U nited States (and future Foreign Minister) A ndrei
Gromyko. Gromyko characterized wartime Soviet-American relations as only a starting point for
future “durable bonds... in the interests of the preservation of general peace and prosperity of the
peoples . ”29 Joseph E. Davies, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, warned th a t peace with
Russia m ust be preserved, otherwise “civilization would be set back hundreds of years, if it
survived at all. ”30

T h en Under-Secretary of State D ean A cheson called for increased

understanding and com m unication between the two countries, whose differences must be
mitigated by the “overwhelming desire for m utual understanding . ”31
O f course, a lasting m om entum of Soviet-American friendship was contingent upon
ongoing Germ an and Japanese aggression, whose actions had temporarily eclipsed the pre
existing animosity between the U nited States and the Soviet Union. As the presidential
historian Robert Dallek pointed out, “The Soviet regime of 1939 th a t outraged us by signing the

28W endell L W illkie, O n e W orld (N ew York: Simon and Schuster, 1943), 50-87.
29Andrei Gromyko, “N o Third W orld W ar.” Speech reprinted in U .S .A .-U .S .S .R .. Nations
U nited for Victory. Peace and Prosperity (New York: N ational C ouncil o f A m erican-Soviet Friendship,
1945), 25.
30Joseph E. Davies, “Mutual C onfidence for Security.” Speech reprinted in ibid., 22.
31

D ean A ch eson , “Problems o f Security and Understanding.” Speech reprinted in ibid., 15.
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Nazi-Soviet pact was precisely the same as th at in w hich we came to discern so many virtues
during the war . ”32 John Lewis Gaddis observed, “Through a curious kind of illogic the Russians’
vigorously successful resistence to H itler purified them ideologically in the eyes of the
Americans . ” 33
Yet d etente never suffered a total collapse. From 1947 until Stalin’s death in 1953 w hat is generally considered the height of the Cold W ar - d etente was on hiatus just as the
Soviet-American en ten te during W orld W ar II greatly shadowed the two nations’ m utual
hostility. T he historian W illiam Taubm an identified the period of January 1946 to April 1947
(at least as far as Stalin was concerned) as a detente in transition. In early 1946, the U nited
States and the Soviet U nion remained allies, but growing tensions in this year and a half period
were clearly intensifying toward Cold W ar. Taubm an referred to Soviet-Am erican relations
during this time as dem onstrating the basic characteristics of detente: “A m oderate am ount of
tension plus a good deal of negotiation, all w ithin the context of w hat the Soviets, at least,
regarded as inevitable, ongoing com petition . ”34 Taubm an emphasized his description of this
detente period by noting the intensity of its negotiations as compared to the later detente:
“Richard N ixon would hail detente as a transition from confrontation to renegotiation. But the
1970s had nothing on 1946 w hen it came to time spent at the negotiating table . ”35
By early 1947, U.S. foreign policy, as embodied in the T rum an Doctrine, enacted major
increases in military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey. As the Cold W ar scholar

32Robert D allek, “H ow W e See the Soviets,” in Mark Garrison and A bbot Gleason, eds., Shared
Destiny: Fifty Years o f Soviet-A m erican Relations (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 85.
33Gaddis, T he U nited States and the Origins o f the C old W ar. 33.
34W illiam Taubm an, Stalin’s American Policy: From Entente to D eten te to Cold W ar (N ew York:
W .W . N orton &. Company, 1982), 128.
35Ibid„ 159.
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Thomas G. Paterson observed, “T he doctrine assumed th at eastern Europe was already lost to
the Soviet U nion,” and th a t the major countries on Russia’s southwest flank - Iran, Greece and
Turkey - “were to be drawn into the U nited States’ sphere of influence . ” 36 The strategy of
C ontainm ent helped to move American-Soviet relations from a shaky period of postwar detente
to one of Cold W ar. If Stalin’s February 9, 1946, election speech, in which he called on the
Soviet U nion to militarize in preparation for another global conflict, heralded the Cold W ar, the
Trum an Doctrine made it operational .37 Soviet and American leaders made no significant efforts
to return to detente until 1953, after Stalin’s death and the armistice in Korea.
In a speech delivered in 1969 to the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, international relations expert William E. Griffith characterized the whole of East-West
relations: “International detente has often been interrupted b u t has basically continued since
1953.1,38 O nce freed from the terror and cult of Stalin’s personality, the new Soviet leaders
wasted little time in making overtures to the U nited States. O n M arch 9, 1953, four days after
Stalin’s death, Soviet Prime M inister Georgii M alenkov called for the “possibility of a lasting
coexistence and peaceful com petition between the two different systems . ”39 M alenkov also
advocated increased domestic production of consumer goods, and significantly muffled the
Soviet U nion’s traditional call for proletarian revolutions abroad. T he Soviets’ successful test
of a hydrogen bomb, announced on August 8 , 1953, undoubtedly supplied Malenkov, and First

36Thom as G. Paterson, Soviet-A m erican Confrontation: Postwar R econstruction and the Origins
o f the Cold W ar (Baltimore: T he Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 174.
37W alter LaFeber, America. Russia, and the Cold W ar. 1945-1966 (N ew York: John W iley and
Sons, 1967), 30.
38W illiam E. Griffith and W alt W . Rostow, East-W est Relations: Is D eten te Possible?
(W ashington, D.C.: A m erican Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969), 1.
39Loth, Overcom ing the Cold W ar. 19.
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Party Secretary N ikita Khrushchev, with the confidence necessary to enact these significant
reforms . 40
The Geneva Conference of July, 1955, represented the first significant step toward
detente for the U nited States, bo th at the popular and political level. Joseph M cCarthy’s
Com m unist w itch-hunt had subsided by the end of 1954, and U.S. policy toward Moscow
became more flexible as a result. Richard W . Stevenson, an historian, explained Eisenhower’s
response: “W hile the frenzy of McCarthyism had blinded Americans to the changes th a t had
been occurring since 1953, it was the excesses of M cCartyhism th a t forced Americans to reassess
their views in 1955. It was this reassessment th at persuaded Eisenhower to explore alternatives
to the stalemate in the Cold W ar and helped him politically to do so .”41 A lthough the “spirit of
G eneva,” as the conference came to be known, failed to produce any significant changes in the
Cold W ar system, bo th the American and Soviet delegations concluded talks by affirming their
com m itm ent to peace. A W hite House statem ent on the G eneva Conference declared, “The
President expressed the belief th at the outstanding feature of the m eeting was apparently sincere
desire expressed by the Soviet delegation to discuss world problems in th e future in an
atmosphere of friendliness and a willingness to sit down together to work out differences . . . . ”42
By 1956, K hrushchev’s de-Stalinization program was well underway. T he General
Secretary believed th a t the potential of therm onuclear war necessitated a fundam ental
reorientation of Lenin’s foreign policy. W hereas early Soviet doctrine regarded war with the

40LaFeber, America. Russia, and the Cold War. 148-149.
41Richard W . Stevenson, T he Rise and Fall o f D etente: Relaxations o f T ension in U .S .-S o v iet
Relations, 1953-1984 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 37.
42Dwight D . Eisenhower, as cited in U nited States, President, Public Papers o f the Presidents of
the U nited States: D w ight D . Eisenhower (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1956), 728.
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bourgeois industrial nations as inevitable ( if n o t necessarily im m inent), the idea of global
nuclear holocaust dictated th a t such a conflict was unacceptable. Yet the Marxism-Leninism
ideological com ponent - always central to Soviet d etente policies toward the U nited States remained intact. As the scholar Fred W arner N eal theorized, the new Soviet policy held:
T h e therm onu clear n ature o f m odern was su ch th a t n o so ciety w o u ld escap e destruction; and
com m u n ism co u ld n o t possible b e built o n the ruins o f w h at, if an yth ing, w ould be left.
T herefore, a void an ce o f therm onuclear w as n o t o n ly possible, b u t in order to insure th e final
trium ph o f com m un ism , essen tial.43

A lthough anything approaching Soviet-American nuclear parity would not be achieved
until the late 1960s, K hrushchev’s characteristic embellishment of Soviet capabilities held that
W estern aggression had become deterable, and, as a result, the Soviet U nion could continue its
support of Socialist revolutions around the globe .44 T hus was created the Soviet policy of
peaceful coexistence in its m odern form.
The C uban Missile Crisis, by far the most tense episode of the Cold W ar, actually proved
to be a boon to the detente process. As the Kennedy A dm inistration enjoyed its “victory” after
the Soviets backed down from the naval blockade standoff, Moscow dem onstrated, as far as the
Americans were concerned, th a t it could act rationally during crisis situations. Additionally,
Kennedy’s hardline strategy during the showdown furnished him w ith the domestic credentials
necessary to pursue d etente - a policy at once urgently needed and seemingly attainable, due
to the intensity of the crisis, and its peaceful conclusion, respectively .45
T he Limited Test Ban Treaty, certified betw een th e U nited States, Britain and the

43Fred W arner N eal, as cited in U nited States, Congress, T he C old War: Origins and
D evelopm ents. 1971, 175.
44David Holloway, T h e Soviet U nion and the Arms Race (N ew Haven: Yale University Press,
1983), 84.
45Stevenson, T he Rise and Fall o f D eten te. 138-139.
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Soviet U nion on O ctober 10, 1963, represented the first significant step by the nuclear powers
to avoid a repeat of anything like the Cuban crisis. Like the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty, signed in 1972, the earlier Test Ban Treaty aimed to reduce tensions through indirect
means. In an April 12,1963, interview w ith the Saturday Review, K hrushchev reasoned, “After
Cuba, there was a real chance for bo th the Soviet U nion and th e n U nited States to take
measures together th a t would advance the peace by easing tensions. T he one area on which I
thought we were closest to agreement was nuclear testing . . . . ”46
Kennedy’s famous com m encem ent address at A m erican University on June 10 aimed
to break the deadlock on the test ban negotiations. T he President declared: “Today, should
total war ever break out again - no m atter how - our two countries would become the primary
targets. It is an ironical but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most
danger of devastation.” Kennedy agreed with Khrushchev - a test ban on nuclear weapons was
the one feasible area of arms control th at would help relax tensions betw een the superpowers.
“The conclusion of such a treaty,” Kennedy said, “so near and yet so far - would check the
spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas . ”47 K ennedy’s speech, especially his
m ention of the grievous losses sustained by Russia during W orld W ar II, elicited a positive
response from Khrushchev, who offered a limited ban on nuclear testing in outer space and
under w ater in a speech delivered in East Berlin on July 2,1963.48 Intense negotiations, with W.
Averell Harrim an leading the A m erican team, produced the docum ent titled “Treaty: Banning

46G lenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy. Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley: University o f California
Press, 1981), 180.
47John F. Kennedy, as cited in U nited States, President, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the
U nited States: Tohn F. Kennedy (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing O ffice, 1964), 462.
48Harland B. M oulton, From Superiority to Parity: The U nited States and the Strategic Arms
Race, 1961-1971 (London: G reenwood Press, 1973), 129.
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Nuclear W eapon Tests in Atmosphere, in O uter Space and U nderw ater” signed in Moscow on
August 5, 1963. T he Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements of the following
decade could n o t claim a loftier goal than that offered by the T est Ban Treaty. T he second
paragraph read,
Proclaim ing as their [U .S ., U .K ., and U .S .S .R . governm ents] principal aim th e sp eed iest possible
a ch ie v em en t o f an agreem en t o n general and co m p lete d isarm am ent under strict in tern ational
con trol in accord an ce w ith the objectives o f the U n ite d N a tio n s w h ich w ould put an en d to the
arm am ents race and elim inate the in cen tiv e to th e p rod uction and testin g o f all kinds o f
w eap ons, in clu d in g n uclear w ea p o n s....49

Secretary of Defense Robert M cNamara was able to convince a skeptical Senate th a t the treaty
in no way represented a softening of U.S. nuclear strategy and superiority. M cNam ara declared,
“W e are determ ined to m aintain th at superiority. In order to achieve it, we m aintain a total
number of nuclear warheads, tactical as well as strategic, in the tens of thousands . ”50 As
M cNamara’s testimony makes clear, the Test Ban Treaty would not actually impede global
nuclear proliferation. U nderground testing was not included in the agreement; France and
China refused to sign the treaty; and, as the German historian Wilffied Loth observed, advances
in nuclear technology would find increasingly novel m ethods of testing weapons . 51
In 1964, the Soviets began development for an ABM shield around Moscow and Russia’s
western border. M cNam ara immediately recognized th a t the missile shield would create another
arms race - largely w hat the T est Ban Treaty, if only in name, was designed to curtail. The only
concrete success th at came as a result of the treaty’s enforcem ent was environm ental - after

49T he T est Ban Treaty is reprinted in U nited States, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Third A nnual Report to Congress, January 1, 1963-D ecem ber 31, 1963, 33.
50Robert McNamara, as cited in U nited States, Congress, Senate, C om m ittee on Foreign
Relations, N uclear T est Ban Treaty. Hearings before the C om m ittee o n Foreign R elations. 8 8 th Cong., 1st
sess., 1963, 97.
51Loth, O vercom ing the Cold War. 77.

October, 1963, the level of radioactive pollutants in the atmosphere decreased. Nonetheless,
the treaty was an im portant first step in the history of nuclear diplomacy, and in conjunction
with the J une 20 m em orandum establishing a direct com munications link betw een Moscow and
W ashington, D.C., the summer before Kennedy’s assassination dem onstrated a shared resolve
of both superpowers to improve their crisis m anagem ent capabilities. Both Kennedy and British
Prime M inister H arold M acmillan considered the Test Ban T reaty a great achievem ent of their
respective term s . 52
K ennedy’s assassination effectively ended the tacit detente th at had been building since
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, directed his efforts toward
the G reat Society reforms and the American military engagem ent in the V ietnam conflict, which
was quickly transforming from “C ontainm ent in action” to fiasco.

Stanley Hoffmann

characterized Soviet-Am erican relations between 1964-1968 as “years of rather m uted
C ontainm ent of Moscow and limited accommodation. O ne could perhaps speak of a de facto
detente, a detente more improvised than thought through . ”53 This fact was best exemplified by
the impromptu Glassboro, New Jersey summit of 1967, where Prime M inister Alexei Kosygin
and Johnson m et on cordial, if shallow, terms. Ambassador Dobrynin concluded of the summit,
“T he fact th a t the Glassboro Summit seemed to yield no concrete results can...be explained by
its sudden genesis; having been arranged with so little preparation it could hardly be expected
to make significant advances .”54 Johnson framed the goals of his presidency in domestic terms,

52Seaborg, Kennedy. Khrushchev and the Test Ban. 282.
53Stanley Hoffm ann, “D eten te,” in Joseph S. N ye, Jr., ed., T he Making o f Am erica’s Soviet Policy
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 234-235.
54A natoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: The Memoirs o f M oscow ’s Ambassador to Am erica’s Six
Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (N ew York: Random H ouse, 1995), 167.
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and he intended th a t he would continue the policies of his hero, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in the
form of the G reat Society. But th a t “bitch of a war,” Johnson’s telling nicknam e for the Vietnam
conflict, sapped A m erican resources and his domestic credibility alike .55 T o the extent that
Johnson’s adm inistration kept a wary eye on Comm unist expansion, A m erican officials looked
to China and the rising tide of the Cultural Revolution. It was n o t until two years after Richard
N ixon’s election th a t he and H enry Kissinger linked Moscow, Beijing, and Vietnam , thus shifting
a linked Soviet-Am erican detente to the forefront of international affairs.

New Leaders. New D etente
The fall of N ikita K hrushchev in O ctober 1964, and subsequent accession to power by Leonid
Brenzhnev and Alexsei Kosygin - First Secretary of the C entral Com m ittee and Chairm an of
the Council of Ministers, respectively - did not result in any significant foreign policy changes
of the Soviet Union.

W hile Khrushchev’s ouster resulted principally from his failed

brinkmanship in Cuba, the new leaders in Moscow emphasized th a t the “palace coup” would not
be accompanied by reinvigorated hardline policies. Ambassador Dobrynin was dispatched to the
W hite House on O ctober 16 to inform President Johnson of the planned continuation of
Moscow’s policy toward the U nited States .56 In th a t early juncture, the Soviet U nion was totally
unprepared for change - bo th Brezhnev and Kosygin were am ateurs in the foreign policy realm,
which remained in the hands of Foreign Minister A ndrei Gromyko. In 1966, Gromyko issued
a foreign policy report to the Politburo which reiterated the basic detente policy th at had been

55Bruce J. Schulm an, Lyndon B. lohnson and A m erican Liberalism: A Brief Biography with
D ocum ents (Boston: St. M artin’s Press, 1995), 125-152. Schulm an’s chapter o n V ietnam offers a good
explanation as to why Johnson was distracted from other concerns.
56Dobrynin, In C onfidence. 128.
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in place since 1956. He called for a “m uch greater scope” in the “Soviet-Am erican dialogue”
and for socialism’s peaceful victory in the long run: “T he concentration of our m ain efforts on
the domestic purposes is fully in line with Lenin’s statem ent th a t the final victory of socialism
over capitalism will be ensured by the creation of a new, m uch higher level of labor
productivity .” 57
As the Cold W ar expert Foy Kohler argued, Brezhnev’s conception of peaceful
coexistence, as influenced at the beginning of his tenure by Gromyko, was a continuation of
Lenin’s own proclamation of peaceful coexistence, with the noted emphasis on economic, rather
than military, measures to achieve Moscow’s final goal.58 Soviet President Nikolai Podgomy’s
toast to N ixon during the 1972 Moscow Summit exemplified this longstanding approach:
A s far b ack as in th e early years o f the you ng S o v ie t states, its foun der V .I. L enin su bstan tiated
the ob jective n eed ed for and possibility o f p eaceful co e x iste n c e o f co u n tries w ith d ifferent social
system s. T oday, as before, the S o v iet U n io n is prepared to d ev elo p and d eep en relations o f
business coop eration and m utually b en eficia l ties w ith states o f a different social system .59

In a more candid m om ent, Podgorny might have added, “in order to observe their eventual
destruction.”
T he State D epartm ent under N ixon also emphasized Am erica’s long history of detente,
noting th at any substantive changes in detente policy in the early 1970s were of an operational,
as opposed to strategic or ideological, nature. A rthur A. H artm an, the Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs, noted th at from 1933 to 1974 the A m erican and Soviet governments
signed a total of 105 agreements, of which 58 took place since 1969, and of those, 41 since

57A ndrei Gromyko, as cited in Loth, Overcoming the C old War, 84.
58Foy Kohler, as cited in U nited States, Congress, D eten te. 1974, 70.
59N ikolai Podgorny, as cited in U nited States, President, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the
U nited States: Richard M. N ix o n (W ashington, D.C.; G overnm ent Printing O ffice, 1973), 168.
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1 9 7 2 60

W alter Laqueur characterized this trend as the latest - and clearly the most

comprehensive - period of detente, which nonetheless had yet to achieve a cohesive policy .61
As the scholars G ordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George observed, the intensity of the early
1970s detente m ust be understood in light of N ixon and Kissinger’s highly ambitious goal of
developing a new international system. Nixon and Kissinger believed th a t the Soviet Union
would remain the principal threat to the U nited States, b u t the growing rift betw een Moscow
and Beijing could be exploited by pursuing detente w ith b o th C om m unist nations over an
extended period of tim e .62 T he implications of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy - especially in the
context of understanding Soviet and American actions in the Yom Kippur W ar - are twofold.
First, the “new international system” assured an ongoing conflict w ith the Soviet Union; second,
the benefits to be derived from the expanded conception of d etente would be apparent only in
the long term. In other words, the new international system was still in its infancy by O ctober
1973, and the peace the U nited States sought to achieve rem ained very m uch a hypothetical
possibility up to th a t time.
In 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird emphasized this point: Soviet and American
differences, he said, “are rooted in a conflict of world interest and differing perceptions of how
those interests should be protected and forwarded. W e cannot eliminate these differences
overnight. W e probably cannot eliminate them in your lifetime or m ine . ”63 By 1977, detente

60Arthur A . Hartman, as cited in U nited States, Congress, D eten te. 1974, 48.
61W alter Laqueur, as cited in U nited States, Congress, Senate, C om m ittee on Governm ent
Operations, Hearings: N egotiation and Statecraft (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1973),

2.
62Gordon A . Craig and A lexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: D iplom atic Problems o f Our
Tim e (New York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1983), 132-133.
63M elvin R. Laird, T he N ixon D octrine (W ashington, D.C.: A m erican Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1972), 6.
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had lost most of the luster attached to it during the N ixon adm inistration, and an American Bar
Association pam phlet aptly reflected the prevailing mood: “D etente, stripped down to its
coexistence essence, is hardly a n otch above an undertaking to attem p t to adjust superpower
differences through negotiation .”64
A limited interpretation of detente is thus necessitated by the fact of an ambiguity
inherent to the Nixon-Kissinger strategy. W hatever their long term goals, Soviet-American
relations in the early 1970s remained steeped in a Cold W ar setting, w hat Fred W arner Neal
described as a m utual goal toward “negative coexistence,” or the process by which b o th countries
could “reach an agreement about w hat n o t to do. This is the primary task of statesmanship for
the m om ent - no t to produce an ideal world b u t to insure as far as possible th a t there will be a
world .”65 In light of this m ost basic determ inant, detente inhibited superpower com petition in
the Third W orld only insofar as it threatened to create a crisis situation th a t could potentially
become nuclear. In less tense circumstances, detente actually encouraged the competition. As
Roger E. Kanet, a scholar, interpreted the Soviet objective, detente
provides an en v iro n m en t in w h ich th e forces o f reaction , b o th in th e W e s t an d th e T h ird W orld,
w ill gradually w eak en . D e te n te is n o t v iew ed by th e S o v ie t leadersh ip as a prelude to a period
in w h ich coop eration , rather th an con flict, w ill characterize th e basic relations b etw e en th e tw o
superpowers and their allies.66

In other words, the Soviets rejected the American d eten te strategy aimed at forcing Moscow
to abandon its interests in the Third W orld in favor of de facto acceptance of the existing world
order. As Raymond Garthoff, a formet arms control expert, noted, the Soviet counter-strategy

64A m erican Bar A ssociation, D etente: A Law Professor W orkshop. 38.
65Fred Warner N eal, as cited in U nited States, Congress, T he C old W ar. 1971, 171.
66Roger E. Kanet, Soviet Foreign Policy and East-W est Relations (N ew York: Pergamon Press,
1982), 42.
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of detente was essentially the same as the Nixon-Kissinger model, only in “reverse mirror
reflection,” whereby Moscow aimed to prod W ashington into acceptance of a new world no
longer under A m erican global predominance.
In the Soviet framework, the fact of strategic parity w ith the U nited States shattered the
status quo, and by extension, furthered the legitimacy of Marxism-Leninism on a global scale .67
Because the Soviet U nion and U nited States based their d etente strategies on these highly
divergent assumptions, H elm ut Sonnenfeldt, a m ember of the N ational Security Council in the
N ixon administration, argued for the word “d etente” to be banished from the Am erican political
lexicon in favor of the phrase “m anagement of the emergence of Soviet power.” For political
purposes, the phrase was m uch clumsier than “d etente,” b u t Sonnenfeldt believed th a t it would
more accurately reflect the ongoing American-Soviet conflict, and emphasize the importance
of crisis m anagem ent w hen the Soviets decided to dem onstrate their power .68
These interpretive differences of detente at the politico-strategic level in no way negated
real gains in detente in other areas. As Marshall Shulm an argued, detente was a “multi-level
relationship, and the m ovem ents on the various planes on w hich th e two nations now interact
are not always in the same direction.” Along with the politico-strategic level, Shulm an identified
the plane of “functional cooperation” as a major com ponent of d eten te .69 T he Soviet writers
Henry Trofimenko and Pavel Podlesny echoed Shulm an’s point: “T he discords stemming from
the differences betw een the two countries’ interdependence is just as im portant, and so are the

67Raymond L. Garthoff, D eten te and Confrontation: A m erican-Soviet Relations From N ixon to
Reagan (W ashington, D.C.: T he Brookings Institution, 1985), 33-38.
68H elm ut Sonnenfeldt, as cited in American Bar Association, Confrontation in the U S-U SSR
Relationship: Can It Be Managed? A Law Professor W orkshop (N ew York: A m erican Bar A ssociation
Press, 1978), 2
69Marshall D. Shulm an, “Toward a W estern Philosophy o f C oexistence," Foreign Affairs 52
(October 1973) 36.
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factors th a t make it indispensable to promote contacts and cooperation betw een the two powers
and the two peoples . ”70 T he idea was th at detente was n o t a m onolith, and there was no
necessary contradiction between im portant gains made in cooperation in non-strategic areas, and
deadlock over arms lim itation treaties and com petition in the T hird W orld.
The Nixon-Brezhnev detente secured concrete gains in several areas in the plane of
functional cooperation. In the business realm, the Congressional removal of th e “Most Favored
N ation” ban on the Soviet U nion was a necessary condition for several agreements, including
settlem ent of the Lend-Lease debt, left over from W orld W ar II, increased trade between the
two nations, and Soviet access to low-interest Export-Import bank credits . 71 In July, 1969,
Apollo

8

C om m ander Colonel Frank Borman took a nine-day tour of the Soviet U nion and

exchanged pleasantries with many Soviet officials. President Podgorny remarked th at a "blip had
appeared on the U.S.-Soviet friendship screen" - clearly the A m erican anxiety caused by the
launching of Sputnik was a thing of the past . 72 A report commissioned in 1989 by the United
States Institute of Peace concluded th a t Soviet-American cooperation in areas including health
research, technological exchange, space exploration, and environm ental protection, all
contributed to a very real detente th a t served as a m oderating influence on the Cold W ar .73
Shulman's term of functional cooperation is especially apt; for the non-strategic aspect
of detente, namely peaceful exchange, reflected the m utual desire for cooperation between two

?0Henry T rofim enko and Pavel Podlesny, U S S R -U S A : Lessons o f Peaceful C oexistence: FiftyFive Years o f Soviet-A m erican D iplom atic Relations (Moscow: N ovosti Press A gency Publishing, 1988), 36.
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powerful nations irrespective of the ongoing Cold W ar. T he shortcomings of both superpowers
in their attem pts to relax tensions in the areas of arms proliferation and global political influence,
i.e. the real issues of the Cold W ar, do not contradict the success of d etente in the functional
realm - these areas were n o t necessarily interdependent. Finally, even if the whole of detente
can be judged as only partially successful, alternative policies were not necessarily viable. Henry
Kissinger characterized the detente policies he and N ixon had established: "The quest for
peaceful coexistence clearly had its perils, it did n o t follow th at a crusading policy of
confrontation would prove more successful."74 T he former Secretary of State was answering the
many critics of the U nited States policy of detente. His reasoning could have served the Soviet
architects of coexistence as well.

D etente and A dventure
Henry Kissinger explained in his memoirs the necessity of his hardline policy against the Soviet
Union: "If Moscow is prevented by a firm W estern policy from deflecting its internal tensions
into international crises, it is likely to find only disillusionment in the boast th a t history is on its
side ."75 Moscow's hum an rights record serves as a useful gauge for measuring domestic tensions.
In Kissinger's conception, fomenting crises abroad was a release valve for th a t tension, and the
impetus to divert attention away from domestic problems was strong indeed. O ne of the major
communiques issued in the detente era, the "Basic Principles of M utual Relations Between the
U nited States of Am erica and U nion of Soviet Socialist Republics," signed in Moscow on May
29, 1972 (henceforth referred to as the BP A, which will be further exam ined later in this

74Henry A , Kissinger, W hite House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 1256.
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chapter), affirmed:
T h e U S A an d U S S R h a v e a special responsibility, as do o th e r co u n tries, w ith the perm anent
m em bers o f th e U n ite d N a tio n s Security C o u n cil, to d o ev ery th in g in their pow er so that
con flicts or situ ation s w ill n o t arise w h ich w ou ld serve to in crea se in tern ation al ten sion s.
A ccord ingly, th ey w ill seek to prom ote co n d itio n s in w h ich all co u n tries w ill live in p eace and
security and w ill n o t be su bject to outside interference in their in tern al affairs.76

T he simple calculus of this statem ent holds th at the superpowers had a m utual and overriding
interest and responsibility in m aintaining global stability, which itself was a crucial determ inant
in avoiding nuclear war. In other words, detente precluded w hatever benefits either superpower
stood to gain by aiding or creating regional instability. A broad interpretation of this principle
would effectively condem n arms proliferation in superpower-client relations and political
meddling in sovereign states. Thus, the BPA, viewed in this light, expressed the m utual desire
to eliminate the competitive nature of the Cold W ar.
T he actual policies of the Soviet U nion exposed the hollow m eaning of the BPA for two
reasons. First, a central ten et of Marxism-Leninism required destruction of the status-quo;
indeed, there would have been little operational value of the ideology w ithout its disruptive
component.

Second, as Kissinger argued, Moscow also exploited international crises for the

decidedly non-ideological purpose of deflecting attention from its own internal problems. These
factors explain how, contrary to a literal interpretation of the BPA, Moscow saw in detente an
opportunity to pursue a very different policy.

T he fact of the Soviets' growing nuclear power

since the time of K hrushchev created m utual deterrence, o u t of which grew detente. In the
Soviet view, nuclear power was the master of detente - n o t the other way around. As the
scholar A lbert W eeks observed,

76T he BPA is reprinted in Richard P. Stebbins, and Elaine P. Adams, eds., A m erican Foreign
Relations. 1972: A D ocum entary Record (New York: N ew York University Press, 1975), 76.
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D eterren ce o p en ed up n ew a v en u es for revolu tionary agitation an d for exp ortin g rev o lu tio n to
T hird W orld 'nations’ bourgeoisies struggling against colonialism .' P recisely b eca u se o f the fear
o f an ou tb reak o f therm onuclear war, 'wars o f n a tio n a l liberation' (local wars) h ave b ecom e
feasible b ecau se the superpowers w ould be lo a th to esca la te su ch wars in to w orld co n flic ts.77

A dam Ulam, an historian, identified Soviet support for "wars o f national liberation" as the
theater in which Moscow attem pted to gather global prestige and eventually emerge victorious
in the Cold War:
A lth o u g h th ey are d eterm in ed to p revent the outb reak o f a m ajor war, S o v ie t leaders seem as
yet in sufficien tly aware o f the n eed to e v o lv e tech n iq u es for p reven tin g sm all crises from
escalatin g in to m ajor o n es. O n the contrary, they see su ch sm all crises as offering opportunities
for th e S o v ie t U n io n to im prove its diplom atic pow er and p o sitio n .78

As the political scientist W alter Laqueur noted, "wars of national liberation are no t covered...by
the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence, for they are considered progressive wars which ought
to be supported ."79 Professor Laqueur's statem ent raises two m ajor implications: 1)MarxismLeninism and detente were in some ways incompatible, and 2) the Soviets cosigned a major
detente agreement th a t included principles which ran counter to Moscow's basic foreign policy.
Brezhnev himself outlined the paradox of detente and national self-interest in his Foreign Policy
Report of the 24th Party Congress:
W e d eclare that w hile con sisten tly pursuing its policy o f p eace an d friend sh ip am ong nation s,
th e S o v iet U n io n w ill co n tin u e to co n d u ct a resolute struggle against im perialism , and firmly to
rebuff th e ev il d esigns and subversions o f aggressors. A s in th e past, w e sh all give u nd eviatin g
support to th e people's struggle for dem ocracy, n atio n a l liberation an d socialism .80

As Moscow's "undeviating support" was in fact checked before tensions reached a point that

77W eeks, T he O ther Side o f C oexistence, 241.
78A dam U lam , as cited in U nited States, Congress, Senate, C om m ittee o n G overnm ent
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would risk an A m erican response. As Stanley Hoffmann, a scholar of international relations,
argued, the period of relaxed tensions allowed the Soviets increased latitude for provocation .81
W ith the possible exception of Southeast Asia, no region in the world received greater amounts
of Soviet weaponry th a n the N orthern Arab states. In public, Moscow couched this support in
terms of fraternal socialism, b u t privately based its decisions in terms of enhanced self-interest.
(This topic will be further discussed in chapter 3).
Fred Schulman, a nuclear scientist, asserted th a t deten te “perm itted the Soviet U nion
to incite the O ctober W ar ."82 This was perhaps oversimplified, b u t nonetheless gets at the heart
of the very different modes of detente principles and practices. T o be sure, the U nited States did
not sacrifice international interests for detente, either - the events of 1973, in Chile, speak to
this fact.

A nd, in the Middle East, the U nited States supported its client Israel no less

enthusiastically th an Moscow's influence policies attem pted to m aintain sway over the Arabs.
N ixon declared as m uch in his 1972 Foreign Policy report to Congress, "The Emerging Structure
of Peace": "We stand at the head of a group of countries whose association we value and are not
prepared to sacrifice to an improvement in Soviet-Am erican relations ."83 In sum, Moscow's
revolutionary policies exhibited more dramatically the divide betw een ideals and geopolitical
reality, but this fact applied to both superpowers. D etente cannot be judged only in the vacuum
of imprecise com munique wording. T he refusal of both the U nited States and the Soviet U nion
to adhere to the lofty principles set forth in detente proceedings underscores the ongoing Cold
W ar conflict, which had at its roots continued avoidance of nuclear war. For the U nited States,

8!Hoffmann, “D eten te,” in N ye, ed., T he Making o f A m erica’s Soviet Policy. 243.
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these preventative measures would be accomplished through the strategy of the N ixon Doctrine.

D etente and the N ixon D octrine
T he N ixon D octrine provided an operational link betw een d etente and the Yom Kippur W ar.
As part repudiation, and part continuation of the T rum an D octrine, the basic foreign policy
strategy of the U nited States during the N ixon A dm inistration reflected the need to manage an
evolving Cold W ar. T h e U nited States would continue to support democracy and its allies
against Comm unist expansion, b u t the real catastrophe of V ietnam and the realistic possibility
of nuclear holocaust - m ade all the more frightening toward the end of the 1960s as Soviet
nuclear stockpiles reached comparable levels with those of the U nited States - necessitated
indirect support of its allies in the form of military and economic assistance. Nixon's Foreign
Policy Report to Congress of 1970, “A New Strategy for Peace,” defined the N ixon Doctrine,
first the president announced by in 1969:
Its cen tral thesis is th a t th e U n ite d S tates w ill participate in th e d efen se and d ev elo p m en t o f
allies and friends, b u t th a t A m erica ca n n o t - and w ill n o t - c o n c e iv e all th e plans, design all the
programs, e x e c u te all th e d ecision s and undertake all th e d efen se o f th e free n a tio n s o f the world.
W e w ill h elp w here it m akes a real d ifference and is co n sid ered in our in terest.84

In other words: no more Vietnams, and no more potential for direct confrontation of
Soviet and A m erican forces. Secretary of Defense M elvin Laird categorized the four major
com ponents of the N ixon Doctrine, all of which relied on the longstanding Am erican strategy
of deterrence and containm ent. T he first, "deterring strategic nuclear warfare," emphasized the
continuation of A m erican policy since W ashington was first confronted w ith Soviet nuclear

84Richard N ixon, as cited in U nited States, President, Report to Congress. “U .S. Foreign Policy for
the 1970s: A N ew Strategy for Peace," (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1970), 6.
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capabilities in the years following W orld W ar II. T he second, and third com ponents, "deterring
theater nuclear warfare," and "deterring theater conventional warfare," respectively, reflected
the growing strength of Am erican allies in Europe and their consequent responsibility in
deterring localized nuclear war and/or conventional aggression by C hina or the Soviet Union.
The N ixon A dm inistration introduced the fourth com ponent, "deterring subtheater or localized
warfare," in the form of Vietnamization, which was expressed most fully w ith A m erican support
to Israel during the Yom Kippur W ar .85 T he D epartm ent of Defense referred to this fourth
com ponent as a "strategy of realistic deterrence,” which recognized the inadmissibility of massive
retaliation as a means to deter Comm unist aggression in non-strategic regions; i.e., the Third
W orld.
By the early 1970s, the U nited States had lost a clear nuclear advantage over the Soviets.
As the Am erican hom eland became more or less equally vulnerable to Soviet attack,
W ashington could no longer credibly threaten "massive retaliation" in defense of "subtheater"
allies.86 N ixon defined the alternative, which was designed to take the potential of nuclear
attack on A m erican cities out of the equation: "In cases involving [subtheater] aggression we
shall furnish military and economic assistance w hen requested in accordance w ith our treaty
commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly th reaten ed to assume the primary
responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense .”87
As N ixon noted in his 1973 Foreign Policy Report to Congress, "Shaping a Durable

85Laird, T he N ix o n D octrine. 9-10.
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Peace," the superpowers could n o t assume th a t their policies would be obeyed by client
countries, which had their own agendas. This fact intensified the need to keep U.S. and Soviet
forces out of situations th a t they could no longer control .88 T he course of the Yom Kippur W ar
(to be fully discussed in chapters two and three) dramatically exemplified Nixon's concerns. As
Edward B. A tkenson, a military expert, noted,
T h e O ctob er 1973 exp erien ce m arked the first o cca sio n o f th e ex ercise o f real pow er by m em ber
states o f th e T h ird W orld. N e v e r before h ave former co lo n ia l territories or n o n -a lig n ed countries
b een able to d ictate political and eco n o m ic terms to industrialized n a tio n s o n su ch a scale or
w ith su ch effec tiv e n e ss.89

Thus, the N ixon D octrine attem pted to synthesize old and new policies in order to m eet
the challenges of a Cold W ar comprising old and new elements.

T he political scientists

Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke aptly characterize the N ixon Doctrine as essentially
"an odd mixture of C ontainm ent (thought not referred to as such) and hints of a successor to
that policy. ”90 Because the N ixon D octrine emphasized above all else the necessity to avoid
crisis situations and nuclear war, it m ust be viewed at the center of the overall U.S. detente
policy. As a strategy, it illustrated an attem pt to confront the Soviet U nion both firmly and
rationally. As H enry Kissinger argued, "To be sure, detente is dangerous if it does not include
a strategy of C ontainm ent. But C ontainm ent is unsustainable unless coupled with a notion of

Kissinger's observation emphasized the moderate character of the Nixon D octrine in

88Richard N ixon , as cited in U nited States, President, Report to Congress. “U .S . Foreign Policy for
the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace” (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing O ffice, 1973), 136.
89Edward B. A tkeson, “The Impact o f Crises on the Evolution o f Strategy and Forces in an Era o f
Detente," in General Andrew J. Goodpaster, et al. N ational Security and D eten te (N ew York: Thom as Y.
Crowell Company, 1976), 43.
90Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in A m erican Foreign Policy: Theory and
Practice (N ew York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 593.
91Kissinger. Years o f U pheaval. 241-242.

particular and detente as a whole. A lthough both superpowers had augm ented their strategic
forces many times over since the beginning of the nuclear arms race, n eith er country enjoyed
greater security as compared to the early 1950s. The fact of nuclear parity alone accounted for
this state of affairs, b u t a num ber of factors also contributed to each superpower's compromised
security, and consequently, their desire to m aintain a detente.
By the early 1970s, the industrial nations of the world had recovered from the
devastation ofW orld W ar II. W est Germany and Japan enjoyed robust trade surpluses while the
U nited States suffered a trade deficit th a t had nearly tripled betw een 1971 and 1972. As
Richard T hornton observed, the U nited States was "gradually losing its leading position and was
experiencing a declining share of world economic product ."92 Kissinger, of course, was not an
economist, but he understood the close connection between geo-strategy and economics. Citing
the shrinking percentage of the Am erican contribution to the global Gross N ational Product (it
had dropped from 52 to 30 percent between 1950 and 1970), Kissinger reasoned: "Still the
strongest nation but no longer preem inent, we would have to take seriously the world balance
of power, for if it tilted against us, it might prove irreversible . ”93
These economic concerns were not lost on the Soviets. Leonid Brezhnev declared at the
24th Party Congress: "The ruling circles of the capitalist countries are afraid more th a n they have
ever been of the class struggle developing into a massive revolutionary movement...capitalism
has not stabilized as a system. T he general crisis of capitalism has continued to deepen ."94 The
Soviet Union, however, had serious international economic woes of its own. The growing
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economic power of W estern Europe's Comm on M arket underscored the irrelevancy of Moscow's
opposition to it - and consequently reduced Soviet political influence throughout Europe .95 A nd
as Morris Bernstein noted, the beginning of the 1970s saw a decline in the value of Soviet
petroleum exports - w hat he called "the USSR's principal earner of convertible currency" - thus
inhibiting Moscow's access to technology and equipm ent exports from the industrial countries .96
T he evolving Cold W ar thus found two superpowers w ith growing nuclear arsenals but
diminishing political and economic global influence. Both the U nited States and the Soviet
U nion recognized each other’s vulnerabilities. Before the Cold W ar could end in an ultimate
victory of one side over the other, detente would implicitly m aintain the military power of each
nation for the time being.

Summit I: SALT
N o event signaled the Soviet achievem ent of nuclear parity with the U nited States more
dramatically th an SALT. Negotiations began in November, 1969 at Helsinki, as the U nited
States began to recognize Soviet nuclear capabilities th a t had been long in the making. In 1963,
Secretary of Defense Robert M cNamara testified before Congress th a t U.S. nuclear superiority
would n o t guarantee victory in the event of a nuclear war - at least n o t in the conventional
sense. T he U nited States would “win” insofar as its nuclear arsenal would destroy more of the
Soviet U nion th an the Soviets would destroy the U nited States. M cN am ara reasoned, “I do not
believe we can, not in the normal sense of the word, ‘win,’ because in my opinion there would

95Caldwell, Soviet-A m erican Relations. 25.
96Morris Bernstein, “Soviet Econom ic Growth and Foreign Policy,” in Bialer, ed., T h e Dom estic
C ontext o f Soviet Foreign Policy. 248.

43

be so m uch severe damage done to this country th a t our way of life would change, and change
in an undesirable direction . ”97 M cN am ara’s response, w hich would n o t have been out of place
in the movie “Dr. Strangelove,” essentially heralded the age of nuclear parity of Soviet and
American forces, realized by the early 1970s, and codified by SALT.
Serious diplomatic efforts to control the arms race dated back at least as far as the
Kennedy Adm inistration, b u t N ixon was the first A m erican president to conduct arms
negotiations from a position of parity. As the historian H arland B. M oulton summarized, N ixon’s
objective in SALT was to produce “a verifiable agreement in w hich stable strategic equilibrium
is achieved . ”98 For the first time, U.S. policy was aimed n o t at staying ahead of the Soviets, but
in maintaining rough parity.
Paul H. Nitze, an arms negotiator and scholar, identified crisis m anagem ent as the other
major com ponent of SALT. He reasoned th at the A m erican SALT strategy attem pted to
formalize the essential equivalence of each superpower’s nuclear arsenal, so “th a t both sides
would be willing to downgrade the nuclear arms relationship betw een them as a factor in the
world political balance . ”99 T he ultimate goal of the superpowers’ de-emphasis on nuclear power
would in turn help to m aintain nuclear-free crisis situations. As Laurence W . M artin, a political
scientist, argued, the SALT agreements were “major landmarks by any standards. The mere
achievem ent of agreem ent on such critical and complicated issues goes far beyond w hat many
observers believed possible betw een major adversaries . ” 100 M artin was referring to the freeze on

97Robert M cNamara, U nited States, Congress, H ouse, C om m ittee on Appropriations, Department
o f Defense Appropriations for 1964. Hearings before a subcom m ittee o f the com m ittee on Appropriations.
88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, 340.
98M oulton, From Superiority to Parity. 302.
" P a u l H. Nitze, as cited in Am erican Bar Association, D etente: A Law Professor W orkshop, 16.
100Laurence W . Martin, “Military Issues: Strategic Parity and Its Im plications,” in Osgood, et al.,
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ABM shields at two for each side - one each for the national capital and a missile launching
area. Like the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the ABM Treaty, signed on May 26, 1972, at
the Moscow summit, sought to curb the nuclear arms race by indirect means. Paragraph three
of the treaty read, “Considering th a t effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems
would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms . . . . ” 101 T he rationale
behind the ABM Treaty held th a t an unchecked proliferation of nuclear defensive shields
(assuming th a t ABMs could indeed adequately defend regions from nuclear attack) would in
turn spur a new arms race in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). T he ABM Treaty
sought to avoid arms proliferation th at would invariably result from th e fact of a new, and
mutual, superpower vulnerability.

Each superpower would have to increase its offensive

capabilities so th a t its strategic deterrent effect would n o t be neutralized by the opposing
superpower’s augm ented defense structure.
This line of reasoning had its limits. By the early 1970s, ABM technology was still in its
experimental stage, and older defense strategies had by no means lost their appeal. Secretary of
Defense Laird noted in 1972: “W e continue to believe th a t an effective defense of our
population against a major Soviet attack is not now feasible. T hus we m ust continue to rely on
our strategic offensive forces to d eter a Soviet nuclear attack on our cities . ” 102 In 1972,
M cNamara would no longer have been able to qualify the likelihood of U.S. “victory” in the
event of a nuclear conflict.

By this point, the Soviet U nion had the capability to inflict

approximately an equal m agnitude of destruction as it would sustain. Admiral of the Navy and

101T he ABM Treaty is reprinted in U nited States, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 12th
A nnual Report to Congress, lanuarv 1, 1972-D ecem ber 31, 1972, 44.
102M elvin Laird, as cited in U nited States, D epartm ent o f D efense, Toward a N ational Security
Strategy o f Realistic D eterrence. 1971, 63.
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Chairm an of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Thomas H. Moorer testified in 1972 th a t a general nuclear
war between Soviet and A m erican forces would kill in the short term approximately 100 million
citizens of each country . 103 T he magnitude of such a conflict, which would have quickly claimed
the lives of four times as many humans who died in all of W orld W ar II, defied comprehension.
Jurii Pankov has observed th a t superpower parity created a “nuclear stalem ate” which effectively
negated the famous Clausewitzean principle, th a t war is a continuation of policy by other means,
“because nuclear war cannot lead to the achievem ent of political goals...at this point there is no
sensible alternative to peaceful coexistence and d eten te . ” 104
T he particularities of the complicated SALT process m ust be understood in the context
of what Henry Kissinger recognized in the nuclear age as a fundam ental change in the meaning
of national power:
It w ould h ave b e e n in con ceiv a b le e v e n a g en era tio n ago th a t su ch pow er o n c e gain ed cou ld n o t
be translated directly in to ad vantage o v er o n e ’s o p p o n en t. B u t n o w b o th w e and th e S o v iet
U n io n h ave b egu n to find that ea c h in crem en t o f pow er d oes n o t necessarily represent an
in crem en t o f usable political stren g th .105

Thus, like detente as a whole, SALT in the Nixon-Brezhnev years did n o t seek a fundam ental
change in the political relationship of the U nited States and the Soviet Union. N either country
entertained the notion of substantially reducing their nuclear capabilities already in existence,
and each exploited SALT as a platform to emphasize the continued im portance of military
power. N uclear parity may have negated the political utility of nuclear weapons as a means of
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gaining leverage over the other, but SALT never aimed to p u t a real h alt on the arms race, due
to the prestige th a t A m erican and Soviet leaders continued to associate with nuclear
preeminence. Richard Pipes has argued against the idea “th a t in the nuclear age numbers of
weapons do not m atter once a certain quantity has been attained . ” 106 T he record of SALT
clearly supports his claim. During the Moscow Summit - the high point of SALT in the three
years after its inauguration - Brezhnev informed N ixon th a t the Soviet U nion intended to
continue its nuclear arms buildup in any way n o t expressly prohibited by SALT. O ne group of
experts observed th a t immediately after the Moscow summit, the Kremlin began “a public
campaign for the further overall strengthening of Soviet armed forces on the stated ground that,
despite the present effectiveness of Soviet deterrent capabilities, the danger of war will persist
as long as imperialism survives . . . . ” 107
D etente had n o t changed Moscow’s basic equation of nuclear m ight and international
prestige.

This fact was clearly dem onstrated by Brezhnev’s declaration at the 24th Party

Congress: “Let no one, for his part, try to talk to us in terms of ultim atum s and strength . ” 108
Moscow had repeatedly rejected the American notion of sufficiency, which Secretary of Defense
Laird defined as “an effort to avoid major war increases in strategic force expenditures ,” 109 for two
reasons, one ideological, and the other a simple m atter of power politics. First, the static nature
of strategic sufficiency was incompatible with the revolutionary, forward-momentum ethos of
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Soviet foreign policy. 110 Second, Moscow saw little reason to inhibit future enhancem ent of the
prestige it had already gained as a result of a rigorous arms buildup. As far as the Soviets were
concerned, SALT evidenced Am erica’s recognition of its own limits; Moscow did not see a mere
coincidence in the fact of the U nited States struggle in V ietnam and its willingness to begin the
SALT process in 1969.111 In the Soviet view, as the world’s “correlation of forces” continued to
tip in favor of Moscow, at the expense of America’s deteriorating global position, the impetus
to augment socialist power at its epicenter was strong indeed.
T he U nited States, for its part, was no more interested th a n the Soviets in allowing
SALT to compromise its nuclear strength. Secretary of Defense Laird emphasized in a speech
delivered after the SALT I agreement th a t the U nited States would never abandon its nuclear
deterrent, which depended on offensive nuclear weapons th a t rem ained unaffected by the first
round of SALT: “A ctual reductions in weapons can come later, after more patient negotiation
from a position of adequate strength . ” 112 A 1974 State D epartm ent publication affirmed: “W e
are no t dealing with the Soviet U nion out of a position of weakness. O n the contrary, the
preservation of our military strength is a prerequisite for detente, and military strength inferior
to none is the only national defense posture which can ever be acceptable to the U nited
States .” 113 Unsurprisingly, Senator Henry Jackson denounced SALT as a framework th a t put
more stringent limits on A m erican strategic forces as compared to their Soviet counterparts, thus
leaving the U nited States vulnerable to “inferior" strategic force levels in an ongoing arms race.

110A good exam ple o f the revolutionary aspect o f Soviet foreign policy can be found in a speech
delivered by L.I. Brezhnev, Lenin’s Cause Lives on and Triumphs: Report at a loin t Celebration M eeting o f
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111Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia, 70.
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Jackson never elaborated on his interpretation of inferiority, but, as W illiam Bundy observed,
he needed a strategy to deflate N ixon’s post-summit prestige in the summer of 1972 - arguably
the high point of N ixon’s presidency.114
Gerard Sm ith’s memoir, Doubletalk, recounted the frustrations of the U.S. SALT
negotiating team, which Sm ith headed in the N ixon A dm inistration as Director of the U.S.
Arms C ontrol and D isarm am ent Agency. He argued th a t N ixon’s use of the “back channel” for
nuclear diplomacy effectively surrendered expert control of the negotiations to politicians like
Kissinger and N ixon - to the detrim ent of both superpowers. T he ABM Treaty earned N ixon
an enormous am ount of political capital, but Sm ith noted th a t the treaty compromised U.S.
strategic interests particularly and th at of both nations generally. First, the U.S. delegation
originally pushed for a num erical advantage of ABM sites b u t consented to an equal number of
t

two for both sides in the final agreement. This loss, although major, was dwarfed by a larger
blown opportunity for bo th superpowers. Sm ith bitterly noted: “There was a chance to outlaw
ABMs entirely. W e pulled away w hen this prospect seemed to brighten.”115
T he impressive, yet strictly limited, success of the ABM treaty serves as a microcosm for
Nixon and Kissinger’s overselling of the entire detente policy. Gerard Sm ith characterized
N ixon’s eagerness to complete the treaty as reflecting “the natural tendency of a politician
approaching an election to magnify the significance of his accomplishm ents.”116 For Kissinger,
the SALT agreements satisfied his enormous appetite for combining geo-strategic policy with
personal prestige.

As Kissinger’s biographer W alter Isaacson noted, the Moscow Summit

114Bundy, A Tangled W eb . 354.
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116Ibid., 453.
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“completed Kissinger’s transition into a global superstar, the first and thus far only celebrity
diplomat of the m edia age.”117 It is illustrative of detente politics as a whole th a t the m ain SALT
experts, Raymond Garthoff, Paul Nitze, and Gerard Sm ith - all of whom possessed a technical
command of nuclear diplomacy far beyond th at of their politician bosses - were largely excluded
from the summit negotiations. N uclear parity may have rendered meaningless marginal gains
of one G reat Power over another - but its utility for gaining domestic political clout remained.
In addition to the overselling of detente, SALT also exemplified the ongoing fact of the
Cold W ar arms race. SALT evolved out of four years of intense diplomacy and two summit
meetings w ithout any perm anent reduction in either superpower’s strategic offensive capabilities.
A n Interim Agreem ent, attached to the end of the ABM Treaty, placed a five-year freeze on
ICBM launchers and submarine-based ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers. As if to underscore
the title, “Interim A greem ent,” Article VIII, paragraph three, read: “Each party shall, in
exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim A greem ent if
it decides th a t extraordinary events related to the subject m atter of this Interim A greem ent have
jeopardized its supreme interests.”118 Gerard Sm ith testified before the Senate Comm ittee on
Armed Services th a t the Interim A greement “does not provide long term comprehensive
limitation on strategic offensive weapons systems.”119 A nd N ixon could only offer at an ABM
signing ceremony th at limitations on defensive systems were im portant because they would set
the stage toward arms limitations for the “vitally im portant” area of offensive nuclear weapons.120
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If the success of the ABM treaty is to be judged by its potential in limiting offensive weapons,
it was indeed a m uted success.
As Stanley Hoffmann observed, SALT I produced a “sausage effect,” which succeeded
in “inciting bo th sides to produce w hatever weapons had n o t been limited.”121 In the beginning
of the 1970s, the U.S. A ir Force had successfully tested and deployed its first generation of
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) Poseidon and M inutem an III missiles,
allowing several warheads each aimed at a different target to be fired from a single launcher.
The Americans justified the development of these enormously lethal weapons on the grounds
th a t as of 1970, there existed no guarantee th a t Moscow would agree to limit their ABM
program, which could have eroded the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
In May of 1972, Soviet MIRV technology was still in its testing stage. Understandably,
Moscow refused to include MIRVs as part of SALT, for doing so would have put the Soviets in
a permanently inferior nuclear position. In what Richard Smoke calls a “tragedy of timing” the
omission of MIRVs from SALT m eant th at “the num ber of separate nuclear warheads th at each
side could rain down on the other increased from betw een one and two thousand as SALT was
getting underway to approximately ten thousand in the 1980s.”122
In Moscow’s view, the checkered success of SALT represented the contradictory
impulses of m aintaining - or even surpassing - A m erican nuclear capabilities. O n the other
hand, the Soviets w anted to avoid an intense arms race which threatened to rupture the entire
detente framework.123T he Soviets perceived the benefits of d etente in a more complicated light
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than the U nited States. W hereas W ashington formulated one basic d etente strategy vis-d-vis
Moscow, the Soviet U nion managed an independent detente w ith several U.S. allies. Moscow
saw enemies in all directions (not to m ention its arch-nemesis C h in a), and therefore refused to
concede any grounds during SALT th at they interpreted as limiting their strategic forces.124
Richard Pipes explained Moscow’s anti-equivalence nuclear strategy: “Essentially, the Soviet
U nion hopes to neutralize the damage to its interests implied in the balance-of-power principle
by establishing its physical (military) presence in every major strategic area of the globe and
demanding a senior voice in all regional politico-military arrangem ents.”125
T hrough a com bination of political and strategic factors, SA LT as it existed up to the
Yom Kippur W ar did not curb the arms race. T he second Soviet-Am erican Summit held in the
U nited States during June 1973, did n o t produce any significant breakthroughs in arms
negotiations, and detente, as it related to the control of a nuclear buildup, had clearly
dem onstrated its limits. As the historian David Holloway concluded, “T he Soviet leaders did
not see a contradiction betw een growing military power and detente. O n the contrary, the one
was seen to provide the basis for the other.”126 This contradiction was n o t unique to the Soviets.
In a bizarre defense of detente, aimed at policy makers who charged th a t relaxed tensions with
Moscow would translate into reduced U.S. security as a result of cutbacks in defense
expenditures, H enry Kissinger noted th a t the Pentagon’s research and development efforts
flourished only after the signature of SALT I - as if the point of SALT was geared for the benefit
of defense contractors.127
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In sum, SALT I succeeded mainly in formalizing the rough parity of Soviet and American
nuclear force levels.

T he Soviet MIRV program did n o t become operational until 1975;

therefore, the Interim A greem ent left the number of A m erican nuclear warheads at twice the
Soviet level. In turn, Moscow enjoyed a three-to-two advantage o f total missiles and three times
more mega-tonnage th a n th a t possessed by the U nited S tates.128 As Richard Thornton, a
political scientist, observed, “SALT established a com m on basis for evaluating the complex
power shift underway,” m eaning the transition from U.S. superiority to parity with the Soviet
Union.129 N either superpower dem onstrated any inclination toward perm anent, genuine nuclear
disarmament, and in some ways, the Cold W ar arms race becam e reinvigorated as a result of
detente. As Stanley Hoffmann remarked, “Nuclear weapons have n o t abolished war, they have
displaced it.”130 His observation speaks directly to the fact th a t the looming threat of nuclear
holocaust necessitated a superpower detente in which general war could never become “a
continuation of politics by other m eans.” But superpower behavior throughout SALT I speaks
to a “non-violent” nuclear war by other means as well.
Because of the absolute inadmissability of such a conflict, bo th the Soviet U nion and the
U nited States sought to enhance their nuclear power - w ithout any particular desire to unleash
it - as a means of furthering the Cold W ar to its ultimate and peaceful conclusion. T he nuclear
theoretician Robert Jervis succinctly captured the contradictory nature of the political
com ponent to the nuclear arms race: “M uch of the history of nuclear strategy has been a series
of attem pts to find a way out of this predicament and return to the simpler, more comforting pre-
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nuclear world in which safety did n o t depend on the adversary’s restraint.”131 Direct G reat
Power conflict may have ended w ith the advent of nuclear weapons, b u t G reat Power politics
continued in the Cold W ar as vigorously as ever.

Summit I: T he Basic Principles A greem ent (BPA)
Along with the ABM Treaty, the other major docum ent signed during the May 1972 summit in
Moscow dealt w ith political relations between the superpowers. “T he Basic Principles of M utual
Relations betw een the U nited States of America and the U nion of Soviet Socialist Republics”
attem pted to link the spirit of a responsible policy in arms control w ith responsible political
exchanges as necessitated by the danger of nuclear conflict.

H enry Kissinger framed the

' Am erican strategy as a com ponent of linkage between SALT and the BP A: “T he two elements
reinforced each other; they symbolized our conviction th a t a relaxation of tensions could not be
based exclusively on arms control; the ultimate test would be restrained international
behavior.”132 Like the ABM Treaty, the BPA signaled an im portant first step toward normalized
relations betw een th e superpowers.

Adam Ulam, a scholar who did n o t romanticize the

potentials of detente, characterized the BPA in positive terms: “For the first time in a generation
the two superpowers were able to survey the whole realm of international relations, and to do
so w ithout resorting to m utual vituperations and accusations.133
Moscow initiated the BPA, which, as Ambassador Dobrynin noted, received far more
attention in the Soviet U nion th an in the U nited States.134 In hindsight, this disparity seems
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logical - the fundam ental them e of the BPA assumed th a t all political relations betw een the
superpowers flow from the basis of equality, of which nuclear parity was a primary com ponent.135
Thus, Moscow viewed the BPA as a victory for Soviet prestige on the world stage, and as such,
it figured prominently in the Soviets’ self-image as leader of the world’s revolutionary socialist
movements. O ne docum ent released after the Moscow sum m it by th e Council of Ministers of
the USSR emphasized the great importance th at Moscow attached to A m erica’s recognition of
Soviet legitimacy, as embodied by the BPA: “T he results of the Soviet-Am erican talks showed
once again th a t in m odem circumstances controversial international questions cannot be solved
by methods of the policy from ‘a position of strength.’ They can and m ust be settled through
negotiations based on observing the principal of parity and equal security of [both] sides....”136
Richard Nixon, for his part, reinforced the spirit of equality during the opening toasts of
the Moscow Summit. He declared at the state dinner of May 22: “Because we are both prepared
to proceed on the basis of equality and m utual respect, we m eet at a m om ent when we can make
peaceful cooperation betw een our two countries a reality.”137 Nixon, always a shrewd politician,
told the Soviets exactly w hat they w anted to hear. A firm A m erican declaration of equality,
noted Dobrynin, “C reated the impression among the Soviet population th a t its governm ent at
last had prevailed over the U nited States on this principle [of equality], which had long been
reluctant to accept it even though we had presented it as a fundam ental issue of war or peace.”138
A m erican officials did n o t ascribe nearly as m uch im portance to the BPA as their Soviet
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counterparts. They generally found little reason to revel in the principle, or fact, of Soviet
equality. Between V ietnam and impressive economic growth in W estern Europe and Japan, the
condition of global U.S. preeminence was damaged enough - adding to th a t list nuclear parity,
and, by implication, de facto acceptance of Moscow’s political strength, did not strike American
leaders as deserving of great publicity. Article I of the BPA addressed the issue of political
equality most directly: “Differences in ideology and in the social system of the U SA and USSR
are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of
sovereignty, equality, non-interference in international affairs and m utual advantage.”139
W here the Soviets tended to see the BPA as a meaningful and overdue recognition of
their country’s viability and seriousness, American leaders dismissed the docum ent as a function
of diplomatic pleasantries. Among Kissinger’s objectives during his secret pre-summit trip to
Moscow in April 1972 was to ham mer out the details of the BPA so th a t it could be signed
w ithout incident at the upcoming summit. Kissinger was unm oved by Brezhnev’s promise of “the
accolades of history” if he agreed to accept an essentially Soviet-constructed docum ent, which
Kissinger considered to be “flavored with Pravda-like rhetoric.” Kissinger dryly commented: “I
did not believe th a t history would remember a set of principles so w atered down as to be equally
acceptable to the principal capitalist and strongest Com m unist state.”140 Kissinger biographer
W alter Isaacson observed th a t N ixon and the State D epartm ent “tended to dismiss [the BPA]
as a boilerplate, w ith good reason: the docum ent sought to enshrine a nebulous and unworkable
code of conduct....”141 Indeed, the principal docum ent of the Moscow Summit, as far as the

139T he BPA, in Stebbins and Adams, eds., Am erican Foreign Relations. 1972. 76.
140Kissinger, W hite House Years. 1150.
141Issacson, Kissinger, 427.

56

Americans were concerned, was the ABM Treaty; their concern for the BPA was remarkably
more m uted th an th a t of the Soviets, who valued it more th an other summit agreem ents.142
If A m erican officials were skeptical of the viability of the BPA in the short term, their
solution was to “free” the U nited States by interpreting the docum ent as a vague set of objectives
to be m et over a long period of time. N ixon’s foreign policy report to Congress of 1973, “Shaping
a Durable Peace,” interpreted the BPA as such: “W h at we have agreed upon are principles that
acknowledge differences, b u t express a code of conduct which, if observed, can only contribute
to mold peace and to an international system based on m utual respect and self-restraint. These
principles are a guide for future action.”143 This interpretation was consistent w ith N ixon’s
statem ent before a joint session of Congress following his retu rn from the Moscow Summit: “The
principles to which we have agreed in Moscow are like a roadmap. Now th a t the map has been
laid out, it is up to each country to follow it.”144
Soviet leaders, of course, did not publicly degrade the im mediate significance of the BPA,
although the evidence suggests th a t they were content w ith its emphasis on superpower equality.
Beyond that, there is little reason to assume th a t Moscow attached any more operational weight
to the docum ent than the Americans, insofar as they intended to truly refrain from instigating
crisis situations. As previously quoted, Article I of the BPA identified peaceful coexistence as
the basis by which the two superpowers would conduct their relations. In the Soviet political
lexicon, peaceful coexistence referred to a framework of superpower relations far different from
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the American conception of detente. During Kissinger’s pre-sum m it negotiations in Moscow,
Foreign Minister Gromyko and General Secretary Brezhnev insisted on including the phrase
“peaceful coexistence” in the docum ent. William Bundy characterized the term as a “code
phrase meaning th a t the relationship with the U nited States would still be intensely competitive.
The USSR would n o t abandon any form of pressure, threats or covert action by intelligence
agencies; it merely implied th a t it would not engage in th e outright use of force against the
U nited States.”145
Kissinger was entirely aware of the Soviet interpretation of peaceful coexistence; Article
II of the BPA represented his attem pt to neutralize w hatever “free pass” the Soviets believed
they gained to pursue international adventurism. T he key sentences in Article II essentially
served as a rebuttal to Article I: both nations “will always exercise restraint in their m utual
relations and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means....Both sides
recognize th a t efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or
indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.”146 Because the Soviets interpreted peaceful
coexistence in far more precise terms th an the Americans framed their rebuttal against obtaining
unilateral advantage, Moscow saw the BPA above all as a legitimization of their interpretation
of peaceful coexistence. A lexander L. George concluded his brilliant analysis of the BPA by
referring to the docum ent as a “pseudoagreem ent.” He noted: “It gave an erroneous impression
that the U nited States and the Soviets were in substantial agreem ent on the rules of the game
and the restraints to be observed in their competition of third areas.”147 As John Lewis Gaddis
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observed, not only did the Soviets have “no intention of giving up support for Third World
‘national liberation’ m ovem ents,” but, as with any international agreement, the BPA was not
self-enforcing, hence “there was no way for W ashington to m onitor Moscow’s compliance.”148
Senator Stephen J. Solarz of New York, in raising the fact th a t d etente “did not prevent
the outbreak of the [October] 1973 war,” rhetorically asked: “If nobody had ever thought of the
word detente, th a t bo th sides, recognizing the real possibility th a t a continuation of the conflict
would lead to a confrontation between our two countries, would have recognized the m utual
interest in bringing it, at th a t particular point, to a halt.”149 Solarz’s counterfactual question is,
of course, impossible to answer, but it raises an im portant point: if the BPA was intended to
capture on paper the essence of relaxed tensions between the superpowers, b u t instead negated
itself through its internal contradictions, th e n the efficacy of d eten te as it related to preventing
tensions in Third W orld conflicts is questionable. H elm ut Sonnenfeldt emphasized that the
BPA “and subsequent agreements with the Soviets in 1973 regarding international political
conduct never were intended to be self-enforcing.”150
Given these circumstances, it is fair to ask why the docum ent was created in the first
place. T he answer m ust reflect the detente framework as a whole. Two superpowers were
competing in an ongoing Cold W ar and exploited detente in the interests of their own national
power and political prestige w ithin a system which aimed to minimize the potential of a nuclear
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war. N either side viewed detente, or the docum ents th a t gave it expression, as a hallowed set
of laws to be meticulously followed. T h at is the meaning of Moscow’s insistence on including
the phrase “peaceful coexistence” in the BPA, and the A m ericans’ subsequent dismissal of the
docum ent as a “roadm ap.”

Superpower actions surrounding th e Yom Kippur W ar certainly

“violated” d etente principles in many forms (each of which will be discussed in detail in the
following chapters): Moscow’s decision n o t to warn the U nited States of an im m inent surprise
Arab attack; the huge weapons airlift undertaken by each superpower during the war; and the
caustic Soviet-Am erican exchange th a t took place during the ceasefire violations.
But a larger question needs to be addressed before d eten te can be evaluated in a simple
cause and effect analysis. If, indeed, detente was pushed and prodded in the Middle East in the
interests of national power over m utual accommodation, it is clear th a t neither side assumed that
the agreements which had defined detente were designed for strict adherence beyond the
ongoing avoidance of nuclear war. This view does not condone the decisions th a t helped to
produce one of the most destructive wars of the m odern era - it merely seeks to interpret detente
in the terms understood by the Soviet U nion and the U nited States. T he second SovietAmerican summit, held in the U nited States in June, 1973, three m onths before the outbreak
of the Yom Kippur W ar, reinforced each superpower’s prevailing notion of a limited detente.
A t the global level, peace would be m aintained in the form of avoiding nuclear war, yet local
conflict in the Middle East would erupt yet again.

Summit 11: T he M idnight Harangue and the N uclear A greem ent
Two major situations affected the Soviet-American detente in the eleven m onths betw een the
Moscow and W ashington/San Clem ente summits. In the U nited States, the W atergate affair,
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sparked by a break-in of the offices of political opponents, was transforming from a domestic
nuisance into a full-blown scandal th at was threatening to erode N ixon’s ability to perform his
presidential duties. N ixon had always thought that his greatest legacy would be in the foreign
policy realm. Just as N ixon tied m uch of his reelection hopes in 1972 to a successful (if oversold)
record of detente w ith the Soviets, the president became determ ined to dem onstrate his
ongoing command of U.S. foreign policy.

T he Soviets, unsurprisingly, could not quite

understand how the leader of the U nited States allowed himself to get mixed up in the m ounting
W atergate crisis. But they did respond favorably to N ixon’s d etente overtures, although with
reservations about the president’s ability to retain the credibility necessary to make
commitments.

If the W atergate scandal never occurred, N ixon likely would have found

Kissinger’s growing fame unbearable. But Kissinger was left unscathed by the W atergate
shakeup, and as a result, saw his own powers increase dramatically. T he trend culm inated in
Kissinger replacing W illiam Rogers as Secretary of State (he rem ained N ational Security
Adviser) in late August, 1973.
O n the Soviet end, by the spring of 1973, Moscow had armed its A rab clients in Egypt
and Syria to levels sufficient to launch a war against Israel. T he Soviets had put themselves in
the curious position of neutralizing their authority in the region by transferring sufficient
amounts of weapons so th a t the Arabs could effectively ignore Moscow’s wishes. (This clientpatron relationship is discussed in C hapter 3.) For m uch of 1973, the Soviet U nion tried to
balance the impossible - continuing influence in the Arab world w ithout damaging its relations
with the U nited States.
As the war in V ietnam was coming to an end, and no major breakthroughs occurred in
the area of SALT, the A m erican Summit of 1973 began with fairly singular objectives for both

sides: N ixon w anted to push detente forward, and Brezhnev w anted to warn the Americans of
the possibility of another war in the Middle East w ithout being too explicit about it. The
General Secretary first brought up the m atter of a looming crisis with Kissinger during the presummit negotiations. The Arab-Israeli conflict was still deadlocked under the unworkable
U nited N ations Resolution 242 rubric, which called for full Israeli withdrawal from Arab
territories occupied since the June 1967 W ar, in exchange for political normalization and Arab
pledges of security. Brezhnev ominously hinted to Kissinger: “N othing in the world is eternal
- similarly the present military advantage enjoyed by Israel is n o t eternal either.”151 His warning
fell on deaf ears; the Americans (and Israelis, for th a t m atter) assumed th a t an A rab attack was
unlikely because it would end in another catastrophic defeat similar to the outcome of the June
W ar of 1967. Kissinger informed the Soviets th at they were inflating W ashington’s ability to
exert any meaningful influence over the Israelis. It was only w ith the beginning of the Yom
Kippur W ar th a t Kissinger became interested in a comprehensive Arab-Israel settlem ent. Before
the war, he considered all third-party efforts to impose a peace on the region futile, as evidenced
by w hat he called a “meaningless” paragraph in the BPA affirming m utual superpower
com m itm ent to a territorial and political agreement as envisioned by U nited N ations Resolution
242.152 The thorny Middle East issue was not raised at the June 1973 summit until the last day
of Brezhnev’s trip.
A t a lavish dinner party hosted by the Soviets in their W ashington embassy, N ixon
delivered a speech in w hich he emphasized th a t detente would n o t cure the fundam ental
differences th a t comprised the Cold W ar: “I would not for one m om ent suggest to this audience,
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or to those who may be listening on television or radio, th a t one m eeting or two meetings at the
summit brings instant peace, instant relaxation of tensions, and instant reduction or limitations
of arms.”153 It is noteworthy th a t N ixon characterized detente in such cautious terms. Beginning
with the Yom Kippur W ar, detente suffered a precipitous decline through the 1970s, and
collapsed entirely at the end of the decade.
O n the following day, the superpowers signed the “A greem ent for the Prevention of
Nuclear W ar” (henceforth referred to as the P N W ). In its final draft, the docum ent was a rather
bland reiteration of the superpowers’ mutual, if non-com m ittal, desire for global peace. Moscow
had originally pushed for an agreement to ban the use of nuclear weapons. N ixon and Kissinger
steadfastly rejected the proposal on the grounds th a t such an agreem ent would deny W estern
Europe a nuclear shield against Soviet attack - an especially dark scenario given the
overwhelming superiority of Soviet conventional forces - and afford Moscow maximum latitude
in a potential war with China. T he U nited States refused to shelve its nuclear arsenal for the
simple reason th a t doing so would increase the likelihood of war, thus illustrating continued U.S.
emphasis on nuclear deterrence.154
T he PN W did n o t depart from the conditions of the BPA except in the area of crisis
management. Article IV stated th a t if a situation arose th a t ran the risk of erupting into nuclear
war as a result of direct tensions or third party conflict, th e U nited States and Soviet Union
“shall immediately en ter into urgent consultations w ith each other and make every effort to
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avert this risk.”155 O n its own accord, the language of Article IV was unambiguous, b u t Article
VI m anaged to negate m uch of the docum ent’s viability - especially if the overall aim of the
PN W set out to codify a set of norms during crisis situations.

It read: “N othing in this

A greem ent shall im pair...the obligations undertaken in treaties, agreements, and other
appropriate docum ents.”156
T he nuclear imbroglio th a t would occur at the end of the Yom Kippur W ar became the
first such crisis situation to test Soviet and Am erican intentions. T h e behavior of bo th countries
(to be discussed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3) in th a t tense period reflected the ambiguity
expressed in the PNW : N either side w anted nuclear war, b u t neither side dem onstrated a
willingness to sacrifice its clients’ interest, either.
As if to dem onstrate th a t the summit was an inappropriate forum to discuss unpleasant
issues, the Middle East received no official m ention except one passing reference in a joint
communique. This docum ent broadly covered all detente issues raised during the summit, from
ongoing negotiations in arms control to cultural exchanges. O nly the topic of transportation
received fewer words th an the Arab-Israeli conflict. T he relevant passage read: “Both parties
agreed to continue to exert their efforts to promote the quickest possible settlem ent in the
Middle East.”157 T he statem ent could n o t have been further removed from reality. The
Americans were doing nothing to push the Israelis tow ard accepting the provisions set forth
under U nited N ations Resolution 242 on the m istaken assumption th a t Israel’s military
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hegemony would indefinitely m aintain regional stability. T he Soviets, meanwhile, were in the
process of arming their Egyptian and Syrian clients w ith enormous am ounts of materiel,
including advanced surface-to-air-missile technology.
Brezhnev clearly sensed th a t conditions were ripe for a major war in the Middle East.
He decided th a t the summit could not end w ithout a concerted attem pt to impose peace on the
region - on Arab terms. O n ju n e 23, at N ixon’s “Casa Pacifica” residence in San Clemente, the
Soviet and A m erican delegations had retired for the evening at 7:15 p.m., only to resume talks
three hours later w hen Secret Service agents informed Kissinger th a t Brezhnev was demanding
an immediate m eeting w ith the president. It was a gross breach o f diplomatic protocol, but
N ixon consented, and at 10:45 p.m. the leaders of the world’s superpowers m et, in their pajamas,
in N ixon’s study accompanied by Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin. Brezhnev proceeded to
launch into a rambling diatribe about the Middle East. He dem anded Israeli withdrawal from
all occupied territories, and intim ated th a t if the U nited States failed to coerce Israel to do so,
Moscow would be compelled to blame the Americans if and w hen a war should erupt.158
As Dobrynin observed - and the events in early O ctober clearly proved - the Americans
should not have discounted Brezhnev’s insinuations, no m atter how bizarrely he chose to present
them .159 Given th at Brezhnev himself was not sure of the Arabs’ intentions (Egyptian President
Anwar Sadat refused to inform Moscow of his exact plans until the last possible m om ent), it is
unlikely th at the G eneral Secretary could have been any more explicit. O n the other hand,
Brezhnev did n o t deliver another such warning in the weeks preceding the war. He would have
enjoyed more credibility as Am erican and Israeli intelligence reports were tracking large-scale

158Bundy, A Tangled W eb . 412.
159Dobrynin, In C onfidence. 282.

65

Egyptian and Syrian deployments throughout September. Furtherm ore, Brezhnev’s harangue
- unconventional as it was - did not depart from the UN Resolution 242 framework th a t had
failed to break the six-year deadlock. Aside from Brezhnev’s insistence on giving himself a place
to air out Moscow’s frustrations, it is unclear if he believed th a t Israel would throw away its
entire defense posture based simply on the vehem ence of the Soviet leader’s demand. In the
twilight hours of the meeting, a bleary eyed and unimpressed N ixon did his best to reject politely
Brezhnev’s plan, and the summit ended on one of the weirder notes in the history of SovietAmerican relations.

A Limited D etente: Toward the Yom Kippur W ar
T he Nixon-Brezhnev years were characterized by a basic paradox: the superpower detente
blossomed while the A rab world coalesced as never before toward another war w ith Israel. It
must be left to imagination regarding the path of Soviet-Am erican relations had the Yom Kippur
W ar never occurred. It cannot be known w hat the Cold W ar would have looked like, but it is
clear th at O ctober, 1973, marked the beginning of a downward tu rn in superpower relations.
If one fact emerges from the ambiguous and sometimes inconsistent record of detente, it is that
the inadmissability of nuclear war, and the moral imperative of effective crisis management,
transcended the ideological nature of the Cold W ar. T he Yom Kippur W ar was the first major
third-party conflict to dem onstrate th at detente was fair game in furthering superpower selfinterest, so long as th e avoidance of direct engagement of Soviet and A m erican forces remained
at the fore of each n atio n ’s policies.
Even though N ixon and Kissinger assumed th a t another Arab-Israeli war was unlikely
in the short term, the Middle East had long been recognized by many Americans as the region
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which posed the greatest threat to a superpower confrontation.

As such, the Arab-Israeli

conflict provided a barom eter for measuring the “push and pull” im peratives of detente and the
Cold W ar. In 1969, W illiam E. Griffith com m ented on the potential for catastrophe in the
Middle East, where neither superpower had dem onstrated m uch success in controlling its clients,
but had nonetheless supplied them each with the ability to wage a massive war.160 George
M ahon, C hairm an of the House subcommittee on D epartm ent of Defense Appropriations, aptly
summed up a major A m erican foreign policy concern in 1972: “I think the feeling in this
country, certainly my feeling, is th a t the greatest threat to W orld W ar III lies not in V ietnam or
W estern Europe as such, b u t in the Middle East.”161 T he Yom Kippur W ar would thus test the
competing factors of superpower restraint and the desire for regional prestige.
A t the outbreak of the war, both the U nited States and th e Soviet U nion exonerated
their own actions by accusing the other as the instigator of hostilities. Moscow blamed the
U nited States for n o t heeding their warning of a looming war; while the U nited States countered
that the warnings were too vague, and delivered too early, to be taken seriously. A t the Pacem
in Terris conference on O ctober 8, two days after the beginning of the war, Kissinger warned:
“W e will resist any attem pt to exploit a policy of detente to w eaken our alliances, we will react
if a relaxation of tensions is read as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots.”
A nd most pointedly: “T he Soviet U nion cannot disregard these principles in any area of the
world w ithout imperiling its entire relationship with the U nited S tates.”162 For all of Kissinger’s
dismissals of the BPA - the docum ent th a t most directly prohibited superpower instigation - the
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Secretary of State and other Am erican officials were clearly surprised th a t Moscow had chosen
not to inform the Americans of an im m inent attack in early O ctober and believed th a t this
choice threatened the entire detente framework.163 A State D epartm ent publication released
in June 1974 made clear th a t the passage of time did n o t mellow W ashington’s heated reaction
at the start of the war: “W e will react if a relaxation of tensions is used a cover to exacerbate
conflicts in international trouble spots.”164
W ith the W atergate scandal occupying a majority of N ixon’s time, Kissinger became the
de facto head of U.S. foreign policy. A lthough Kissinger interpreted Soviet policy as essentially
discarding d etente in favor of other interests, the Secretary of State decided w ith N ixon on the
morning of O ctober 6 th a t detente should still guide U.S. policy:
O u r strategy was to use the th en prevailing policy o f d eten te to seek a jo in t approach w ith the
S o v iet U n io n from em erging as the spokesm an for the A rab side, isolatin g us in the Islam ic
w orld, and d ivid ing us from Europe. A b o v e all, it w o u ld also g a in tim e to perm it th e m ilitary
situ ation to clarify, sin ce w e w ere still co n v in c e d th a t w e w ou ld so o n h a v e to deal w ith the
p olitical co n se q u en ce s o f a rapid Israeli v icto ry .165

Kissinger’s strategy was em blematic of superpower behavior as a whole. D etente was many
things for many reasons: a tool of national self-interest; a means of expressing one’s intentions
to allies and enemies alike; and perhaps, most importantly, detente was seen as an essential
com ponent of crisis m anagem ent in th a t it could buy time so th a t a local crisis would be
understood before it erupted into nuclear war.
Ambassador Dobrynin observed th a t improved superpower com m unication - one of the
fundam ental goals of detente - was instrum ental in the m aintenance of superpower tension
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during crisis situations.166 Indeed, Soviet-American com m unication throughout the war was on
the whole constructive and crucial in keeping a bloody proxy war at th e local level. (Chapters
2 and 3 will elaborate on how each superpower, over the course of the conflict, challenged the
details of detente b u t did n o t break its basic purpose in avoiding a nuclear conflict.) After the
war, Brezhnev declared in a speech: “If the current conflict would explode in an environm ent
of general international tension and the sharpening of relations betw een... the U nited States and
the Soviet Union, the confrontation in the Middle East could become far more dangerous and
be on a scale threatening general peace.”167
Brezhnev was right. There were many ways th a t both superpowers could have taken
steps to minimize both the local and global tensions th a t arose as a result of the Yom Kippur
W ar. T h at the U nited States and the Soviet U nion chose n o t to in certain areas, was illustrative
of the overall meaning of detente in Cold W ar history. D etente was n o t “born” in the NixonBrezhnev era; rather it had developed over a long history of Soviet relations w ith the outside
world. D etente never aimed to end the Cold W ar - th a t would only come at the peaceful selfdestruction of one superpower of the course of a mutually exclusive com petition. Therefore, the
major com ponents of detente - arms control and restraint in consolidating influence in the Third
W orld - never reached a point th a t would hinder the ability of one of superpower in gaining
leverage over the other.
A n overview of the Soviet-Am erican detente reveals a system characterized by deception
and over-selling, domestic and international power politics, and even diametrically opposed

166Dobrynin, In C onfidence. 201.
167L.I. Brezhnev, as cited in Hoffmann, “D eten te,” in N ye, ed., T h e M aking o f A m erica’s Soviet
Policy, 245.
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interpretations of the meaning of relaxed tensions. It is certainly tem pting to ascribe to the
realist position as enunciated by Hans M orgenthau: “W h en you probe behind a term such as
detente you realize th at it is a typical ideology of foreign policy. T h a t is to say, it is n o t a foreign
policy by itself, but it is an attem pt to justify on rational and moral grounds w hatever policy the
term detente is invoked.”168 As M orgenthau would have it, detente was little more th a n
whatever Cold W ar leaders said it was in order to suit their interests in a particular time and
place. M orgenthau was correct to a point. N o am ount of diplomacy could have produced a
comprehensive definition of detente to be strictly followed at all points of conflict and
compromise. But criticizing detente only by examining the gulf th a t existed betw een words and
deeds misses a larger point.

It is the one th a t explains the major transform ation of each

superpower’s foreign policy over the middle decades of the 20th century: in the Soviet U nion,
from Lenin’s call for an inevitable war against the bourgeois world to K hrushchev’s renunciation
of therm onuclear conflict; in the U nited States, from C ontainm ent and massive retaliation to
the N ixon Doctrine and linkage.
N either the U nited States nor the Soviet U nion w anted nuclear war. By any measure,
detente intensified in the Nixon-Brezhnev era, as a result of nuclear parity and the dangers such
destructive capacity threatened, in a newly complex and m ulti-polar world. W h at W alter
Laqueur concluded of Soviet actions during the Yom Kippur W ar was true of the U nited States
and its ally as well: “T he Soviet dilemma was n o t w hether to support [the Arabs in] the war but
how far involvem ent could go w ithout antagonizing the A m erican architects and advocates of

168Hans M orgenthau, “D etente: Reality and Illusion,” George Schwab and Henry Friedlander,
eds., D etente in Historical Perspective (N ew York: Cyrco Press, 1975), 71.
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detente too m uch."169 Such was the threshold of detente: local conflict would continue so long
as global nuclear war could be avoided. As the Cold W ar played o u t in the M iddle East, the final
months of 1973 dem onstrated th a t detente had remained w hat it always had been: something
to be valued, b u t never at the expense of self-interest; and something to be denigrated, b u t never
to the point of nuclear war. In a system that rejected b o th m utual destruction and m utual
accommodation, there existed no alternative to the spirit of compromise created and sustained
by detente.

169W alter Laqueur, “D etente: W hat’s Left o f It?” N ew York Times Magazine, 16 Decem ber 1973,

27 .

Chapter III
Self Interest in a Client-State Relationship:
Soviet-Egyptian Affairs Through the Yom Kippur War

By 1973, the Arab-Israeli conflict fully evolved from a localized border dispute to a zone of major
superpower competition. Following Israel’s crushing victory in the June W ar of 1967, the Arab
border states immediately undertook a military and diplomatic program aimed at regaining
Israeli-occupied territory. T he A rabs’ goals were decisively more limited after the Six Day W ar;
although recognition of Israel as a legitimate political entity was unthinkable, its Americansupplied military superiority was unquestionable. T he Arabs, led by Egypt, exercised their only
acceptable option: increased support from, and dependence on, the Soviet Union. In public
treaties and proclamations, Moscow stressed its interests in the Middle East in ideological terms.
In the Soviet view (at least after Israel’s birth in 1948), Zionism and imperialism were two sides
of the same coin, and the Middle East was one of several regions across the globe where, in the
Cold W ar system, the Soviet U nion vowed to support socialist wars of national liberation. But
the historical record, which includes Moscow’s detente w ith the U nited States, reveals a
considerably different and more complicated picture from the supposedly rigid dimensions of a
bi-polar world.
Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar el-Sadat was staunchly anti-Comm unist,
interested in doing business with the U nited States, and vigilant in preventing excessive Soviet
influence in and around its borders. Egypt perceived relations w ith the Soviet Union, its
superpower patron, therefore as a m atter of default. N o other nation was willing or capable of
supplying Egypt w ith th e am ount of military and economic support undertaken by the Soviet
U nion beginning in 1955. But Moscow considered its default image in the A rab world as a
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manageable and minor problem in the scope of its own geo-strategic policies. T he Middle East
figured prominently in the Cold W ar system of vying for global dom ination. Industrialization was
quickly making the oil-rich Persian Gulf region one of the world’s m ost valuable areas; the Suez
Canal was the crucial link betw een the M editerranean Sea and the Indian O cean; and Egyptian
ports and airfields afforded strike and surveillance capabilities at the crossroads of Africa, Asia
and nearby Europe.
T he public diplomacy of problem-free Soviet-Egyptian ideological solidarity, therefore,
must be couched in the Realpolitik of each nation’s self interest. This trend became intensified
in the period leading up to, and including, the Yom Kippur W ar of O ctober 1973. Both Egypt
and the Soviet U nion moved toward adopting a singular, overriding foreign policy in the early
1970s. For Moscow, the era of detente ushered in a relaxation of tensions with the U nited
States. W ithin the framework of armaments reduction and increased trade, the Soviet U nion
was determ ined to avoid direct superpower confrontation at the precise time th a t Egypt (with
the support of Syria on Israel’s northern border) was pressing its patron state for sufficient
weapons to attack Israel - an act Moscow believed would heighten the very threat th a t detente
was designed to prevent. Consequently, the frictions w ithin Soviet-Egyptian relations worsened
with the imminence of the planned secret attack on the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.
In O ctober 1973, the Soviets had supplied its Arab clients w ith enough arms for its will to be
ignored. Moscow’s vigorous support of Arab military aims during the Yom Kippur W ar can be
explained, in part, by the Soviets’ inability to stop its clients. Soviet condem nation of Arab
hostilities could have precipitated a rejection of Soviet influence in the region. In fact, the
political nature of the Yom Kippur W ar (th at is, to force Israel to the negotiating table)
culminated in the realization of one of Egypt’s major foreign policy objectives: the resumption

of diplomatic relations w ith the U nited States. In a conflict w ith no real winners, the Soviets’
concern w ith the prospect of reduced prestige in the Middle East - some twenty years in the
m aking-justified Moscow’s longstanding support of the “no war, no peace” Arab-Israeli deadlock.

Historical Background
Russian interests in the Middle East predates the Soviet era by at least two centuries.
Landlocked Muscovite Russia equated international prominence w ith access to a warm-water
port. Peter the G reat worked toward free access through the Bosporus, beyond which lay
Constantinople and India - bo th as strategically im portant in the 18th century as they would be
in the 20th century.1 In 1770, the Russian Black Sea Fleet defeated the Turkish navy in concert
with British forces, as the scholar A aron Klieman observed, “For the nex t four years the Russian
fleet dom inated the Eastern M editerranean.”2 Russia’s tsarist regimes m aintained an interest in
the Middle East and surrounding waters until the revolutions of 1917.
T he Soviet application of Marxism-Leninism, strictly im plem ented in the foreign policy
of Josef Stalin, precluded Soviet interest in Middle Eastern affairs. U nder Stalin’s “two camps”
policy, Moscow’s foreign relations allowed no nuance betw een capitalist and Communist
countries. Non-aligned nations th a t had recently gained their independence were generally
shunned by the Soviets on the basis of their non-C om m unist (therefore, capitalist) status. In
N ikita K hrushchev’s program of de-Stalinization, the Soviet U nion began to fill the power
vacuum created in the wake of post-W orld W ar II colonial independence movements.

*Aaron S. Klieman, Soviet Russia in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1970), 27.
2Lawrence L. W h etten, The Canal War: Four-Power C onflict in the Middle East (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1974), 18.

Khrushchev dism antled Stalin’s “two camps” policy in favor of the more fluid “two zones”
framework.3 T he “peace zone” was comprised of both socialist and non-socialist “peace loving”
nations; i.e., those countries grounded in a national/anti-im perialist m ovem ent. This new policy
helped to create a major feature of the Cold W ar system, namely, superpower com petition for
influence in the non-aligned world. Along w ith Southeast Asia, the eastern rim of the
M editerranean became a focal point of superpower-client state relations.
A lthough the Soviet U nion was among the first nations to recognize the state of Israel
in 1948, relations betw een the two countries quickly soured. As historian W alter Laqueur noted,
“O nce the state of Israel was established, it ceased to be an agent of revolutionary ferment, and
thus had no further value for the Kremlin.”4 By 1956, Soviet policy toward Israel had completely
reversed from warmer relations following W orld W ar II and Israel’s birth. In the wake of the
Israeli, British and French tripartite attack on Egypt following N asser’s nationalization of the
Suez Canal, Soviet Foreign M inister A ndrei Gromyko denounced Israel as an “instrum ent in the
hands of extrem ist imperialist powers... [whose] actions are putting a question m ark on the very
existence of Israel as a state.”5
T he increased friction between the Soviet U nion and Israel coincided w ith the beginning
of comprehensive agreements between Moscow and th e A rab countries, led by Egypt,
surrounding (and opposing) Israel. Despite the clearly emerging confluence of Soviet and Arab
interests, it is im portant to note th at the first two major initiatives of Soviet support to Egypt -

3Ben-C ion Pinchuk, “Soviet Penetration into the Middle East in Historical Perspective,” in
M ichael C onfino and Shim on Shamir, eds., The U SSR and the Middle East (Jerusalem: Israel University
Press, 1973), 65.
4W alter Laqueur, T he Struggle for the Middle East: T h e Soviet U n ion in the M editerranean 19581968 (W ashington: M acM illan, 1969), 45.
5A ndrei Gromyko, as cited in A lden V oth, M oscow A bandons Israel for the Middle East: T en
Crucial Years in the M iddle East (W ashington, D.C.: University Press o f Am erica, 1980), 239-240.

the 1955 Czech arms deal and the process of funding the H igh Aswan D am - were commenced
by default. Nasser sought A m erican aid first, was turned down in bo th cases, and only then
struck a deal w ith the Soviets. This legacy of “second best” Soviet-Egyptian dealings would harm
relations betw een the two countries through the Yom Kippur W ar.
In 1955, President Nasser sought to fortify Egypt’s military capabilities in order to
counter both Israel’s growing strength and Iraq, which had newly acquired W estern support and
was threatening to replace Cairo as the most influential regime of the A rab world. Nasser was
likely unsurprised w hen the Eisenhower A dm inistration turned down his arms request; in effect,
he was asking the U nited States for weapons which could potentially be used against
W ashington’s regional allies.6Nasser was attem pting to prove A rab goodwill toward America by
underscoring the similarities of the Egyptian president’s anti-im perialist principles and
W ashington’s post-W orld W ar II history of supporting independence m ovem ents throughout
Asia and Africa - the very relationship the Soviet U nion would soon claim as its own.7 It was
Nasser’s anti-imperialist focus on Israel th a t helped attract the Soviets to his cause. T he Egyptian
leader’s flaring prose would n o t have been out of place among the statem ents em anating from
the Soviet propaganda machine:
Im perialism is th e great force that is im posing a m urderous, in visib le siege o n e hun dred tim es
m ore pow erful an d pitiless th an that w h ich was laid u p o n us in our tren ch es at Faluja, or that
w h ich en circled our in dividu al armies and our capitals w here w e re ce iv e d our orders.8

T he Baghdad Pact, announced on January 12, 1955, was a decisive factor in the

6Robert Edward Hunter, “T he Soviet Dilem m a in the Middle East, Part I: Problems o f
Com m itm ent,” London: Institute o f Strategic Studies. A delohi Papers. N o. 59, (September 1969), 6.
George Lenczkowksi, Soviet A dvances in the Middle East (W ashington, D.C.: Am erican
Enterprise Institute for Foreign Policy Research, 1971), 81.
8Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy o f the R evolution (W ashington. D.C.:
Public Affairs Press, 1955), 97-98.
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development of Soviet-Egyptian m utual interests. T he W estern-supported military alliance
between Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan posed two major threats to Cairo and Moscow. From the
Egyptian perspective, the pact was an attem p t to shift authority from the Cairo-centered
collective security pact of the A rab League to Baghdad. In the Soviet view, an alliance of three
W estern clients flanking its lower border posed grave security threats insofar as the military could
potentially be prevented from southerly thrusts toward the Middle East.9 O n Septem ber 27,
1955, the Soviet U nion (operating under the cover of Czechoslovakia) and Egypt signed their
first arms agreement. Egypt received almost 300 com bat aircraft, 100 tanks, heavy artillery, six
submarines, and a substantial number of guns - valued at an estim ated total of $250 million.10
A lthough the agreem ent significantly augm ented Egypt’s military strength, the 1955 Czech deal
was primarily political in nature. As Uri Ra’anan, a scholar, noted, the Soviet U nion’s objectives
w ould be to d em on strate that th e W estern m on op oly over th e supply o f arms to th e N ea r East
and, co n seq u en tly, over the local m ilitary and political b alan ce had co m e to an end; therefore,
N ea r Eastern rulers n eed n o lon ger go alon g w ith the W este rn d efen se plans or a ccep t the
territorial status q u o .11

The Soviet U nion fully realized its status as Egypt’s patron after Nasser nationalized the
Suez Canal in 1956. T he Soviets played their first major role in M iddle Eastern international
considerations w hen they opposed W estern intervention at the London Conference on the
Canal.12 Moscow was beginning to use the Middle East as a point of leverage by which to
proclaim its G reat Power status. A lthough Moscow enjoyed credit for the restoration of the
Sinai, it was U nited States President Dwight Eisenhower’s dem and for tripartite withdrawal that

9Uri Ra'anan, T he U SSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy
(Cambridge: T h e M IT Press, 1969), 20.
10Lenczkowksi, Soviet A dvances in the Middle East. 146.
11Ra'anan, T he U SSR Arms the Third W orld. 30.
12W h etten, T he Canal W ar. 27.
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ended hostilities. N onetheless, Egypt’s army was destroyed, and the Soviets were faced with the
choice of re-supplying their client or accepting a significantly downgraded role in Middle Eastern
affairs. Moscow’s decision to rebuild Egypt’s armaments sparked a new and more intense Middle
East arms race. Yigal Allon, an Israeli scholar observed, “T h e Soviet supply of arms to Egypt
grew in scale and caliber and with it Egyptian dependence on the Soviet U nion.”13
Following G reat Britain’s rather pathetic expulsion from th e eastern M editerranean, the
region set the Soviet U nion and the U nited States squarely against one another (thus making
the Middle East one more major point of Cold W ar confrontation), and W ashington quickly
moved to assume the position as defender of the W estern world’s interests in the region.14 Also,
the Arab-Israeli dispute cem ented the clear dem arcation of U nited States-Israel and
Soviet-Egyptian client-patron relations. The Soviets began publicly to link the ideological
m utuality of its support for national liberation movements and N asser’s unique brand of
anti-imperialist Arab nationalism.
In addition to military support, Egypt’s major foreign policy objective was to secure
sufficient economic aid to build the Aswan High Dam, a project th a t would greatly increase
Egypt’s acreage of irrigable land. T he Czech arms deal of 1955 served as a “wake-up” call to
W ashington, which initially expressed interest in this massive undertaking. Nasser first w ent to
the U nited States for aid, was rejected, and only th en turned to the Soviets. Initial A m erican
opposition to financing the project came from southern co tto n growers wary of abundant and

13Yigal A llon, "The Soviet Involvem ent in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in C onfino and Shamir, eds.,
T he U SSR and the Middle East. 150.
14U nited States, Congress, Subcom m ittee on Europe and the Subcom m ittee on the Near East o f
the Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings: Soviet Involvem ent in the M iddle East and the W estern
Response (W ashington, D .C .: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1971), 192.
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cheap Egyptian cotton on the world market; a strong pro-Israeli sentim ent among the public; and
a skepticism within the Eisenhower A dm inistration regarding Egypt’s economic ability to absorb
a project of such magnitude. Egyptian Ambassador to the U nited States A hm ed Hussein was
“crushed” by U nited States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ statem ent of rejectio n , which
concluded, “the economic situation makes [the dam] n o t feasible for the U nited States to take
part. W e have to withdraw our offer.”15
Dulles seriously miscalculated th a t Moscow would back the dam, and consequently, the
Egyptian people, he believed, would oust Nasser for his inability to secure funding for the project.
W ashington’s rejection did n o t help America’s image throughout the A rab world. T he U nited
States withdrawal was soon followed by G reat Britain’s own aid withdrawal, and with it the
withdrawal of a $200 million loan from the W orld Bank, which would n o t authorize grant
support w ithout U nited States and British backing. As A nthony N utting, a biographer of
Nasser, observed, Dulles’ decision not only “collapsed the house of cards” w ith his decision on
the Aswan High Dam; “he had pulled down the pillars of the temple on W estern influence not
only in Egypt, b u t throughout the Arab world as well.”16 In O ctober 1958, Nasser therefore
accepted Moscow’s $100 million loan, b u t even then he took special care to dem onstrate to the
Americans (as well as the Soviets) th a t Moscow’s support could in no way be interpreted as a
deviation from Egypt’s strict stance of non-alignm ent.17 T he Soviet U nion’s prestige in the area
increased as a result of W estern refusal to fund the dam.

Additionally, the 1958 Iraqi

15John Foster Dulles, as cited in D onald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes Am erica into
the M iddle East in 1956 (Brattleboro, VT: A m ana Books, 1988), 261.
16A nthon y N utting, Nasser (N ew York: E.P. D utton, 1972), 140-141.
17Ibid., 254.
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Revolution “ruined” the Baghdad Pact - a welcome developm ent in b o th Moscow and Cairo.18
By the late 1950s the Soviet position in the Middle East had evolved from exploiting
weak spots in the A rab-W estern relations to a tangible - and increasingly prestigious - profile
among its Arab clients. K hrushchev’s “Speech on the M iddle East,” presented to the 21st
Congress of the CPSU in January 1959, declared th at “differences in ideological views m ust not
hinder the developm ent of friendly relations betw een our countries and the cause of common
struggle against imperialism.” He w ent on to differentiate Soviet interests in the Middle East
from those of the imperialists, who
turn their ec o n o m ic relation s w ith u nd erdevelop ed co u n tries in to th e o b ject o f blackm ail and
extortion ; they im pose m ilitary and political co n d itio n s o n th em . O u r cou n try builds its relations
w ith all states o n principles o f com p lete equality and co lla b o ra tio n w ith o u t any co n d itio n s o f a
m ilitary or political n a tu re .19

Like most Soviet proclamations, Khrushchev’s speech was deceptively pleasant. W hatever
ideological solidarity th a t existed between Soviet and Egyptian leaders was consciously m uted
by Nasser, who never accepted the divisive lines drawn by the Cold W ar leaders.

Soviet

economic policy, exemplified by th e Egyptian cotton trade, was in some ways also imperialist.
The Soviet U nion bought Egyptian raw cotton at inflated prices and returned only finished
products. A nthony N utting described this relationship: “In short, K hrushchev’s policy had been
to help Russia by helping Egypt to become independent of the W est at the price of becoming
correspondingly dependent on the Soviet bloc.”20John Domberg, a journalist, characterized most

18U nited States, Congress, Subcom m ittee o n Europe and the Subcom m ittee o n the N ear East o f
the C om m ittee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings: Soviet Involvem ent in the M iddle East and the W estern
R esponse. 209.
19N .S. Khrushchev, "On the Middle East— Speech to the T w enty First Congress o f the CPSU,"
reprinted in A lvin Z. Rubinstein, ed.,' T h e Foreign Policy o f the Soviet U n ion (N ew York: Random House,
1960), 401-402.
20Nutting, N asser, 359.
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of the post-W orld W ar II Comm unist states “n o t as members of a com m onw ealth or alliance but
as the satellites and buffers of a new empire”; it was becoming obvious th a t the Soviet U nion saw
the Middle East as a modified extension of its original post-war policy.21 In fact, Soviet influence
in the Arab world grew w ithout any parallel expansion of Com m unist ideology in the region.22
W hen Nasser began to accept large numbers of Soviet soldiers and technicians in Egypt, he
frequently had to defend his policy against the general Egyptian concern of Comm unist
influence. O ne of N asser’s rebuttals to this concern is telling:
W e h ave 3 ,0 0 0 S o v iet tech n icia n s at A sw a n [m ilitary b ase] and as far as I k n o w n o n e o f the
A sw anis h ave b eco m e C om m u nists. O n th e o th er h a n d all th e S o v ie t tec h n icia n s n o w ea t lib
(roasted pum pkin seed s o f w h ich Egyptians are en orm ou sly fo n d ).23

Anwar el-Sadat, successor to Nasser, was more rigidly anti-Com m unist th a n Nasser (this was
likely one expression of his deeply religious convictions) and, in his view, the A m erican standard
of living was clearly superior to th at of its Cold W ar adversary.24
From N asser’s perspective, Communism, Israel, the arbitrary borders th a t Europe drew
over the Arab world after W orld W ar I, and superpower com petition in the region were all alien
elements th a t exerted unw anted influence on the Egyptian way of life. Peter Woodward, an
historian, observed, “It was the sense of his instinctive search for a more just political order that
took him into the political maelstrom of international politics in the region.”25 T he “maelstrom”
forced Egypt to tu rn to the Soviet Union, patron-by-default. N or did Moscow actively seek the
expansion of communism in the Middle East, where the atheist ideology was particularly

21John Dom berg, Brezhnev: T he Masks o f Power (N ew York: Basic Books, 1974), 217.
22Laqueur, T he Struggle for the Middle East. 181.
23Gamal Nasser, as cited in John Waterbury, The Egypt o f N asser and Sadat: T he Political
Economy o f T w o Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 393.
24Kirk J Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics and Civil Society (Boulder:
W estview Press, 1994), 36.
25Peter W oodward, Nasser (London: Longman Publishers, 1992), 151.

unwelcome among the leading regimes. W hile M arxism-Leninism was the theoretical guiding
force in the Soviet military and political structure, the age of nuclear warfare challenged the
efficacy of a doctrine th a t assumed violence of capitalist states to be th e “midwife of history”; the
threat of nuclear holocaust acted as a m oderating influence on the Soviet U nion’s quest to
overthrow the status quo in the Middle East.26 Soviet military support to Egypt can be described
as a balancing act betw een pleasing its client and sustaining its influence - always ensuring its
self-preservation as top priority. This explains, in part, the Egyptians’ almost perpetual complaint
of the quantity and type of weapons they received and the speed at which they arrived. Soviet
success in the Middle East, then, m ust be measured by the exchange of economic aid for
influence in a vitally im portant geo-strategic area.
In 1973, Leonid Brezhnev, successor to K hrushchev as G eneral Secretary of the CPSU,
declared, “In the developing countries, as anywhere else, we are on the side of the forces of
progress, democracy, and national independence; we regard them as our friends and comrades
in arms.”27 T he always-silent caveat to this and other Soviet proclamations regarding its
relations w ith countries could be, “so long as the friendship primarily serves our own interests.”
W hereas the Soviet explanation of national policy sought to persuade its audience that
benevolence and camaraderie were its chief exports, Eugene Rostow, former Undersecretary of
State saw a quite different agenda:
T h e first purpose o f the S o v iet effort is to a ch iev e strategic a n d ta ctica l co n tro l o f the
M editerranean, the M idd le East and the P ersian G u lf area. O n th a t footin g, th e n e x t step w ould

26Laqueur, T h e Struggle for the Middle East. 145.
27Leonid Brezhnev, Leonid Brezhnev: Pages From His Life (N ew York: Sim on and Schuster,
1978), 197.
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be to drive the United States out of Europe, and to have NATO dismantled.28
Robert O. Freedman, a scholar, is even more pointed: “T h e overall strategic goal at this time
[early 1970s] seems to have been the elimination of w estern military, economic and political
influence in the A rab world to the greatest degree possible, while substituting Soviet influence
in its place.”29 O f course, the tendency to focus on the niceties of foreign relations at the expense
of realities is hardly a Soviet monopoly. But perhaps the m ost telling illustration of this divide
was Egypt’s constant hostility toward a nation th a t supplied it w ith billions of dollars’ worth of
arms.
In exchange for this aid, as Galia Golan, an Israeli historian noted, Egypt hosted the
“Soviets’ largest overseas presence in a non-Soviet bloc country.” Moscow enjoyed “partially
.exclusive rights in some six or seven air bases, at least two naval ports, and several naval facilities
as well as approximately 20,000 military personnel.”30 L ieutenant G eneral Saad el-Shazly of the
Egyptian army outlined his country’s need for military strength and its dearth of options on how
and where to secure it:
W ith o u t the h elp o f th e S o v iet U n io n , our b a ttle, [th e Y om Kippur W ar] w ould h ave b een
im possible. I m ake n o ju d gm en t for or against the S o v iet U n io n , its ideology, pow er structure
or social system . I state a fact. N o other cou n try or group o f co u n tries co u ld an d w ould have
su p p lied Egypt w ith the arms in the profusion an d so p h istica tio n n eed ed to com b at
Is r a e l...[p r e c is e ly that fact led to the first o f p erenn ial problem s in our relationship w ith the
S o v iet U n io n . A s a m onop oly supplier, the S o v iet U n io n co u ld a n d did co n tro l their release o f
arms to us: th e w eap on s, the am oun ts and d ates o f d elivery.31

28Eugene V. Rostow, "The Middle Eastern Crisis in Perspecti ve o f W orld Politics," International
Affairs 47, (April 1971), 275-276.
29Robert O. Freedman, "Detente and U nited States-Soviet Relations in the Middle East During
the N ixon Years," in D ella W . Sheldon, ed., D im ensions o f D eten te (N ew York: Praeger, 1978), 83.
Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet U n ion and the M iddle East Crisis (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1977), 6-7.
31Saad el-Shazly, T he Crossing o f the Suez (San Francisco: A m erican M ideast Research, 1980),

100.
83

Shazly’s remarks exemplify the view as seen through the clients’ perspective. T he Egyptians were
constantly aware of the near-total lack of non-Soviet sources of aid. T heir only economically
feasible alternative to Moscow was politically infeasible: as the patron of Israel, the U nited States
was satisfied w ith the status quo, which Secretary of State and N ational Security Adviser H enry
Kissinger and President Richard N ixon believed could be m aintained as long as Israel was
ensured military superiority. A fter the Six Day W ar of June 1967, Egypt and its A rab allies were
thus “stuck” with the Soviet Union. T he Soviets, in turn, exploited their unique position by
actively seeking opportunities on a case by case basis w ithin the larger context of increasing
Soviet influence at the expense of W estern interests.32 T he Soviet policy of opportunity was not
unique to the Middle East. Alvin Rubinstein, an expert on M oscow’s Middle East policy
observed, “the more closely one examines Soviet diplomacy in the T hird W orld, the more one
is impressed by the flexibility and opportuneness of its responses to the potentialities of each
... _•
»33
situation.

T he simplest way to define opportunism is to frame choices in light of ability. The
Soviets chose to exert military and diplomatic influence in Egypt because they were able to do
so. But the more relevant question examines m atters of degree: why did the Soviet U nion focus
so intently on the M iddle East in general and Egypt in particular? In the Cold W ar system, the
U nited States and the Soviet U nion competed for global dominance. T he superpowers, in the
era of detente, actively sought to remove the threat of nuclear warfare from the range of

32Foy Kohler, Leon Goure, and Mose L. Harvey, Soviet Strategy in the Middle East: A Special
Report on Hiphliehts and the Implications for U nited States Security Interests (Coral Gables, FL: Center
for A dvanced International Studies, University o f Miami, 1975), 12.
33A lvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet U nion and the Third World," in Stephen F. C ohen, A lexander
Rabinowitch and Robert Sharlet, eds., The Soviet U n ion Since Stalin (Bloom ington: Indiana University
Press, 1980), 328.
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available options by which to manage this com petition. But d eten te did n o t erase the nature of
the com petition, and the Middle East offered two major points of leverage: geo-strategic
centrality and oil.

T he Soviet N avy Enters the M editerranean
Egypt sits at the crossroads of the M editerranean, and the Suez Canal and Red Sea allow passage
to the Indian O cean and beyond. Few countries offer access to three continents from as central
a position as Egypt.34 Egypt’s location thus offered Moscow a unique base for its expanding naval
and air forces. O ne A dm iral of the Soviet Navy described the im portance of the seas in the
nuclear age:
T h e principal ob jectiv e for th e lau n ch in g o f th e n u clea r attacks from th e sea a g a in st vitally
im portant targets o n en em y territory.... T h e o ce a n s h a v e lo st their form er sig n ifican ce as
p rotective barriers, w h ich during the tw o w orld wars effectiv ely separated th e cou n tries o f the
W este rn h em isp here from the d ev a sta tio n and d estru ctio n v isite d u p o n the n a tio n s o f Europe.35

Soviet military doctrine held th a t the world’s oceans are defensive in nature only in the sense
that they m ust be controlled for a deterrent effect.

Intercontinental missiles effectively

neutralized the vastness of the seas; for the Soviet hom eland to be protected, its navy m ust be
in position for a nuclear strike capability, designed n o t only to deter any opponents from attack,
but also to strengthen Soviet bargaining leverage betw een and after wars.36 Soviet military
commanders, like their political masters, espoused M arxism-Leninism as their guiding principle.
This ideology, in their view, was a force of benevolence amidst an evil and capitalist world. O ne

34Klieman, S oviet Russia in the Middle East. 43.
35K. Stalbo, "The Significance o f the Seas and O ceans in C om bat Actions," in Selected Readings
from Military T h ough t. 1963-1973, v. 5 pt. II. (W ashington D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office: 1982), 7736K enneth R. McGruther, T he Evolving Soviet N avy (Newport, RI: N aval W ar College Press,
1978), 58.
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Soviet colonel wrote:
In con trast to th e aggressive b locs o f the im perialist pow ers, th e u n io n o f th e cou n tries o f the
socialist co m m o n w ea lth an d their close m ilitary alliance h a v e a firm ob jective basis for
m on olith ic solidarity. T h is u n io n w as formed and is d ev elo p in g in acco rd a n ce w ith th e principles
o f S ocialist in tern ation alism , full equality o f th e m em ber states, strict ob servan ce o f their
sovereignty, n a tio n a l and in tern ation al interests, and u n selfish fraternal m utual aid.37

T he Soviet record bears a considerably different picture from this portrayal of a socialist fraternal
utopia.
Moscow had a strong impetus to build a large naval presence in the M editerranean. The
Soviets’ retreat from the naval confrontation at Cuba was recent history, and weighed heavily
in the Soviet strategy, as one writer describes “to be tak en seriously as a world power.”38 The
U nited States Sixth Fleet and Polaris submarine squadron lost its 15-year-long nuclear monopoly
in the region after the Soviet Navy commenced sustained exercises in the M editerranean in
1964. In a speech delivered in Egypt at Port Said in May 1964, K hrushchev sounded the alarm
over imperialist ambitions in the area:
T h e colon ialists n o w w an t to use th e aircraft carriers an d o th er w arships against the n a tion al
liberation m o v em en t o f th e peoples, to bring the p olicies o f n eu trality and n o n -a lig n m en t into
range o f their sh ips’ guns an d m issile s....T h e im perialists w an t, w ith th e aid o f aircraft carrier
diplom acy, to restore reactionary regim es in th e cou n tries o f A sia an d A frica.39

T he Soviet U nion com menced its first prolonged presence in the M editerranean one
m onth after Khrushchev’s speech. From the time Soviet Adm iral Sergei Gorshkov commanded
the navy to “sail upon the world’s oceans” in 1964 to 1968, the Soviet U nion expanded its

37M.P. Skirdo, "The People, the Army, the Commander: A Soviet View," in Soviet Military
Thought, published under the auspices o f the U nited States A ir Force, v. 14 (W ashington D.C.:
Governm ent Printing Office: 1970), 13.
38Hunter, "The Soviet Dilem m a in the Middle East," 24.
39George S. Dragnich, "The Soviet Union's Q uest for A ccess to N aval Facilities in Egypt Prior to
the June War o f 1967" in Ken Booth, John M cD onnell and M ichael M acGuire, eds. Soviet N aval Policy:
Objectives and Constraints (N ew York: Praeger, 1975), 253.
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out-of-area naval maneuvers by a factor of ten.40 T he scope of this buildup, along with other
considerations, allowed for a Soviet confidence unachievable directly after the C uban missile
crisis. According to one Soviet general, the M arxist-Leninist military doctrine of the Soviet
U nion provides a
stable fou n d a tio n [that] p redeterm ines the stability o f our g o v ern m en t an d th e in vin cib le m ight
o f th e S o v iet A rm ed Forces, their colossal co m b at capabilities, an d th e d ecisiv e character o f our
m ilitary d octrin e and strategy in the interests o f the d efen se o f th e cou n try.41

The new Soviet G eneral Secretary Brezhnev declared in 1965: “W e are trying to make our
diplomacy active and thrusting, while at the same time showing flexibility and circumspection.”42
In this context, “diplomacy” is a euphemism for the m aneuvering capabilities of the Soviet
military (the adjective “thrusting” would not, of course, be appropriate for describing an
embassy), which underscores the highly politicized nature of Soviet military doctrine. The
U nited States Navy regarded the Soviet strategy as a “conventional first-strike, optimized for a
preemptive attack against an opposing naval force th a t m ight be superior in overall combat
capabilities.”43 T he Soviet navy would have unquestionably lost in any head-on confrontation
with the Sixth Fleet, b u t in a nuclear conflict, a first-strike capability did n o t require military
superiority to serve as an effective deterrent. Steve Kime, an A m erican naval expert, defined
modern naval power as a “limited display of national will and power embodied in a ship or
squadron... [that] requires visibility for local effect.”44 In the Soviet view at the time, the U nited

40McGruther, T h e Evolving Soviet N avy, 36.
41S. Ivanov, "Soviet Military D octrine and Strategy," in S elected Readings from Military Thought.
1963-1973. v. 5 pt. II, 25.
42Leonid Brezhnev, as cited in McGruther, T h e Evolving Soviet N avy. 32.
43C ited in U nited States, Departm ent o f D efense, O ffice o f the C hief o f N aval Operations,
Understanding Soviet N aval D evelopm ents (W ashington, D.C.: D epartm ent o f the N avy, 1975), 19.
44Steve F. Kime, A Soviet N avy for the N uclear Age: N ational Security Affairs Issue Paper N o.
80-1 (W ashington, D.C.: N ational D efense University, 1980), 14.
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States had to be denied its nuclear monopoly in the M editerranean, and as a consequence, its
“natural” claim of dom inance in the seas.45 The Soviet navy was working toward a combination
effect th a t satisfied b o th security-defensive interests and political objectives during times of
peace. Admiral Gorshkov summarized the navy’s purpose:
By a w ell-b alan ced n avy w e m ean a navy w h ich in co m p o sitio n and arm am ent is capable o f
carrying o u t m issions assigned it n o t on ly in a n uclear war, b u t in a w ay w h ich d oes n o t m ake use
o f n uclear w eap on s, an d is also able to support state in terests at sea in p ea cetim e.46

These generalities of Soviet military doctrine were devised on a global scale, of which the
M editerranean/M iddle East was one vital theater.

T he

scholar Ivo Lederer observed, “a

governing Soviet assumption would appear to be th a t a global power m ust exercise its power
globally.”47 In the words of one journalist, the Soviet Navy’s presence in the Middle East was
designed to “make the W estern powers step just th a t more gingerly in any future crisis.”48
Moscow’s search for facilities to accommodate its navy forced its objectives abroad, because the
European portion of the Soviet U nion had strictly limited southerly access from its own ports.
Robert Freedm an noted th a t “Egypt presented the best or optimum conditions and
communications facilities required by Soviet naval-military, political, and diplomatic strategy in
the Middle East after 1956.”49 In the north of Egypt, airfields accom m odated Soviet bombers
that provided air cover to the M editerranean squadron; in the south, the air base near Aswan

45Ibid., 15.
46John G. Hibbits,"Admiral Gorshkov's Writings: Tw enty Years o f N aval Thought," in N aval
Power in Soviet Policy, published under the auspices o f the U nited States A ir Force, v. 2. (W ashington
D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office: 1982), 16.
47Ivo J. Lederer, "Historical Introduction," in Ivo J. Lederer and W ayne S. V ucinich, eds., The
Soviet U nion and the M iddle East: T he Post-W orld W ar II Era (Palo Alto: H oover Institution Press,
1974), 3.
48Econom ist, 18 May 1968, reprinted in Laqueur, T h e Struggle for the Middle East. 155.
49P.J. Vatikiotis, "The Soviet U nion and Egypt: T h e N asser Years," in Lederer and V ucinich, eds.,
The Soviet U nion and the Middle East. 131.

afforded a degree o f dom inance of N ortheast Africa and the Indian O cean.50 T he Egyptian
airbases, as the U nited States Navy observed, enabled “Soviet land-based naval reconnaissance
aircraft to operate over the eastern M editerranean w ithout overflying [N A T O members] Greece
and Turkey.”51 Soviet docking privileges in the Egyptian harbors at Port Said and Alexandria
additionally allowed the Soviet Navy a powerful and constant presence in the M editerranean
after the Six Day W ar of June 1967.
T he Soviet Navy’s major objective in the M editerranean was to check the dominance
of the U nited States N avy’s Sixth Fleet. Egyptian airfields were the major facility for the TU-16
aircraft, which specialized in surveillance of the Sixth Fleet.52 T he Soviet M editerranean Fleet
could boast of three advantages over its Am erican opponent: a younger squadron; proximity to
its home base in the Black Sea; and, as George Lenczkowski, an expert in the Middle East and
international relations, observed, “access to facilities in the radical A rab states along most of the
eastern and southern shores of the M editerranean.”53
N one of these advantages, however, could be translated into actual superiority over the
U nited States forces. T he ability to deny the U nited States monopoly in the M editerranean (or
any other theater, for th a t m atter) did n o t require certain superiority, b u t did dem and a
well-equipped and visible presence large enough to prevent uninhibited maneuvers like the 1958
American landing in Lebanon - a move th at the Soviet U nion was in no position to deter at that
time. However, had the U nited States decided to withdraw th e Sixth Fleet for any reason, the

50Freedman, "Detente and U nited States-Soviet Relations in the M iddle East During the N ixon
Years," in Sheldon, ed., D im ensions o f D eten te. 83.
51U nited States, Departm ent o f D efense, Office o f the C hief o f N aval Operations, Understanding
S oviet N aval D evelopm ents. 11.
52Hunter, "The Soviet Dilem m a in the Middle East," 13.
53Lenczkowksi, Soviet A dvances in the Middle East. 157.
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Soviet U nion would have remained, as one group of experts argued,
T h e d o m in a n t m ilitary pow er in the ea stern M ed iterran ean an d probably the Persian
G u lf... [w hich] w ou ld redu ce the risks o f a S o v iet co n fro n ta tio n w ith th e U n ite d S tates, and it
w ou ld grant th e S o v ie t U n io n naval and e v e n tu a l air superiority o v er th e E uropean N A T O
cou n tries bordering o n the M editerranean.54

Thus, th e im petus to build a sizeable M editerranean fleet was indeed strong. As one
scholar notes, the Soviet U nion’s acquisition of port and air field facilities in order to sustain a
M editerranean fleet “alone would account for K hrushchev’s and Brezhnev’s persistent efforts to
establish close working relations w ith a number of Arab states.”55 By the time of the Yom Kippur
W ar of O ctober 1973, the Soviet squadron reached its peak w ith 96 ships, which outnum bered
the U nited States Sixth Fleet.56
T he Soviet U nion’s interest in commanding a global reach through its navy was, as the
U nited States Navy understood it, indicative of Moscow’s policy toward “possessing a better
\

worldwide general purpose naval capability...[that is] increasingly capable of denying such
control to o th ers.”57 It is therefore apparent why Egypt was of great value to Moscow’s naval
requirements. W ith Egypt as its major Soviet satellite base in the region, Moscow was able to
project its naval power, under significant air cover, from southern Europe, northeast Africa, and
the Middle East and into the Indian O cean - a range n o t possible from any single domestic
military base. Given Egypt’s vital importance in the scope of the Soviet U nion’s geo-strategic
considerations, there is a clear disingenuousness to the Soviets’ oft-repeated tone of purely

54Kohler, Goure, and Harvey, Soviet Strategy in the M iddle East, 58.
5501es M. Smolansky, "The Soviet U nion and the Middle East," in W illiam E. Griffith, ed., The
Soviet Empire: Expansion and D eten te (Lexington, MA: D .C . H eath and Co., 1976), 260.
John J. Herzog, "Perspectives on Soviet Naval D evelopm ent: A N avy to M atch N ational
Purposes," in N aval Power in Soviet Policy, published under the auspices o f the U nited States A ir Force, v.
2. (W ashington D .C .: G overnm ent Printing Office: 1982), 40.
57Thom as W . W olfe, "Military Power and Soviet Policy," in Griffith, ed., T h e Soviet Empire:
Expansion and D eten te, 260.
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socialist camaraderie with the Egyptian people.

Soviet military requirem ents necessitated

policies th at contradicted M arxist-Leninist policy. A n orthodox application of the doctrine
would have prohibited relations with Egypt - a country w ith a long history of persecuting local
Communist parties. T he central location of Arab states along the M editerranean rim, and the
nature of their own weaknesses, can satisfactorily explain the Soviet U nion’s foreign aid policy.58
But geo-strategic considerations constituted only part of Moscow’s (Egypt-centered) interest in
Middle Eastern influence. T he concentration and am ount of A rab oil factored as the other
major determ inant th a t weighed heavily on the Soviet U nion’s M iddle East policies.

The Soviet U nion and Middle Eastern Oil
Middle Eastern oil is concentrated in the relatively small Persian G ulf region, which accounted
for the great majority of “free world” oil reserves.

As A braham Becker, a specialist in

international oil politics, noted, the Soviet U nion “could n o t be indifferent to Persian Gulf oil
affairs if she was at all concerned w ith the politics of the region.”59 This statem ent, while
certainly true, begs for elaboration. T he great influence of Persian G ulf oil over A rab politics was
without question, b u t to w hat end did oil directly serve Soviet interests?
Precise data on Soviet domestic oil reserves was unavailable to foreigners under the
Soviet State Secret A ct.
constituted

However, studies showed th a t the oil-rich Volga-Ural region

m uch of the oil exploration conducted throughout the Soviet U nion’s vast

58Klieman, Soviet Russia in the Middle East. 12.
Abraham S. Becker, "Oil and the Persian G ulf in Soviet Policy in the 1970s," in C onfino and
Shamir, eds., T he U SSR and the Middle East. 174.
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territory.60 In 1967, the Soviet journal International Affairs claimed:
T h e rationalization for U n ite d S tates policy in the M idd le East is th e alleged threat o f a S o v iet
takeover o f th e area’s oil. Im perialist sp okesm en know , o f co u rse, th a t th e U S S R , a large oil
e x p o r te r , has n o n eed o f M idd le E astern o il and d oes n o t take co n tro l o f o th er p eo p le’s resources
in th e im perialist m ann er.61

In fact, the Soviet U nion was importing a relatively small am ount of M iddle Eastern oil by the
late 1960s, mostly for consum ption in the Eastern bloc countries for the purpose, as W alter
Laqueur noted, “to balance trade relations and to recoup the Soviet credits th a t have been
extended to [the Arabs] .”62 It was clear to W estern observers that, w hatever the precise am ount
of proven oil reserves w ithin the Soviet borders, Moscow’s energy dilemma was nothing like that
of Japan’s or the countries of W estern Europe, which all were totally dependent on foreign oil
sources. Middle Eastern oil was an attractive import for Soviet policy, to the relatively m inor
degree th a t production and transportation costs of domestic oil often exceeded the price of
imported Arab oil to the industrial and population centers of European Russia.63
T he Soviet energy situation, then, had to contend w ith the rather enviable problem of
transporting and refining its own massive reserves. Between 1972 and 1982, as the historian
A nthony Stacpoole argued, “Russian oil sales have provided the bulk of Soviet hard-currency
earnings; latterly, this feature has become so marked th a t cynics have spoken of the USSR has
a ‘one-crop economy.’”64 In 1973, the year of the Arab oil embargo, Soviet oil production was

60U nited States, Congress. Joint Econom ic C om m ittee, A C om pendium o f Papers: Soviet
Econom ic Prospects for the Seventies (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office: 1973), 46.
6lC ited in Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, T he Soviet U nion and International O il Politics (N ew York:
Columbia University Press, 1977), 117.
62Laqueur, T he Struggle for the Middle East. 135.
63Leslie D ienes, "Issues in Soviet Energy Policy and C onflicts O ver Fuel Costs in Regional
Developm ent." Soviet Studies 23. (July 1971), 46-47.
64A nthon y Stacpoole, "Energy as a Factor in Soviet Relations w ith the Middle East" in Adid
Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, T h e Soviet U n ion in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives (N ew York:
H olm es & Meier, 1982), 91.
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planned at almost 1.5 billion tons of conventional fuel, o f which 32 percent of all exports was
marked for consum ption in six Eastern bloc countries.65 T he Soviet U nion was the world’s
greatest crude oil producer by the early 1970s. Soviet interests in Middle Eastern oil was, like
its support of Egypt and other revolutionary A rab states, primarily strategic in character.
Moscow was far more interested in denying the W estern and industrialized capitalist countries
of Persian G ulf oil imports than they were in expropriating the valuable commodity for
themselves. Moscow vigorously supported all three major Arab oil embargoes of 1956, 1967 and
1973-74 for this reason.66 During the Cold W ar, there was m uch debate on the Soviets’ ability
to sustain its impressive record o f oil production. Today, we know th a t Soviet proven oil reserve
capacity was not a fluke. David Remnick, a journalist, recently noted th a t today “Russia is lucky,
floating on a tide of profits from the oil-and-gas industry.”67 Joe D uarte, another journalist,
observed, Russia is “setting itself up as the potential undisputed oil and energy m arket
heavyweight cham pion of the world.”68
The Soviet U nion worked to ensure the continued strength of its own robust oil trade
in the Middle East. Soviet oil, which accounted for 62 percent of all fuel traveling south through
the Suez Canal, was blocked from reaching its A sian m arkets w hen the Canal was closed in
1967. T he eight-year closure of the Canal forced a 32 percent decrease in Soviet.oil exports.69
Moscow also actively sought to link oil to the Arab-Israeli dispute after the 1967 Six Day W ar.

65U nited States, Congress, Joint Econom ic C om m ittee, A C om pendium o f Papers: Soviet
Econom ic Prospects for the Seven ties. 51.
66Arthur Jay Klinghoffer. "Oil, Politics, and U nited States-Soviet Relations in the Middle East," in
Sheldon, ed., D im ensions o f D eten te. 83.
67D avid Rem nick, "Post-Imperial Blues," N ew Yorker, 13 O ctober 2003.
68Joe Duarte. "Bush's O ther Energy Problem Advances: U nited States, Russia M ove to Becom e
Supply Giant," < http://w w w .cbs.m arketwatch.com > o n 20 O ctober 2003.
69Klinghoffer, T h e Soviet U nion and International O il Politics. 97.

O ne expert argues th a t the Soviets “m aintained th a t because an Israeli withdrawal from
occupied A rab territories would lead to the reopening of the Canal, it was in the interest of W est
European states to seek an Israeli pullback to the pre-1967 borders.”70
Moscow’s interest in oil was similar to Soviet military doctrine, as bo th followed strategic
not ideological or economic considerations. W est European countries and Japan were the most
im portant allies in the A m erican industrial alliance and heavily dependent on Middle Eastern
oil. T he Soviet U nion sought influence - mainly through the auspices of its relationship with
Egypt - throughout the A rab world in order to gain influence over the Persian G ulf oil trade and
eventually force a re-orientation of W est European and Japanese foreign policy away from their
traditional superpower ally.71
Moscow also linked W estern oil interests with imperialism on the basis of a history of
friendly relations betw een the conservative oil sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf and W estern oil
corporations. Moscow saw an opportunity in the formation of OPEC, the founding principle of
which espoused an anti-imperialist policy ensuring an equitable share of oil profits for the
exporting countries.72 In the Soviet view, Arab oil interests in the 1960s and early 1970s were
clearly coalescing into an anti-W estern orientation - a trend th a t Moscow attem pted to exploit.
In February 1973, the Soviet newspaper hvestiict called for “the very rich oil sources of the Arab
world [to become] an effective weapon in the struggle against the forces o f imperialism.”73 Two

70Ibid„ 103.
7lU nited States, Congress, Subcom mittee on Europe and the Subcom m ittee on the Near East of
the C om m ittee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings: Soviet Involvem ent in the M iddle East and the W estern
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72"Resolution o f the First OPEC Conference", in OPEC Official Resolutions and Press Releases:
1960-1983. published and distributed on behalf o f OPEC, V ienna (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1984), 13.
73Izvestia. as cited in Foy Kohler, Leon Goure, and M ose L. Harvey, T he Soviet U nion and the
October Middle East War: T h e Implications for D eten te (Coral Gables, FL: C enter for A dvanced
International Studies, University o f Miami, 1974), 81.
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m onths before the im pending O ctober 1973 oil embargo, A natoly Gromyko, son of the foreign
minister, wrote:
W ith o u t a solu tio n to this [energy] problem in the n e x t few years, th e U n ite d S tates w ill be
u nable to m ain tain any sign ifican t grow th rate w h ich is fraught, for th e U n ite d S ta tes, w ith
far-reaching co n se q u en ce s under co n d itio n s o f th e a ccelera tio n o f co m p etitio n o n the trade
m arket an d th e p resen ce o f very a cu te social problem s.74

In other words, an oil embargo against the U nited States would be very good news for
Moscow indeed. T he Soviet U nion’s support of the 1973 embargo stem m ed from the double
benefit it would enjoy from this action. N o t only would the Am erican-led industrial alliance be
weakened, b u t the fuel shortages would lead to an increased dem and for, and consequently price
of the USSR’s own oil.75 T he 1973 embargo did n o t rupture the A m erican economy to the
extent th a t Moscow had hoped, but the U nited States was nevertheless ill prepared to brace for
the Arab cutbacks.

Easily accessible domestic reserves were mostly depleted, and new

environm ental regulations effectively halted new domestic exploration projects.76 T he posted
price of a barrel of oil nearly tripled by the end of 1973 as a result of the embargo. Ian Smart,
a scholar, argued th a t this dramatic inflation “gave the Soviet U nion an ideal opportunity to raise
the prices...of its own exports, and thus to increase very substantially its earnings of hard
currency.”77
Soviet oil policy in the Middle East, like its naval policy and general Cold W ar objectives,
operated under the cover of ideological principles, while the record of their actions speaks
primarily to self-interested politico-strategic determ inants. T he increasing dependence of the

74A natoly Gromyko, as cited in Kohler, Goure, and Harvey, Soviet Strategy in the M iddle East. 34.
75Golan, Yom Kippur and A fter, 8.
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industrialized world on Middle Eastern oil supplies presented the Soviet U nion with an
opportunity to link oil w ith a burgeoning anti-W estern sentim ent in order to harm the industrial
alliance economically. Ideologically, the Soviet U nion and the conservative A rab oil states
responsible for the embargo were at odds; b u t Moscow’s Middle East strategy planned for future
support of anti-imperialist Persian Gulf oil diplomacy.
T he Middle East served Moscow’s interests as one im portant region in a global, bi-polar
system of East-W est com petition. In the Soviet view, Egypt helped to satisfy all three of its
major objectives in the area. Egypt’s need for weapons to com bat Israel placed Moscow in an
advantageous position as the only country willing and able to arm Israel’s primary enemy. In
return, the Soviet U nion enjoyed naval and air m aneuverability th a t projected military force
from Southern Europe to India, w ith Egypt serving as the major base of operations. Finally, since
Egypt was the leading anti-Zionist state of the Arab world, th e Soviet U nion’s patron-state
position served, as one group of experts argued, “its objectives in increasing Arab dependence
on Soviet political and military support and th a t it facilitates the identification of the U nited
States as being pro-Israel and thus an enemy of the Arabs.”78 T he Soviet U nion positioned itself,
in the course of a decade, as a major power in the Middle East th a t did not exercise any presence
there before 1955. Between 1954 and 1965 Egypt alone received almost $13 billion dollars in
economic aid from the Soviet U nion and Eastern bloc countries.79 Moscow’s interest in Egypt
was part of a long-term strategy of influence as m otivated by self-interest.

78Kohler, Goure, and Harvey, Soviet Strategy in the M iddle East. 95.
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Soviet Aid to Egypt A fter the 1967 Six Day W ar
Israel’s rout of its A rab enemies in the Six Day W ar posed more th an one problem for the Soviet
Union. N o t only did Moscow w atch as Israel destroyed the billions of dollars’ w orth of military
equipm ent and weapons it had invested in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; the Soviets had to come to
terms with the incom petence of the Arab officer corps on which it placed its trust, and by
extension, its prestige.80 W hy, after the Arabs’ total defeat, did the Soviet U nion choose to
re-supply its clients in a more vigorous m anner than th a t w hich preceded the war?
O ne advantage the A rab defeat presented to the Soviets was its compatibility with the
M arxist-Leninist position, th a t held, as George Lenczkowski observed, th a t “in its advanced
stages, capitalism assumed the form of imperialism bent on subjugation of the less developed
nations of the T hird W orld.”81 This position was a convenient way for the Soviets to “save face”
and exploit the A rabs’ m uch expanded dependence of economic and military aid from Moscow
after the June W ar. T he Soviets sensed a new Arab urgency to confront Zionism after Israel had
occupied the A rab territories and believed th at in the new desperate situation re-supplying the
determ ined A rab armies would, eventually, result in a new era o f Soviet prestige in the region.
Former Egyptian ambassador A shraf Ghorbal reflected on the A rab stance th a t refused to accept
the new status q u o : “W hatever length of time, of money, and of effort it would take, [the Arabs]
would have to deploy every means, including resort to arms, to get back their lands and rights.”82
This determ ination could be realized only with renewed and intensified Soviet support.
T he Suez C anal was closed at the conclusion of the Six Day W ar, and Egypt faced an estimated
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annual revenue loss of 100 million pounds. Nasser had no money to buy more weapons to guard
against further Israeli advances. T he Egyptian leader’s requests to Nikolai Podgomy ushered in
a new era of Moscow’s influence w hen the Soviet President traveled to Egypt two weeks after
the June W ar cease-fire had taken effect. As A nthony N utting observed, “N ot only did he ask
for arms as a free gift, b u t he also pressed for Russian military advisers and instructors.... Nasser
insisted th at Soviet advisers and technicians should be attached to every brigade, and if possible,
every battalion of the Egyptian army.”83 After Nasser’s ill-fated war in Yemen and disastrous
confrontation with Israel, the Egyptian president had nowhere else to tu rn but Moscow. Nasser
defended his decision: “In the sphere of foreign policy, I found we had no relations.. .with any
country except the Soviet U nion.”84
The 1967 war taught Egypt th a t any future confrontation w ith Israel m ust begin w ith a
first-strike Arab attack. Arab military doctrine held th a t Israel’s preem ptive strike set the stage
for a rout.85 N asser’s initial requests to Moscow were predicated by his aim of acquiring a
sufficient quantity of offensive weapons to enable Egypt to regain the Sinai. T he Soviets initially
rejected the request on the grounds th at it would increase the chance of direct confrontation
with the U nited States. But Moscow eventually changed its position, reasoning that, in the
words of A nthony N utting, “by complying w ith Nasser’s requests, they would be able to keep
Egypt’s armed forces under their control, [and] they agreed to provide n o t only the arms, but
also the advisors and technicians for which they had been asked.”86 This new agreement would
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afford the Soviet Union, unsurpassed influence in the M iddle East, and in any event, as the
scholar Robert H u n ter noted, “to change policy would be an admission of earlier miscalculation
and a blow to Soviet prestige in the world generally.”87 Given all th a t Moscow had invested in
Egypt up to the June W ar, rejecting Egypt’s requests would have been folly. W alter Laqueur
concluded bluntly, “in the m odern world big powers had to pay a high price for political
influence.”88
The resurgence of Soviet arms shipments and consequent influence after the Six Day
W ar did not constitute a military alliance in the formal sense, b u t there was no doubt that by
1968 Egypt could no longer credibly claim membership to the non-aligned camp.89 Both Egypt
and the Soviets stood to gain from a m utual anti-Zionist relationship. T he major Soviet presence
would likely deter Israel from launching another catastrophic attack against Egypt; and in the
words of Jon Glassman, an expert on arms proliferation, “a repetition of the Six Day W ar
debacle could cause the Soviet U nion to lose all credibility as a protector of those in the Arab
world and elsewhere who were seeking to fight ‘imperialism.’”90 Moscow hoped th a t drawing
Egypt closer to Soviet influence would have the “magnetic” effect of radicalizing more countries
from the neutralist T hird W orld.91
Moscow’s influence increased steadily between the Six Day W ar and N asser’s death in
1970. As Arnold L. Horelick, of the RAND Corporation, described it, the Middle East was on
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its way to becoming “the first substantial Soviet sphere of influence in a non-contiguous area.”92
T he Soviets’ vigorous re-supply program replaced all m ateriel th a t Egypt had lost in the June
W ar by the end of 1968. Moscow also sent 3,000 Soviet advisors to m an the new equipm ent.93
In July 1970, the total num ber of combat aircraft in the Egyptian Air Force exceeded its
inventory before the June W ar by 32.94 Moscow’s ability to procure huge quantities of weapons
in a relatively short time was a project obviously m ean t for public consum ption beyond the
Middle East. In 1968, Secretary Brezhnev declared:
T h e b a la n ce o f forces o n a w orldw ide scale co n tin u es to tilt in favor o f socialism and its allies
b ecau se th e m ight o f th e socialist cam p is n o w su ch th a t th e im perialists are afraid o f the m ilitary
rout in case o f a h ea d -o n cla sh w ith th e m ain forces o f socialism .95

In fact, avoiding a direct superpower engagement was Moscow’s overriding foreign policy
concern. Brezhnev’s reference to “the might of the socialist cam p” by no means accurately
portrayed of Soviet-Egyptian relations after the June W ar.

T he Soviet U nion constantly

discredited A m erican actions toward a negotiated settlem ent, while reminding its client that
Moscow was, as Galia Golan described it, “indispensable to the Arabs as the only superpower
pressing for all A rab dem ands.”96 This fact was n o t lost on Nasser, who would have preferred
not to be entirely dependent on any single nation. T he Egyptian President defended himself
rhetorically: “So w hat should I have done? Should I have waited until the Americans would
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send me equal quantities of food and weapons? I’d have waited for ever if I had.”97 Nasser, of
course, was n o t complaining of the quantity of aid - only its source. Indeed, the Soviets invested
approximately $4.5 billion in the Egyptian miltiary betw een 1967-1970 alone. Egypt was the
leading recipient of Soviet aid among all non-Comm unist countries during this period.98
A t the end of June 1967, Cairo was vulnerable to Israeli raids which could now be
launched from the east bank of the Suez Canal - only 40 miles to the east. T he Israeli
occupation of the Sinai was totally unacceptable to Egypt, and no diplom atic solution would
m eet Nasser’s goal - full Israeli withdrawal. The Egyptian army, fully supplied w ith Soviet
offensive weapons, com m enced the W ar of A ttrition in 1969. T he Egyptian Field Marshal
Mohamed Abdel G hani El-Gamasy explained the reasoning behind Egypt’s renewal of hostilities:
Egypt’s purpose w as to in flict en o u g h dam age o n th e Israeli forces in the S inai in arms,
eq u ipm en t, and to its fortifications - in ad dition to losses in life - to c o n v in c e it that its stay in
th e occu p ied A rab lands w ould be at a very h igh cost, n o t o n ly in terms o f th e a ctu a l losses
su stained - w ith all th e n eg a tiv e psychological im pact this w o u ld h a v e o n th e Israeli forces and
people - b u t also in terms o f th e size o f th e forces it w ou ld h a v e to co m m it to S inai and w ith the
n eed for co n tin u o u s m obilization over lon g periods, w h ich w o u ld in ev ita b ly h a v e d etrim en tal
co n se q u en ce s o n Israeli society .99

In sum, N asser launched the W ar of A ttrition to test the endurance of the Israeli military
- a force not designed for protracted conflict. Nasser hoped to convince T el Aviv th a t it could
not occupy Arab territories indefinitely. During this “war of attrition,” Nasser was again forced
to ask the Soviets for increased aid. Israeli air raids, which penetrated deep into Egypt proper,
were wreaking havoc on the military and society in general. A t first Moscow rejected the request
because sufficient protection would require a new level of Soviet influence th a t could lead to a
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I

superpower engagement. But Nasser’s visit to Moscow in January 1970 successfully played on
the other major Soviet concern. H e declared:
I am a lead er w h o is b om b ed every day in h is ow n country, w h o se arm y is ex p o sed and w hose
p eop le are n aked. I h ave the courage to tell our people the u n fo rtu n a te tru th - th a t w h eth er
they like it or n o t, the A m erican s are the m asters o f th e w orld. I am n o t goin g to b e the o n e w ho
surrenders to th e A m erican s. S o m eo n e else w ill co m e in m y place w h o w ill h ave to do it.100

T he Soviets deliberated for several hours before accepting N asser’s request for aid.101
Moscow undertook a missile defense shield, m anned by Soviet technicians, to protect Egypt from
the Israeli air force. As the historian Raymond Baker put it, “T he only alternative to an enlarged
Soviet presence was capitulation.”102
T he “war of attrition,” which failed to expel Israel from the Sinai, illustrated the basic
Soviet conundrum in the six-year interwar period. Moscow exercised caution with its military
aid and presence so as not to provoke a direct American response in defense of its Israeli clients.
T he Egyptian leadership knew perfectly well th at the only nation th a t would likely settle the
Arab-Israeli conflict was the U nited States - a fact they continually m entioned as leverage
against Moscow in protest of its cautious air defense policy.
Nasser’s d eath (likely caused by the stress induced from Egypt’s intensifying conflict with
Israel) did n o t come as a surprise to Moscow. Soviet doctors who exam ined the Egyptian leader
knew they were dealing w ith a gravely ill patient at least one year before he died. In anticipation
of a new regime in Cairo, the Soviets looked to install their “key m an” Ali Sabri to succeed
Nasser. Nasser responded by naming the conservative and W estern-leaning A nwar el-Sadat as
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Vice President.103
W h en Sadat assumed the presidency following N asser’s death in Septem ber 1970, he
inherited relations w ith Moscow th a t had reached a curious, paradoxical level. T he Soviet
U nion’s massive aid package after the June W ar emphasized Egypt’s constrained and dependent
relationship with its patron, n o t to m ention the thousands of Soviet advisers in Egypt who acted
as if they were sovereigns. Yet, as a result of Moscow’s support, the Egyptian military was
reaching, as Peter W oodward, a biographer of Nasser, noted, a point “at which Sadat could plan
secretly to cut free of his Eastern patrons.”104 In the colorful phrase of Robert H unter, writing in
1969, “The Soviet U nion may be acquiring more influence w ith individual Arab states, but at
the price of appearing often to be the dog wagged by the Arab tail.”105 Furtherm ore, the Soviets’
abrasive style, b o th in regard to the members of the Politburo in Moscow and the advisors
throughout Egypt, did n o t help the cause of socialist fraternity. A nwar Sadat summarized the
situation: “W e had w hat one could call relations only w ith the Soviet U nion - a country that
never made us feel there were advantages in having relations w ith it, since the Russians had
practically no relations with anybody.”106
T he A rab clients found m uch to complain about in nearly every aspect of
Soviet-Egyptian relations. Egyptian generals grappled w ith terribly translated tactical handbooks
in Soviet military academies, and were often instructed by lower ranking Soviet officers.107 In
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Sadat’s words, the “Soviet U nion liked to see [Egypt’s] hands tied,”108 w hich resulted in an
inverse relationship betw een Moscow’s involvement in Egypt and its popularity th ere.109 Lt.
G eneral Shazly was perhaps the most succinct in his characterization: “T he Russians have many
qualities, but concern for hum an feelings is n o t among them .”110 This helps to explain the
popular moniker for the 18,000 self-segregated Soviet advisors stationed in Egypt: “the unsmiling
ones.”111 More im portantly the rising anti-Soviet sentim ent spread from the general public to
the army - a trend th a t would bear heavily on Sadat’s future dealings w ith Moscow.112

Soviet-Egyptian Relations from Sadat’s Inauguration to the Yom Kippur W ar
By the early 1970s the Soviet U nion’s policy in the M iddle East had undergone a major
transformation since its introduction to the region in the 1950s and early 1960s.

Arab

nationalism, once a strong anti-W estern m ovem ent vigorously encouraged by Moscow, had, as
the historian A deed Dawisha described it, turned “against Soviet interests in the 1970s as they
had been against the W est ten to twenty years earlier.”113
Sadat’s relations with Moscow began on a high note early in his administration. The
opening ceremony of the Aswan High Dam on January 13, 1971, m arked the successful
completion of a structural feat comparable to the construction G reat Pyramids.114 The dam
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could n o t have been completed w ithout Soviet assistance, b u t Sadat and the Egyptian military
were n o t content w ith developm ent aid alone; Egypt needed arms. Sadat set out for Moscow
in early M arch to state personally his complaints on the quantity and type of weapons deliveries.
The meeting ended with Sadat in a rage after the Soviets stipulated th a t certain weapons were
only to be used upon receiving prior approval from the Kremlin. “Nobody,” he said, “is allowed
to take a decision on Egyptian affairs except the people of Egypt itself - represented by me, the
President of Egypt!”115 This was the basic Soviet-Egyptian source of strained relations: the
Soviet U nion was careful n o t to arm its client to a level beyond w hich Moscow could dictate its
will, and Egypt resented the political “strings” attached to all Soviet arms shipments, which
Sadat perceived as a slight to Egyptian sovereignty.
A nother major source of friction was Moscow’s attem pted infiltration of the upper
echelons of the Egyptian government, through its pro-Soviet Vice President A li Sabri and his
Communist faction. As a high-ranking governm ent official, Sabri was a serious political liability
to Sadat, who was having enough trouble building his own reputation w ithout Sabri’s repeated
exaltations of Nasser’s legacy. As M ohammed Heikal, an influential Egyptian journalist, p ut it,
“They w anted the dead leader to become a fourth pyramid in Egypt and for themselves to be
installed as perm anent and exclusive high priests ministering to his shrine.”116 President Sadat’s
name was m entioned during a private tea time with Soviet President Podgorny, to which Sabri
joked, “w hat president?” Sadat was not amused upon hearing this story.117 O n April 22, 1971,
Sadat summoned the Soviet ambassador to notify Moscow th a t Ali Sabri, popularly known as
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the Soviet U nion’s “num ber-one” m an in Egypt, would be relieved of his duty.118 A fter Sadat’s
purge of pro-Soviet governm ent officials, Moscow became even less inclined to risk involvement
in another M iddle East war for a client government th a t barely disguised its hostility to the
Soviets. As Raymond H innebusch, a political scientist, observed of Egypt’s response, “Sadat and
those around him became convinced th at Moscow either w anted to freeze the [Egypt-Israeli]
conflict for the sake of detente or to bring about a leftwing revolution in Egypt.”119
In the wake of the considerable cooling of relations betw een Cairo and Moscow as a
result of the Sabri purge, the May 1971 signing of the Soviet-Egyptian T reaty of Friendship and
Cooperation was n o t the warm commemoration th a t its title suggests. Moscow feared for its
relevance in Egypt, and for good reason. T he treaty was signed at th e Soviets’ urging, while
Sadat was considering a total break with the Soviets.120
T he Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty fits the p attern of disparity betw een diplomatic
niceties aired in public and the underlying animosities th a t m arked the actual relations in this
client-state relationship. Article I of the treaty declared,
that unbreakable friendship will always e x ist b etw e en th e tw o co u n tries an d their peoples. T h ey
will c o n tin u e to d ev elo p and stren g th en the ex istin g relations o f friendship an d all-around
coop eration b e tw e e n th e m ...o n th e basis o f th e principles o f resp ect for the sovereignty
territorial integrity, n on in terferen ce in the in tern al affairs o f ea c h other, eq u ality and m utual
b en efit.121

The treaty, disingenuous as it was, marked the first time the Soviet U nion clearly affirmed its
com m itm ent to the defense of a Third W orld non-C om m unist country.122 T he Soviet U nion’s
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major pledge, while interpreted in the W est as a sign of increased Soviet prestige in Egypt, was
in reality a rather desperate move to keep Sadat from seeking a resolution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict through the diplomatic efforts of the U nited States. This would render the Soviet
position in the Middle East largely irrelevant.123 In S adat’s view, th e treaty was another Soviet
bullying tactic; an Egyptian refusal to sign the treaty may have deprived him of future arms
shipments.124
In July a Com m unist coup d ’etat in Sudan put another strain on Soviet-Egyptian
relations. Ga’far al-Numayri regained power three days after he was deposed - only w ith Libyan
and Egyptian support. Moscow had supported the coup, and dem anded th a t Sadat recognize the
new governm ent.125 O n this m atter, Sadat wrote, “My attitude is firm. I said we condem ned it
because we would n o t accept a Comm unist regime established on our doorstep - in a country
sharing our borders.”126 In light of the recently signed Friendship Treaty, S adat’s position is
especially striking. O n the one hand, the greatest Com m unist power in the world had pledged
its support for the defense of Egypt; on the other, its client regarded a bordering Communist
state as a grave th reat to Egyptian security.
Moscow was ever concerned w ith maintaining its influence and investm ent in Egypt.'
Sadat had repeatedly called 1971 the “year of decision,” i.e., a military confrontation against
Israel w ith the stated aim of expelling its military from the Sinai. Moscow agreed to a major arms
deal in O ctober, promising to m eet Sadat’s military requirem ents by the end of the year.127 But
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the Soviet U nion had concerns elsewhere. The war in V ietnam still dem anded Soviet aid and
attention, and in the wake of Indo-Pakistani W ar, which started on Decem ber 8, required th at
many arms shipments earm arked for Egypt be re-routed to India, Moscow’s major client in South
Asia. The Soviets clearly w anted to avoid managing three concurrent wars.128 O f the arms th at
did reach Egypt, there was insufficient time to train properly w ith the new equipment.
Sadat’s m uch heralded “year of decision” ended silently, and he

was humiliated.

Moreover, Egypt was furious with its clients’ Indian policy. From C airo’s perspective, Soviet
arms were being deployed for use against a fellow Muslim nation. Sadat could n o t understand
why the Soviets were exercising caution against Israel - an A m erican friend - while helping to
escalate the war against Pakistan, a formal U nited States ally.129 In a mid-December interview
with the N ew York Times, Sadat voiced his concern th a t the Soviets would unilaterally pull out
of Egypt, which would make Egypt’s already grim military situation even worse.130 A n executive
assessment m eeting of military branch commanders held in the beginning of 1972 presented
Sadat with a nearly total deficiency in offensive capabilities.131 T he Egyptian leader may have
declared war inevitable, b u t inevitability was no guarantee of im m inence.132
In late April 1972 Sadat was compelled to travel to Moscow for assurance of continued
Soviet support. T he m ounting detente between the superpowers threatened to neutralize the
Arab-Israeli conflict - a good strategy for avoiding a nuclear confrontation, b u t a blow, of course,
to the Egyptians. T he Soviets attem pted to assuage Sadat’s fears by ending his visit w ith a pledge
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for a new Soviet-Egyptian communique, which stated, “the A rab states. ..have every reason to
use other means to regain the Arab lands captured by Israel.”133 A lthough the language of the
communique was implicit, it marked the first time th a t Moscow condoned war - provided that
a diplomatic solution was impossible and th at Egypt was militarily ready to resume hostilities.134
The major caveat to the com munique was the second stipulation. W hile a diplomatic solution
did n o t look any more feasible in 1972 then it had in 1968, Egypt’s preparedness for war was
entirely contingent on Moscow’s willingness to support its client accordingly.

Sadat was

convinced th a t in the clim ate of detente, adequate Soviet support would n o t be forthcoming.
Additionally, all diplomatic initiatives with W ashington had proved fruitless. As the scholar
Raphael Israel noted, “T he U nited States had become a ‘lost cause’ for Sadat, as he felt that it
had lent its blessing to Israel, ‘slamming all doors’ in his face.”135
Sadat’s interpretation of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in May 1972 left nothing to the
imagination: “It was clear to me th a t in Moscow the two superpowers had agreed th a t there was
to be no war in the Middle East area. There was to be nothing for us b u t surrender.”136 Sadat’s
dram atic assessment of th e meeting was correct. Following the May summit, Soviet arms
shipments were delayed and did not include offensive w eapons.137 Brezhnev was living up to his
part of the detente bargain, which vowed, among other things, to relax military tension in the
Middle East. In the Egyptian view, the projected sequence of events was extremely grim. A
“military relaxation” m eant th a t Egypt was to receive neither the quantity nor type of weapons
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sufficient to launch the war against Israel. Since Israel, backed w ith implicit U nited States
support,138 gave no sign of withdrawing from the occupied territories before directly negotiating
with the Arabs, Egypt’s continuing inability to forcibly expel the Israeli military was tantam ount
to acceptance of the status quo, w hich in turn m eant surrender.139 Moscow simply did n o t want
to jeopardize its new position vis-a-vis the W estern world because of a Middle Eastern border
dispute.
Sadat sent Brezhnev a m em orandum after the May summit, which asked for an
explanation on the affairs of their respective countries. T he Egyptian President waited over a
m onth for a reply, which contained only pleasant generalities w ith none of the specific points of
information Sadat dem anded.140 In response, Sadat had a prepared message to be delivered to
Moscow by the stunned Soviet ambassador:
It seem s that th e S o v iet U n io n has no co n fid en ce in the E gyptian lea d ersh ip and fails to
appreciate th e dangers o f the situ ation . W h ile Egypt is an xiou s to m ain tain th e friendship o f the
S o v ie t U n io n sh e is u nab le to subm it to a p osition o f tru steesh ip to a n y o n e, in clu d in g th e S o v iet
U n io n .141

Sadat decided to expel th e 15,000 Soviet advisors currently stationed in Egypt and to banish all
Soviet equipm ent th a t Moscow was unwilling to sell to him .142 As A deed Dawisha noted, Sadat
decided “th at the Russians had become n o t just a nuisance, b u t a positive obstacle to his future
Middle Eastern and international policies.”143
Sadat’s decision was politically brilliant. As Alvin R ubinstein argued, “N ot since Nasser
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had nationalized the Suez Canal Company almost sixteen years earlier to the day had an
Egyptian leader so captured the attention and im agination of the A rab world and the
international com m unity.”144 Nasser’s legacy weighed heavily on this m om entous event. Before
the expulsion, Soviet military personnel had obtained near-sovereignty on Egyptian army bases
- a fact most Egyptians believed Nasser would never have perm itted.145 This was a highly
debatable, b u t for a relatively new president still working in the shadow of his predecessor,
invoking Nasser’s spirit was beneficial for Sadat’s domestic standing. T he expulsion was also
militarily brilliant. If detente worked toward preventing war betw een Egypt and the Israelis,
Sadat believed th a t launching a war with a large num ber of Soviet advisers in harm ’s way would
be impossible.146
The Soviets complied with Sadat’s order. Soviet advisors and weapons were promptly
evacuated from Egypt. Moscow hoped th a t its comprehensive response would remind the client,
in the words of Galia Golan, “of the American com m itm ent to Israel - as well as the fact th a t
the Soviet U nion was their only true friend - lest they think they would find satisfaction in the
W est.”147 T he message was lost on Sadat, who was no longer interested in finding “satisfaction”
elsewhere. T he Israelis and the Americans misinterpreted Sadat’s expulsion order as a break in
Soviet-Egyptian relations th a t would render another war unlikely.

A m erican military and

diplomatic analysts were quoted in a July 19 article in the N ew York Times interpreting the effect
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Shamir,
eds., T he U SSR and the M iddle East, 174.
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147Golan, Yom Kippur and A fter. 25.
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of the expulsion as ham pering Sadat’s ability to expel th e Israelis from the Sinai.148 T he
expulsion led to one faulty justification of U nited States support for Israel. As the prom inent
Israeli historian Nadav Safran observed, Sadat’s decision “was seen in the U nited States as the
major payoff of a policy of close support for Israel rather th an as a possible ground for changing
that policy.”149 Sadat, then, tricked his enemies into believing th a t their policies would
indefinitely prevent war - w hich was exactly the kind of intelligence climate th a t would fail to
prevent a surprise attack.
T he next few m onths saw another considerable cooling in Soviet-Egyptian relations.
Moscow had stepped up its military supply effort to Syria, w hich would become a crucial factor
in the two-front Yom Kippur W ar. In October, Egyptian Premier Azziz Sidqi traveled to Moscow
for high-level talks in order to sm ooth over the hostilities betw een the two countries, thus paving
the way for a return - albeit downgraded - of Soviet military personnel to Egypt. The Soviet
expulsion in May had successfully transm itted Sadat’s intentions to the Americans, Soviets, and
Israelis, but Egypt still required Moscow’s support for war.
A February 1973 mission to Moscow, headed by Major G eneral A hm ed Isma’il, finally
netted the Egyptian military the offensive weapons it needed, m ost im portant of which were the
SCUD missiles capable of striking Israel and thus serving an im portant deterrent effect.150 The
arms deal was the biggest in the history of Soviet-Egyptian relations, and n o t insignificantly, the
shipments arrived in a prompt fashion - also unique in Sadat’s dealings w ith Moscow.151 U pon
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surveying the new situation, the Egyptian President exclaimed, “they are drowning me in new
arms!”152
Sadat had many reasons to be happy. In a Newsweek interview in early April, he equated
the arms shipments w ith th e ability to act independently of Soviet wishes.153 This rather bold
statem ent - made in an Am erican periodical, no less - explains S adat’s satisfaction. From the
beginning of his presidency, the Egyptian leader viewed his relations w ith Moscow by a single
criterion: his patrons’ willingness to provide arms. T he Soviet opposition to war was no secret,
but as the expulsion dem onstrated, Moscow’s influence in Egypt was unwelcome if its policies
would prevent Sadat from freedom of military action. In the Egyptian view, relations w ith the
Soviets were useless unless they produced the means to complete Egypt’s major foreign policy
objective.
Sadat knew all too well th a t Moscow’s intentions in th e Middle Eat were strategic, not
ideological in nature. W hile detente m eant accommodation betw een the superpowers, it was
by no means a signal toward ending com petition for global dom inance in a bi-polar system.
Between its oil and its geo-strategic centrality, the Middle East rem ained a crucial theater of
influence from which Moscow was unwilling to part. N or were the Soviets prepared to confront
the U nited States directly, which partly explains their “back-and-forth” arms policy w ith Egypt.
However, the Soviet U nion decided to resume their arms deliveries to Egypt for another reason.
W hereas Nasser had managed to alienate most of th e Persian G ulf States as a result of his
Yemeni W ar, Sadat was able to marshal significant support - in the form of outright cash grants
and pledges to embargo oil shipments as a sign of pan-A rab power - from the billionaire oil
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sheiks, headed by Saudi A rabia’s King Faisal. A fter Israel occupied Arab lands after 1967, the
conflict spread beyond the “first circle” border-states to the “second and third circle” Persian
G ulf states.154 A t least in terms of the conflict with Israel, Sadat enjoyed the support of most of
the Arab world, and Moscow was pleased to obtain oil-derived hard currency, care of Sadat’s
Persian Gulf backers, who agreed to pay for the massive arms shipm ents.155
By M arch 1973, Sadat had the arms and financial support to wage war. O n M arch 26
he spoke before the Peoples’ Assembly in Cairo:
T h e stage o f tota l con fro n ta tio n has b eco m e in evitab le an d w e are en terin g it w h eth er w e like
it or n ot. T h e m ilitary situ ation m ust b e m ade to m o v e, w ith all th e sacrificing this en tails. W e
m ust tell th e w orld that w e are here and th a t w e ca n d icta te our w ill.156

Despite Sadat’s previous threats, 1973 was to be the real “year of decision” for the simple fact
th at Moscow was finally willing to supply its client w ith an arms cache at least quantitatively
equal to th a t of Israel’s. Moscow no longer denied its client offensive weapons in the m onths
preceding the war, w ithout which Sadat could never have attem pted to dislodge Israeli forces
from the Suez C anal region.157 Moscow’s public statem ents on the Middle East reflected Egypt’s
new capabilities, and (implicitly at least) recognized th a t Soviet arms were now potentially
capable of contravening Soviet policy. A t an April 5 press conference in Stockholm, Soviet
Premier Aleksei Kosygin cryptically responded to a question about Soviet arms deliveries to
Egypt: “W e believe th a t Egypt has a right to possess a powerful army now in order to defend itself
against the aggressor and to liberate its own lands.”158
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In late summer of 1973 the Soviets considered the many benefits of another Arab-Israeli
war. European imperialism was becoming a distant memory in the A rab world, and Moscow was
struggling to sustain its relevance in the region - which could only be accomplished through
public opposition to Israel, the “new imperialist”. In Moscow’s view, a new war could deflect
widespread anti-Com m unist sentim ent throughout the Arab world and allow the Soviets an
opportunity to dem onstrate their solidarity with progressive Arab states. W hile a rapprochem ent
with the conservative Persian G ulf monarchies was a pipe dream, the Soviets (correctly)
reasoned th a t a war could engender a serious breach in their relations w ith the Americans,
especially during a time of d eten te.159 All of these positive hypotheticals were augm ented by one
of Moscow’s major concerns.

Opposition to war could very well lead to another Soviet

expulsion. Given the A rabs’ concerted anti-Zionism and their new military capabilities, there
was a chance th a t they could win the war - a t which point it would be unlikely th a t the Arabs
would again invite a major Soviet presence in the region.160
But none of these considerations, of course, existed in a vacuum. In the new era of
detente, avoiding confrontation with the U nited States was still Moscow’s greatest foreign policy
goal. (See C hapter 1 for an expanded discussion on this point.) T he May 1973 Nixon-Brezhnev
summit renewed the leaders’ m utual com m itm ent to detente, which included pledges to contain
local conflicts before they erupted into a superpower crisis.161 In Brezhnev’s thinking, detente
was one-half of a contradictory policy. As Paul Murphy, a biographer of Brezhnev, p u t it, the
Soviet leader aimed for bo th “normalized state-to-state relations w ith Soviet U nion [and
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demonstrated] vigorous support of national liberation m ovem ents and sympathetic factions and
regimes

engaged

in

regional

conflicts.”162 M oscow’s

equivocal

policies

between

detente/opposition to war and support of Egypt’s objectives reflected Brezhnev’s desire to
m aintain bo th positions. This was known as the Soviet U nion’s policy of “no war, no peace”; i.e.,
a stalemate th a t would neither force Egypt to accept the status quo, nor precipitate a war th at
could lead to a superpower engagement. Moreover, since the Soviet U nion’s relevance in the
region centered on its ability to assist the Arabs, as the scholar Roman Kolkowicz argues, “a
peaceful settlem ent of the Middle Eastern situation would erode the rationale for Soviet
presence and would diminish Arab dependence on their Moscow patron.”163
W hile the Kremlin grappled with this uncomfortable position, Egypt had already resolved
to go to war. Sadat laid out his case on the grounds th a t the situation was n o t likely to become
any more conducive to attack: the Soviets were n o t going to send any more weapons; Egypt
should not expect any more support from the Arab world or the international community; and
Egypt’s Persian G ulf financial backers stipulated th a t future aid was conditional upon
com m encem ent of hostilities.164

Soviet Policy Toward Egypt During the Yom Kippur W ar
Moscow’s policy of balancing detente peace initiatives w ith m aintaining its influence on the
Middle East took a sharp tu rn toward the latter in the days preceding the Arab attack on
O ctober 6. T he Soviet U nion had advance knowledge of S adat’s plans and, in the interest of
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maintaining the A rabs’ military strategy, failed to alert the U nited States accordingly.165
Moscow’s decision violated the spirit and letter of detente by m aintaining secrecy, which was
mandatory for the successful execution of the Syrian and Egyptian two-front surprise strategy.
Additionally, the Kremlin may have considered the confidentiality of the Arab attack as
sufficient “payback” for W ashington’s failure to notify Moscow of the C hilean coup - of which
the Americans had comparable advance knowledge.166
For obvious reasons, Sadat did not think he could trust the Soviets with his plans until
the last possible m inute. During an O ctober 3, 1973, m eeting betw een the Egyptian President
and Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Vinogradov, Sadat said, as recounted by one Soviet diplomat,
th at he was planning to “break the deadlock in the M iddle East situation.”167 Sadat did not
elaborate on the day th a t the battle was to begin, but there is no question b u t th a t Moscow knew
that hostilities were im m inent, as evidenced by the Soviet response. Vinogradov scheduled a
critical m eeting w ith Sadat on the following day to report: “I have an urgent message from the
Soviet leadership. Moscow asks you to allow four big aircraft in Egypt to fly the Soviet families
out of Egypt.”168 By th a t evening, the Soviet Foreign M inister A ndrei Gromyko told his staff at
the Kremlin th a t he had learned of the date and time w hen the war was scheduled to begin:
O ctober 6 at 2:00 p.m. W h en one of his subordinates asked about how the Americans and
Israelis might interpret the Soviet evacuation, Gromyko answered bluntly: “T he lives of Soviet
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people are dearer to us.”169 More likely, as Alvin Rubinstein observed, Moscow “w anted to
m aintain a certain diplomatic distance from the attack: it w anted to be sufficiently aloof so that
w hen war broke o u t it could not be accused by the U nited States of complicity, thereby
endangering the advantages it gained from d etente.”170
T he disingenuousness of Soviet rationale is striking, given th a t the evacuation regardless of the response it evoked - was proof th a t Moscow could have shared its intelligence
with W ashington b u t instead chose to violate (at least in the strict interpretation) detente policy
for its own interests.171 T he U nited States and Israeli intelligence failed to recognize the
m ounting A rab attack began after the Soviet evacuation; th e n interpreted it as yet another
rupture in Soviet-Egyptian relations.172This m isinterpretation worked to Egypt’s advantage, but
the Soviet evacuation irked Sadat nonetheless: “T h at episode showed a total lack of confidence
in us and our fighting ability.”173
Moscow’s actions immediately preceding the war were consistent with its well-established
balancing act betw een detente and Middle East influence. In keeping w ith detente and other
considerations, the Soviet U nion was unequivocally against the A rab resum ption of hostilities
on O ctober 6. Vladimir Kirpitchenko, a KGB agent stationed in Cairo during the war, makes
this point clear: “O ur leadership proceeded from the fact th at the effects of military preparations
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would inevitably damage Soviet foreign policy.”174 By the time the Arabs had sufficient arms,
they were able to do exactly w hat Moscow hoped its weapons shipments would prevent: the
rendering of Soviet foreign policy considerations irrelevant. In other words, Moscow did not
want a war, the Arabs were unmoved by Soviet wishes precisely because Soviet arms allowed
them the means for war, and Moscow officials in tu rn believed they could maximize their own
Middle East objectives by dispensing with detente principles w hen they became aware of the
war’s imminence.
Soviet public objection to the war could have irreparably damaged w hatever Arab
loyalty Moscow had gained as a result of its weapons shipm ents.175 T he Soviets were besieged
by their contradictory policies in the Middle East and W estern-oriented detente. But one more
factor weighed heavily on Moscow’s policies. China, Moscow’s giant Com m unist neighbor to
the southeast, had begun to take the Soviets to task for their gradually accommodating policies
vis-a-vis the U nited States.

Vasilii Kozaetsov, chief of the Kremlin’s Am erican Affairs

departm ent, exemplified Moscow’s “C hina syndrome” at the beginning of th e war, w hen top
officials were deliberating on U nited States-Soviet cooperative measures:
C an you im agin e w h at w ould happen if som e o f the A rabs oppose our jo in t steps w ith the
A m erican s, and th e C h in ese co n seq u en tly v e to th e resolu tion? D o you w an t th e C h in ese to
b ecom e leaders o f th e n atio n a l liberation, anti-im perialist forces?176

In the Soviet view, a Middle East border war was n o t w orth an erosion of detente, b u t neither
was excessive “imperialist accom m odation” w orth jeopardizing the Soviet position throughout
the developing world. These factors shed light on Moscow’s vigorous support of Egypt and its
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Arab allies for the Yom Kippur W ar - given th a t Moscow did n o t w ant th a t conflict.
T he Soviet U nion’s initial public acknowledgment of the war was a bald-faced lie. The
lead article in the O ctober 8 edition of Pravda stated:
In re ce n t days Israel had co n ce n tr a te d considerable arm ed forces o n th e cease-fire lines w ith
Syria and Egypt, h ad called up th e reservists, and, h a v in g thu s h e a te d up th e situ ation to the
lim it, u n leash ed m ilitary operations. T h e responsibility for th e p resen t d ev elo p m en t o f ev en ts
in the M iddle East and their co n se q u en ce s falls w holly o n Israel an d those extern a l reactionary
circles, w h ich co n sta n tly en cou rage Israel’s aggressive a m b itio n s.177

In the larger sense, assessing blame for the cause of the Yom Kippur W ar is, of course, a
subjective exercise. Determ ining who actually started the conflict is not. In fact, S adat’s
decision to launch the war on Yom Kippur can be partly explained by Israel’s reduced
mobilization capability during the holiest day of the Jewish calendar.178
The Soviets’ disregard for the tru th at the onset of hostilities was probably a function of
their low regard for Arab military capabilities. For all th e thousands of tons of Soviet military
supplies in Arab hands, Moscow predicted another defeat by the Israelis.179

T he Soviets’

completely wrong assessment bears testimony to the antagonistic and non-cooperative climate
of Soviet-Egyptian military relations in regard both to A rab-attended tactical schools in Russia
and the unpopular presence of Soviet advisors at Egyptian military ports and bases. Just three
hours into the war, top Kremlin officials expressed concern of an Israeli counter-attack that
could threaten the overthrow of the Egyptian and Syrian governments. Brezhnev assumed that
the Arabs would regret ignoring Soviet advice to abstain from war.180
Israeli and A m erican intelligence knew of an A rab military buildup b u t failed to
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appreciate its meaning. T he first several days of the war witnessed unquestioned A rab victories
that capitalized on a masterful surprise attack. O ne-third of Israel’s air force was lost against
Syrian and Egyptian advances during the first three days alone. But more importantly, a war th a t
was undertaken for political reasons - to force the Israelis to the negotiating table for a
settlem ent on the occupied territories - succeeded in disabusing Israel of its belief th a t military
superiority would m aintain the occupation. In the Israeli view, occupation of the Sinai and
Golan H eights afforded a security through natural barriers th a t no treaty or superpower could
guarantee.

A 1972 publication from the Israeli Foreign M inistry summarized this line of

reasoning: “T he boundaries are such as will n o t again expose Israel to tem ptations of Arab
aggression or give an A rab aggressor decisive advantage in various sectors.”181 T he Arab surprise
attack, led by the Egyptians, dem onstrated th a t the land occupation would n o t guarantee Israeli
invulnerability. As Sadat argued: “T he m yth of Israel’s long arm, of her superior, even invincible
air force, armory, soldiers— was finally shattered.”182
Egypt and Syria dem anded th a t their Soviet patron ensure th a t no U N peace resolutions
would pass as long as the Arabs were on the offensive.183

O n O cto b er 8 the Soviet

representative to the U N argued against any cease-fire initiatives, on the grounds th a t a cease
fire “would be exploited by the aggressors again only to distract atten tio n from this key issue and
to continue to occupy and annex other peoples’ lands.”184 T he Soviet representative instead
called for the im plem entation of U N Resolution 242, and argued th a t there should be no cease
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fire until the Arabs secured the land they lost after the Six Day W ar.185 D uring the first week
of conflict, the superpowers deliberated over strategies of containing the war and ensuring a
reasonable time frame for a cease-fire. A t the same time, however, Moscow was encouraging
other Arab and African states to join the struggle against Israel. A message delivered on
O ctober 9 from Brezhnev to Algerian President H ouari Boum edienne stated: “In our view, there
m ust be fraternal Arab solidarity, today more th a n ever. Syria and Egypt m ust n o t remain alone
in the struggle against a treacherous enem y.”186
Moscow m aintained its basic stance in the years preceding the Yom Kippur W ar, that
is, keeping in place concurrent (and contradictory) policies of d etente toward the W est and
maintenance of its prestige and influence among the “progressive” nations o f the non-aligned
world. Indeed, Moscow saw many benefits stemming from a united A rab front. Ideologically,
the A rab world m ight connect the cause of liberation m ovem ents to Soviet policy. A nd
militarily, A rab unity could have decreased the chance th a t Moscow would have to resort to
direct defense of its Arab clients.
The A rabs’ successes reverberated in the U nited States as well. As the scholar Burton
Kaufman observed, “By almost defeating Israel in the first week of the O ctober W ar, the Arab
states in the Middle East have shattered the aura of military invincibility. N o longer could
W ashington assume th a t Israel’s military superiority over its A rab neighbors would ensure
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stability in the region.”187 As long as the conflict remained localized, Moscow was willing to
augm ent Arab military prowess with a massive weapons airlift com m enced on O ctober 8.
A lthough the airlift was initially a blatant attem pt to enhance the Arabs’ identification of Arab
success w ith Soviet support, by O ctober 10 Israel launched its first major counter-offensive thus making the Soviet deliveries indispensable for the Egyptian and Syrian armies.188
S adat’s response to the airlift was typical of the suspicious/gracious stance he had always
assumed when- dealing with Soviet support. U pon receiving news of the airlift, Sadat told
Ambassador Vinogradov: “Yes, yes. Magnificent! Magnificent! Tell comrade Brezhnev th a t it
is Soviet arms which achieved the miracle of the [Suez] crossing.”189 T he Egyptian president,
always the astute politician, made sure to tell the Kremlin leaders exactly w hat they w anted to
hear. But to Sadat’s close aide, M ohamed Heikal, the President said, “I don’t think they will
miss this chance” to restore their prestige in the Arab world.190 S adat’s expulsion of the Soviet
advisors in 1972 was still fresh in the minds of his patrons; in a sense th e Soviet airlift was a
culm ination of Cairo’s policy of denying Moscow the pleasure of feeling it had stability and
prestige on A rab soil.
Even after Egypt began receiving weapons en masse, Sadat shunned Soviet military
advice, to Moscow’s great annoyance.191 The value of Soviet weapons supplied to the Arabs
during the war was roughly equal ($2.2 billion) to th a t sent to Israel by the U nited States.192 But
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qualitatively, the Soviets simply could n o t m atch Am erican air technology.193 This fact likely
m uted the Arabs’ appreciation of Soviet support and strictly limited their willingness to heed
Moscow’s advice advocating a cease-fire on the existing lines.
Israel was on the offensive by the second week o f th e war, at which point Moscow
assumed a more active political role in the conflict. In keeping w ith A rab wishes, the Soviets
refrained from cease-fire initiatives until Israel threatened to b eat back the Arabs to their
original lines. 194 Soviet Premier Kosygin’s trip on O ctober 13 to Cairo reflected the changing
military situation. T he Soviets w anted a cease-fire on the present position of each side, because
they did n o t think it likely th a t the Arabs would advance m uch further - especially w ith the
com m encem ent of th e U nited States airlift to Israel. Sadat described Kosygin as “vicious” and
“aggressive” and in no position to dictate Egyptian military strategy.195 As usual, the Soviets and
the Egyptians were working at cross-purposes.
Kosygin and Sadat agreed to a cease-fire, but the Egyptians believed th a t a term ination
of the war at the present time was prem ature.196 Kosygin did n o t help m atters by making
frequent (and negative) comparisons of Sadat to his predecessor, N asser.197 Exchanges between
the two leaders were testy, which partly explains Moscow’s failure to secure an Egyptian cease
fire from O ctober 13. Sadat did not appreciate w hat he perceived to be Moscow’s overly
cautious position, asking: “Are you afraid of Israel?” to which Kosygin replied: “W e are afraid of
nobody, but we have an obligation to world peace and are com m itted to search for a just and

193el-Shazly, T he Crossing o f the Suez. 273.
194Kohler, Goure, and Harvey, T he Soviet U nion and the O ctober M iddle East W ar. 59.
195el-Sadat, In Search o f Identity. 258.
Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin, 108.
197Ibid„ 112.

124

durable solution of the Middle East problems on the basis of Resolution 242.”198 Sadat sensed
Moscow’s near total lack of confidence in the A rab military m achine - even after their successful
offensive. He replied sharply to Kosygin’s stated concern for the integrity of Cairo: “I’m sorry to
disappoint you, b u t no th reat will ever be posed to Cairo.”199 Between two “progressive” states
supposedly ideologically united against imperialist aggression, one wonders: why would Sadat
claim th a t Cairo’s safety would “disappoint” his patrons?
Sadat called for a cease-fire at the existing lines on O ctober 19. T he Egyptian leader
recognized th a t his military’s capability had peaked, and decided to accept the basic premise that
caused the Soviets to urge term ination six days earlier. He told Ambassador Vinogradov: “The
two superpowers should guarantee the cease-fire and im m ediate im plem entation of Security
Council Resolution 242.”200 Brezhnev was greatly perturbed by S adat’s refusal to accept the
cease-fire w hen Moscow first w anted it. He called S adat’s O ctober 19 message “desperate... [h] e
got w hat was coming to him .”201 O n O ctober 22 Sadat notified Vinogradov of Egypt’s intention
to comply w ith U .N . Resolution 338, which proposed a halting of all activity at each side’s
present position.202 B oth Egypt and the Soviet U nion interpreted Resolution 338 as a cease-fire
that would be guaranteed jointly by the U nited States and the Soviet U nion. But only a few
m inutes before th e cease-fire was to become effective, Soviet supplied SCU D missiles - under
almost total Soviet control because of their ability to strike Israel proper - were being launched

198Anwar Sadat and A lexsei Kosygin, as cited in Heikal, T h e Road to Ramadan. 246.
199el-Sadat, In Search o f Identity. 259.
200Ibid„ 264-265.
201Leonid Brezhnev, as cited in Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin. 130-131.
202U nited N ations R esolution 338 o f O ctober 22 1973, A rticle 1: "Calls upon all parties to the
present fighting to cease all fighting and terminate all military activity immediately; no later than 12 hours
after the m om ent o f the adoption o f this decision, in the position they now occupy,"
< http://w w w .un.org/docum ents.htm > on 3 N ovem ber 2003.
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against Israeli targets.203 Soviet Defense Minister A ndrei G rechko authorized the launch, which
contravened Moscow’s official policy. Foreign Minister Gromyko ordered Vinogradov to halt the
launch, but his order came too late. The SCUDS all missed th eir targets, but despite their
impotence, the Israelis interpreted the SCUD episode as a direct Egyptian-Soviet escalation of
hostilities.204
Cairo and T el Aviv exchanged accusations concerning the violation of the cease-fire.
Militarily, at least, Israel was clearly on the offensive with the encirclem ent of Egypt’s Third
Army division, beyond w hich lay an undefended Cairo. S adat’s calls to Moscow for a guaranteed
cease-fire O n O ctober 23 became desperate as Israel refused to halt its advances. T he Kremlin
issued a warning to Israel:
T h e co n tin u a tio n o f crim inal acts by Israel w ill lead to grave c o n se q u en ce s for Israel itself. T h e
S o v iet U n io n b elieves that an en d o f Israel’s acts o f v io le n c e , th e lib eration o f Israeli o ccu p ied
territory, is th e basis for establishing a just and lasting p ea ce in th e M idd le East.205

The Israelis were confident th a t Moscow’s warning of “grave consequences” was merely a bluff.
Sadat further intensified the situation on O ctober 24 by calling for a unilateral presence of Soviet
troops on the Egyptian side of the front if the U nited States refused to send its own troops.206
Like the Israelis, Sadat did n o t think th a t Moscow was willing to intervene directly; his request
was really a tactic aimed at forcing the Americans to cooperate in the cease-fire. Sadat correctly
believed th a t the Soviets were unprepared to com m it troops to the war. In the Politburo,
Defense M inister G rechko and President Podgorny advocated a “dem onstration of our military
presence in Egypt and Syria,” while Premier Kosygin, Foreign M inister Gromyko, and Secretary

203W h etten, T he Canal W ar. 234.
204Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin. 144.
205C ited in Golan, Yom Kippur and After. 95.
206Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin. 166.
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Brezhnev decided against a unilateral move as too risky.207 Additionally, the Kremlin took
N ixon’s message of O ctober 20 at its word.

N ixon’s statem ent lobbied Brezhnev for

com mitments “from bo th of u s.. .to provide the strong leadership which our respective friends
in the area will find persuasive.”208
Brezhnev’s note to Nixon, delivered on O ctober 24, declared:
I w ill say it straight, th a t if you find it im possible to act to g eth er w ith us in this m atter, w e should
be faced w ith th e n ecessity to urgently co n sid er th e q u estio n o f takin g appropriate steps
unilaterally. Israel c a n n o t be allow ed to get aw ay w ith its v io la tio n s.209

W hile unquestionably harshly worded, the note was nonetheless w ritten under the assumption
that W ashington would agree to direct intervention in order to prevent Israeli forces from
destroying the Egyptian Third Army. If the Soviets were confident of W ashington’s agreement
to send a bilateral force to the front, and if the top Kremlin leaders decided beforehand against
unilateral action, why did Brezhnev choose such strong wording w ith the explicit threat to act
alone?
The tone of Brezhnev’s note was probably indicative of Moscow’s grave concern of the larger
implications of Israel’s continued operations. As Jon Glassman observed,
A t s ta k e .. .was n o t sim ply the S o v iet U n io n ’s M idd le E astern clien ts b ut, rather, th e integrity o f
th e en tire ‘so cialist’ - ‘progressive’ security structure. If Israel was p erm itted to exercise m ilitary
suprem acy over the ‘progressive’ A rabs, w hat w ou ld cau se o th er ‘aggressive im perialist’ forces to
shrink from m ovin g strongly against other S o v iet c lie n t stats an d m o vem en ts?210

W hile Brezhnev’s strong language was, of course, w ritten to Nixon, the implied threats were
actually reflective of Moscow’s internal concerns regarding the threatened state of Soviet

207C ited in Dobrynin, In C onfidence. 295.
208Richard N ixon , as cited in Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin. 161.
209C ited in W illiam B. Quandt, "Soviet Policy in the O ctober Middle East War-II," International
Affairs 53
(October 1977), 598.
210Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, 175.
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influence throughout the world. T he n o te’s meaning was n o t the only miscommunication
between the superpowers. A t an O ctober 26 news conference, U nited States Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger explained the Am erican response to Brezhnev’s note - the
heightened military alert status to DEFCON III - as a reaction to the Soviet alert of its own air
force.211 Given the Soviet alert status, interpreted in conjunction w ith Brezhnev’s sharp note
declaring unilateral action if necessary, this may have seemed like an appropriate response to
im m inent Soviet m ovem ent. T he problem with Schlesinger’s stated rationale was th a t the
Soviet military had been on heightened alert since the beginning of the war; its status did not
change when Brezhnev sent his O ctober 24 note.212
Brezhnev’s message was not intended to be an ultim atum ; the Kremlin likewise
responded to the DEFCON III alert with uniform disgust and surprise at w hat they considered
an unjustified provocation.

Soviet Ambassador to the U nited States Anatoly Dobrynin

summarized the misunderstanding:
W a sh in g to n n ev er h ad any real cau se for alarm b ecau se th e P olitburo did n o t h a v e any in ten tio n
o f in terv en in g in th e M idd le East. It w ould h ave b e e n reckless b o th p olitically and m ilitarily, for
at th at tim e th e S o v ie t U n io n w as n o t prepared to m o u n t im m ed iately a large-scale in terv en tio n
in th e region. A n d e v e n if w e co u ld h ave d o n e so, it w o u ld h a v e transform ed th e A rab-Israeli
war in to a d irect clash b etw een the S o v iet U n io n and th e U n ite d S ta tes. N o b o d y in M oscow
w a n ted th at.213

T he Soviet U nion m aintained a balance between detente politics and its continuing Middle East
influence through the m ajor auspices of Egypt to the end of the Yom Kippur W ar. T he
com munication breakdown w ith the U nited States on O ctober 24-25 represented the
culmination of Moscow’s fractured policy. T he Soviet U nion was determ ined to prevent the

21'U n ited States, D epartm ent o f State, Bulletin, N o. 1795 (1973), 621.
212Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin. 190.
213Dobrynin, In C onfidence. 296.
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defeat of Egypt, w hich was the recipient of billions of dollars’ w orth of Soviet aid distributed over
a period of 18 years. Egypt’s stature among Moscow’s policy of supporting national liberation
movements made th a t country, in the Soviet view, emblematic of the entire Soviet-led socialist
global order. But the Soviets, in the climate of detente, were also determ ined to avoid a
superpower clash th a t may have expanded beyond a regional conflict into general nuclear war.
This was the basic contradiction th a t explained the Soviet U nion’s unambiguous opposition to
Sadat’s m arch toward war. Moscow’s faulty “no war, no peace” solution to the contradiction of
W estern accom m odation and world socialist prestige was most strongly opposed by Egypt - the
client state on w hich Moscow staked a great am ount of its reputation among the non-aligned
world.
T he Yom Kippur W ar did not plunge the superpowers into a nuclear confrontation. By
this fundam ental criterion, detente was upheld, b u t n o t w ithout major damage to Moscow’s
other basic foreign policy objective. T he record of Soviet-Egyptian relations in the interwar
period betrays a self-interested client-patron state structure th a t traded arms for geo-strategic
influence on a sliding scale. Immediately after the cessation of hostilities, Sadat dem onstrated
his utter disregard for Moscow’s wishes. Soviet arms allowed the Egyptian army to gain a toehold
in the Sinai, thus allowing the Egyptian leader to break the diplomatic stalemate after the Yom
Kippur W ar w ith direct negotiations, which could finally be conducted w ith dignity. Beyond this
Clausewitzean victory, as Alvin Rubinstein observed, “w ith n o t so m uch as a nod to Moscow’s
role, Sadat resumed full diplomatic relations with the U nited States for th e first time since Egypt
had severed them on June 6 ,1967.”214 Moscow’s contradictory foreign policies, n o t surprisingly,

214Rubinstein, Red Star on the N ile. 284.
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culm inated in a b itter irony. Sadat concluded th at the only viable p ath to regaining its lost
territory was improved relations with the U nited States - a diplomatic coup only achievable
through the force of Soviet arms.
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Chapter IV
The Challenge of an “Unbreakable” Bond:
American-Israeli Affairs Through the Yom Kippur War

“Israel,” wrote historian Stephen E. Ambrose, “is n o t A m erica’s ally. There is no alliance
between the U nited States and Israel. But there is an A m erican moral com m itm ent to Israel, one
that is so strong as to be unbreakable, in part precisely because now here is it spelled out in a
treaty.”1 Senator Joseph Clark, upon returning from a 1966 trip to th e Middle East, proclaimed,
“The U nited States would never permit the Arabs to overrun the State of Israel.”2
T he “why” and “how” of these statem ents, and many like them , are generally not
discussed in the A m erican political discourse largely because of their fundam ental truth,
reaffirmed at bo th ends of the 20th century. T he Balfour D eclaration of N ovem ber 1917,
declaring Britain’s support of “the establishment in Palestine of a N ational Hom e for the Jewish
people,”3 enjoyed overwhelming U nited States Congressional support on grounds ranging from
religious conviction, hum anitarian sympathy, acknowledgment of nationalist aspirations, and
notably, distaste for “M oham m edan” rule over Middle Eastern lands.4
Only Cordell Hull, Representative of Tennessee, equivocated on the m atter by vaguely

'S teph en E. Ambrose, N ixon . V olum e Three: Ruin and Recovery. 1973-1990 (New York: Sim on
& Schuster, 1991), 240-241.
2Joseph Clark, as cited in U nited States, Congress, C om m ittee on Foreign Relations, Report by
Senator Joseph S. Clark: W ar or Peace in the M iddle East? (W ashington, D.C.; G overnm ent Printing
Office, 1967), 14.
3T he Balfour D eclaration is reprinted in U nited States, Congress, C om m ittee on Foreign
Relations: A S elect Chronology and Background D ocum ents Relating to the M iddle East, 2nd revised ed.
(W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1975), 136.
4This theologically incorrect term, w hich assumes that Muslims pray to M ohham ed as Christians
pray to Jesus, signals an ignorance o f Islam and preference o f allied Britain’s post-W orld W ar I
predominance in the Middle East over the Islamic O ttom an Empire. Both o f these factors w ould begin to
change in the years following W orld W ar II.
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calling for the “Palestine question” question to be decided “by the wishes and the welfare of
those affected by the proposed plan.”5 Fiorello H. LaGuardia, Representative of New York, was
alone in his opposition to a Jewish hom eland in Palestine, reasoning th a t such a state would
further ghettoize the Jews and retard the advances they have made in such liberal democracies
as the U nited States and England.6 In May 1998, a joint resolution, celebrating the 50th
anniversary of Israel’s birth, reaffirmed Congress’s tradition of staunch support for the Jewish
homeland, declaring th at the U nited States “reaffirms the bonds of friendship and cooperation
which have existed betw een the U nited States and Israel for the past half-century and which
have been significant for bo th countries.”7

T he A m erican governm ent’s attitude toward

Zionism at both extremes of a remarkable 80-year odyssey of nationhood, bookends AmericanIsraeli relations during the Cold W ar. These decades, however, considerably complicated
truthful yet simplistic affirmations of U nited States-Israeli relations.
Events leading up to, and culminating in, Am erican policy toward Israel during the Yom
Kippur W ar of O ctober 1973 were arguably the most convoluted in the history of this “unique”
international relationship. A lthough Stephen Ambrose and others have assumed the m atter
as self-evident, it is w orth examining the sources of the “moral” and “unbreakable” American
com m itm ent to Israel. T he historical record, from Harry T rum an to Richard Nixon, bears one
essential truth: the “unbreakable” bond was neither absolute nor exclusive of other interests.

5Cordell Hull, as cited in Zionist Organization o f America, T he A m erican W ar Congress and
Zionism: Statem ents bv Members o f the Am erican War Congress o n the lew ish N ational M ovem ent (New
York: Zionist Organization o f Am erica, 1919), 211.
6Ibid, 166
7U nited States, Congress, U nited States Statutes at Large. 1998. Public Law 105-175, Joint
Resolution, “Friendship Betw een the U nited States and Israel,” 11 May 1998 (W ashington, D.C.:
Governm ent Printing O ffice, 1999), 112.
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This fact tends to get obscured in light of more recent developments, which significantly
intensified the American-Israel security relationship. Following the Yom Kippur W ar, U nited
States foreign aid policy to Israel underw ent something of a revolution: annual aid to Israel in
1974-1978 jum ped to $1.6 billion from $360 million before the war; only 20% of pre-war aid was
slated for military purposes while th a t figure increased to 65% by 1974; and most significantly,
before the Yom Kippur W ar, 96% of all U nited States aid to Israel came in the form of loans following the conflict Israel enjoyed as m uch as 60% of all aid in the form of outright grants.8
A lthough Ambrose, writing in 1991, was technically correct in noting th a t no alliance
exists betw een the U nited States and Israel, Ronald Reagan, following th e unprecedented direct
U nited States military involvem ent in the Lebanon W ar of 1982, recognized Israel in the
following year as a “strategic partner,” and thereafter a de facto A m erican ally.9 A lthough Cold
W ar tensions had heightened in the 1980s after the detente of the previous decade, superpower
com petition in the M iddle East had abated, due in no small part to Moscow’s diminished
regional prestige following the Yom Kippur W ar. A m erican policy in the M iddle East since the
mid-1970s became less concerned with “losing” the Arab world to the C om m unist orbit, and
more preoccupied w ith protecting its interests abroad and at hom e from terrorist attack by Arab
radicals.
There existed no such equation of A m erican w ith Israeli interests in the 1945-1973
period, and the reasons generally cited as the foundations for the “unbreakable” bond between

8Figures cited in M oshe Efrat, “T he U S A and the Israeli M ilitary-Econom ic Dim ension: A
Realpolidk Perspective,” in M oshe Efrat and Jacob Bercovitch, eds., Superpowers and C lient States in the
Middle East: T h e Im balance o f Influence (London: Routledge, 1991), 132.
9U nited States, D epartm ent o f the Army, Israel: A Country Study (W ashington, D.C.:
G overnm ent Printing O ffice, 1990), 234.
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the two countries - namely religious and political affinity - generally did not override the
strategic concerns th a t prevented a policy of unswerving U nited States support for Israel. Those
matters, in fact, served to complicate an already difficult relationship.
T he most im portant, and for th at m atter, simplest, factor

th a t accounts for the

"unbreakable bond" of the American-Israeli relationship is th e sheer num ber of Jews who live in
the U nited States. T he Israeli historian Yossi Beilin wrote, "Israel is the only W estern state in
the Middle East,"10 by which he m eant th a t despite a religion and revived language th a t are
firmly rooted in M iddle East traditions, Israel's founders and leading Ashkenazi classes have
transplanted A m erican and European conventions into the heart o f the A rab world. A majority
of Am erican and Israeli Jews are white, modern, and secular leaning. T he Americans learn
Hebrew and the Israelis learn English, and both groups traverse the A tlantic with relative ease.
In this sense, if large numbers of Jews were attracted to the U nited States for reasons no different
from other immigrant groups, namely for political, economic, and religious liberties, th en these
are the same ideals built into the core of m odern Israeli society. In other words, w hen Am erican
Jews lobby the U nited States governm ent to support Israel, they are, in a very real sense,
lobbying to support themselves.
T he Jewish political action committees, among the m ost influential in Washington, D.C.,
have allowed Israel a certain confidence in their abilities to influence A m erican politics as few
other countries can.11 T hroughout the first thirty years of America's search for a just settlem ent
for the Arab-Israeli conflict, there was virtually no A rab lobby consisting of actual Arabs in

10Yossi Beilin, Israel: A C oncise Political History (London: W eidenfeld a n d N ico lso n , 1992), 1.
n Seth P. Tillm an, T h e U nited States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles (Bloomington,
Indiana University Press, 1982), 158.
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W ashington.

Those who did advocate A rab wishes were generally diplomats and State

D epartm ent "Arabists," or oil executives whose interests in the Persian G ulf rarely impacted the
diplomacy of negotiating betw een Zionists and the northern, more radical A rab states.12 As the
Israeli historian N adav Safran noted, it was only in the period directly preceding the 1973 Yom
Kippur W ar th a t the conservative oil sheikdoms became central to the pan-A rab cause of antiZionism.13
The Jewish lobby has repeatedly emphasized the moral imperative of the U nited States
to support the only democracy in the Middle East,14 and to an ex ten t the image of Israel as a
pioneering democracy in its early years became a running them e in A m erican popular culture
with particular emphasis on Jewish masculinity and association w ith America's own folkloric
tradition of rugged individualism.15 Yet after the June 1967 W ar, Israel forfeited m uch of its
ability to advertise itself as a beacon of freedom in an unfree region - however unwilling Israel
may have been to become a police state exercising political control over Arabs living in the
occupied territories, its leaders were forced to qualify the ethos of freedom in terms of cultural
and racial exceptionalism.16
In sum, viewing the American-Israeli relationship in ideological terms, albeit religious,
cultural, or political, is a shaky proposition, which is largely a consequence of one of the basic

12M itchell Bard, “T h e Israeli and Arab Lobbies,” < http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/usisrael/lobby.html> (28 O ctober 2002).
13N adav Safran, “T he W ar and the Future o f the Arab-Israeli C onflict,” Foreign Affairs 52
Qanuary 1974), 219-221.
14See, for exam ple, U nited States, Congress, Subcom m ittee on N ear Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Hearings: Priorities for Peace in the Middle East (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office,
1975), 22.
15See, for exam ple, M ichelle Mart, “Tough Guys and A m erican C old W ar Policy: Images o f
History, 1948-1960.” D iplom atic History 20 (Summer 1996), 357-380.
16Gabriel Sheffer and M enachem Hofnung, “Israel’s Image,” in Gabriel Sheffer, ed., Dynamics of
Dependence: U .S.-Israeli Relations (Boulder: W estview Press, 1987), 14.
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paradoxes of Zionist/Israeli foreign policy. Israel and the Zionist m ovem ent have always sought
G reat Power protection, not out of choice, but necessity. Theodor Herzl had become convinced,
after failing to secure support for the Zionist cause by the European leaders, th a t Jews could rely
only on themselves to create their own nation. T he Nazi H olocaust highlighted both the truth
of Herzl's conviction and the impossibility th a t sovereignty could be achieved w ithout the
support and recognition of other countries. W ithout the strenuous efforts of Am erican Jews, the
U nited States may never have become central to the support of Israel in its earliest years. Yet,
w ithout the consideration th a t Israel was a potential strategic value to Am erican Cold W ar
policy - itself a questionable proposition until the second term of Richard Nixon's adm inistration
- it is highly unlikely th a t any ideological factors alone could have sustained the American-Israeli
influence relationship.

American Zionism and the Birth of Israel
Despite strong Congressional support, U nited States’ interest in the Zionist question faded in the
years following W orld W ar I, a symptom of America’s withdrawal after its unpleasant experience
on the international stage. A m erican interest in the Zionist question did not reemerge until the
later years of W orld W ar II. In 1944, the Senate Foreign Relations Com m ittee moved to pass
a resolution securing Jewish emigration to Palestine w ith statehood as the ultim ate goal.
Secretary of W ar H enry L. Stim son - who was deeply sympathetic to the plight of European
Jewry - rejected the plan for strategic reasons.

W ith the N orm andy invasion quickly

approaching, Stim son did not w ant any crises developing elsewhere. It was a reasoned prophecy
of w hat would happen four years later.
Franklin Roosevelt, in characteristic fashion, was so impressed w ith his m ediating skills
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that he seemed to have convinced himself th at he alone could solve the Zionist-Arab conflict.
Roosevelt vacillated on the m atter, promising bo th the Zionist organization th a t he would help
establish a Jewish state in his n ex t term , and Ibn Saud, Saudi A rabia’s ruler, th a t no major
American policy would be formulated before consultations w ith b o th Jews and Arabs.17
Roosevelt died a week after his promise to Saud, leaving this and all other foreign policy m atters
to his inexperienced and excluded vice president, Harry Trum an.
Trum an undoubtedly anguished over the moral implications of post-Holocaust Jewish
nationalism placed before him, but he never lost sight of the larger and more threatening
developments of the emerging Cold W ar. A t the end of W orld W ar II, the U nited States likely
would have been co n ten t with British predominance in the M iddle East. T he G reek civil war
and Soviet encroachm ent in Turkey and Iran soon compelled the U nited States to replace wartorn Britain as the major power in the region, a policy formalized by the T rum an Doctrine.
State D epartm ent officials had begun to view the Zionist-Arab conflict in Cold W ar
terms, whereby A m erican support for Zionism would translate into increased prestige for Moscow
in the Arab world.18 T he Zionists’ argued against this view by noting th a t Palestine Jews proved
to be worthy fighters against the Nazis during W orld W ar II,19 and would likewise be useful

17Herbert Feis, T he Birth o f Israel: T h e Tousled D iplom atic Bed (N ew York: W .W . Norton,
1969), 16.
1SRichard Stevens, A m erican Zionism and U .S . Foreign Policy (N ew York: Pageant Press, 1962),
143.
19T he Palestine Jewish struggle against Nazism becam e so important to the Zionist m ovem ent both for dom estic and foreign policy purposes - that a note about it was included in Israel’s Declaration of
Independence, Paragraph 8: "In the Second W orld War, the Jewish com m unity o f this country contributed
its full share to the struggle o f the freedom - and peace-loving nations against the forces o f Nazi wickedness
and, by the blood o f its soldiers and its war effort, gained the right to a life o f dignity, freedom and honest
toil in their national hom eland.” T h e Declaration o f the Establishment o f the State o f Israel is reprinted in
Israel, O ffice o f Information, Israel’s Struggle For Peace (N ew York: Israel O ffice o f Information, 1960),
161-164.
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against the Communists, gained little favor in the State D epartm ent, where officials took
seriously Ibn Saud’s 1947 threat to T rum an th a t should a Jewish state be created in Palestine,
the Arab world “will lay siege to it until it dies of famine.”20 Leading policy makers in both the
State and newly-created Defense D epartm ents, including George K ennan, James Forrestal, and
George Marshall, were convinced th at A m erican support of the Jews would jeopardize W estern
access to Middle Eastern oil, a commodity n o t yet essential to A m erican domestic needs but
central to the rebuilding of post-war Europe.21
T he State D epartm ent clearly wanted to avoid the situation entirely, b u t after the
Zionists had achieved their goal, th at proved to be impossible. Officials publically blamed the
Zionists for the strategic nightmare th a t the Palestine conflict was creating. U nited States
representative to the U N W arren A ustin, in a speech to the G eneral Assembly on April 20,
1948, dispensed w ith the subtleties of diplomacy: “W e hoped th a t the Jews would make every
possible effort to compose their differences with the Arabs in an effort to reduce the violence
which persisted in Palestine.

Events have not fulfilled these hopes.”22 A n exasperated

mem orandum from then-D irector of the Office of the U nited N ations D ean Rusk to
Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett predicted a Middle East war nine days before Israel
declared its independence:
T h e Jews w ill co m e ru n nin g to the S ecu rity C o u n cil w ith th e cla im th a t their state is the ob ject
o f arm ed aggression an d w ill use every m eans to obscure the fact that it is their o w n arm ed
aggression against th e A rabs inside P alestine w h ich is th e cau se o f A rab co u n ter-a tta ck . T h ere
will be a d ecid ed effort, g iv en this ev en tu a lity , that th e U n ite d S ta tes w ill b e called upon by

20Ibn Saud, as cited in D aniel Yergin, T h e Prize: T he Epic Q uest for O il, M oney &. Power (N ew
York: Free Press, 1991), 425.
21John P. M iglietta, Am erican A lliance Policy in the Middle East. 1945-1992: Iran. Israel, and
Saudi Arabia (N ew York: Lexington Books, 2002), 106. T h e U nited States boasted major domestic
reserves in the early postwar era.
22Warren A ustin, as cited in U nited States, D epartm ent o f State, Bulletin N o. 461 (1948), 569.
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elem en ts inside this cou n try to support S ecu rity C o u n cil a ctio n against th e A rab states.
T o take su ch a ction w ou ld seem to m e to b e m orally in d efen sib le w hile, from th e aspect
o f our relations w ith th e M iddle East and our broad secu rity asp ects in th a t region, it w ould
alm ost be fatal to p it forces o f the U n ite d S tates an d possibly R ussia against th e govern m en ts o f
the A rab w orld.23

T he T rum an adm inistration, against the heated objections of the diplomatic and military
elite, backed the U N ’s Palestine partition resolution. If the U nited States had withdrawn its
support for the Zionists, the resolution probably would n o t have obtained the necessary twothirds majority vote of the General Assembly, w ithout w hich Israel would have been denied
international recognition as a sovereign state. John P. M iglietta, a specialist in Middle East
alliance politics, summarized the American motives:
T h e T ru m an ad m in istration ’s policy toward Israel was d riven by d o m estic politics in the U n ite d
S tates. T rum an , faced w ith electo ra l pressures, sid ed w ith his d o m estic p olitical advisers over
his foreign policy cou n cilors. A m erica n support for Israel w as based o n d o m estic politics as
op posed to p ercep tions o f A m erican n ation al in terest.24

After fifty years of lobbying for G reat Power support from the stance of moral and strategic
imperatives, Zionists ultim ately had to thank the unpopularity of an incum bent president for
the political support they needed. Facing reelection, T rum an understood th a t no president (with
the exception of W oodrow W ilson in 1916) won election w ithout winning New York, where the
greatest concentration of voting Jews made clear to T rum an th a t their support was contingent
on the president’s Zionist policy.25 Trum an, never one to m ince words, declared, “I’m sorry
gentlem en, b u t I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of

23D ean Rusk, as cited in U nited States, Departm ent o f State, Foreign Relations o f the U nited
States. 1948. V, “T he N ear East, South Asia, and Africa," part 2 (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing
Office, 1976), 895.
24Miglietta, A m erican A lliance Policy in the Middle East. 115.
25James Lee Ray, T he Future o f American-Israeli Relations: A Parting o f Wavs? (Lexington:
University Press o f Kentucky, 1985), 7.
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Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs am ong my constituents.”26

The

president received a letter from Chaim W eizmann on May 13, informing him th a t the Zionists
would declare the existence of the Provisional G overnm ent of the Jewish State on m idnight of
May 15. Trum an relented only after his political advisors convinced him th a t he would lose the
election if he did n o t abandon U nited States recognition of a temporary trusteeship of the Jews
in Palestine.27 T he U nited States recognized Israel’s independence m inutes after it was
proclaimed. In the end, the Zionists had forced T rum an’s hand. Chaim W eizm ann declared
in his memoirs, “I was convinced th a t once we had taken our destiny into our own hands and
established the republic, the A m erican people would approve our resolution, and see in our
successful struggle for independence the image of its own national liberation a century and three
quarters ago.”28 Am erican policy makers, at least, were unmoved by the comparison, for now the
perpetual conflict they had foreseen was becoming a reality.

Israel and the Eisenhower Years
Dwight Eisenhower, a Republican, did not feel beholden to domestic Jewish interest groups
because they were nota significant part of the Republican constituency. T he president believed
th at this allowed him a greater leeway in Middle East Cold W ar policy, which basically m eant
th a t he and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles could improve relations with the Arab
world w ithout concern of encum bering political constraints at home. Dulles publicized this

26Harry Truman, as cited in Robert J. D onovan, C onflict and Crisis: T h e Presidency o f Harry S
Truman. 1945-1948 (N ew York: W .W . N orton, 1977), 322.
27Stevens, A m erican Zionism and U .S. Foreign Policy , 20428Chaim W eizm ann, Trial and Error: T he Autobiography o f C haim W eizm ann (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1949), 582.
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strategy:
W e are in th e p resen t jam b ecau se th e past adm inistration h ad always d ea lt w ith the area [the
M iddle East] from a political stan d p oin t an d had tried to m ee t the w ishes o f th e Zionists in this
country, and that had created a basic an tagon ism w ith the A rabs. T h a t was w h at th e Russians
are n o w capitalizing o n .29

A lthough Dulles and Eisenhower were still pressing Gamal Nasser, leader of Egypt, to
enlist in the A m erican C ontainm ent strategy as late as 1955, they had realized two years earlier
that the Egyptian strongm an refused to see Moscow as the primary th reat to the Arab world.30
Nasser reserved th a t title for Israel. Dulles believed th a t establishing a security alliance nearer
to the Soviet Union's southwest flank would better serve Am erican C ontainm ent policy. The
resulting Am erican-supported Baghdad Pact of 1955, consisting of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and
Pakistan turned into an unmitigated disaster, having failed to prevent Moscow from gaining
prestige in the region. T he Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly concluded th a t the alliance lacked the
military capability to deter Soviet aggression, and Israel denounced the A m erican plan, in part,
because of its inclusion of Iraq, a country still technically at war against the Zionists.31 Most
damaging, however, was Nasser's incensed reaction to the Pact. H e believed th a t the U nited
States was deliberately attem pting to shift the power center of the A rab world away from Egypt
and into the hands of his H ashem ite rivals in Iraq, thereby encouraging Nasser to move squarely
into the Soviet orbit. "By 1956," the Cold W ar historian Thom as Paterson concluded, "the
Eisenhower A dm inistration was tangled in Arab-Israeli, A rab-Arab, and Arab-British rivalries,

29John Foster D ulles, as cited in Thom as G. Paterson, M eeting the Com m unist Threat: Truman to
Reagan (Oxford: Oxford U niversity Press, 1988), 164.
30Shlom o A ronson, C onflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: A n Israeli Perspective (Baltimore:
T he Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 115.
31Steven Z. Freiberger, Daw n Over Suez: T he Rise o f A m erican Power in the Middle East, 19531957
(Chicago: Ivan R. D ee, 1992), 106.
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while the Soviets through their stunning weapons deal w ith Cairo, leaped over the northern tier
and into the A rab core."32
Nasser, em boldened by his arms deal w ith Moscow, announced on July 26, 1956, that
Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal. T he move threatened to choke the French, British, and
Israeli economies. W hile these three countries were clamoring for war, Eisenhower sharply
rebuked any aggressive recourse, preferring diplomacy over force. There could be no more of
a damaging blow, Eisenhower reasoned, th an collusion betw een the Zionists and the once-great
colonial powers, w hich would likely drive the Arabs directly to the Soviets. A nthony Eden of
G reat Britain, however, began to compare Nasser to Hitler, and the Israelis were eager to deliver
a blow to their arch-nemesis in Egypt. The tripartite attack o f late O ctober 1956 led to some of
the harshest criticism to come out of the W hite House in the post-war era: O n O ctober 31,
Eisenhower announced:
W e b eliev e th ese action s to h a v e b een tak en in error. For w e do n o t a ccep t the use o f force as
a w ise or proper in stru m en t for the se ttle m e n t o f in tern a tio n a l d ispu tes.... T h e action s tak en can
scarcely be reco n ciled w ith the principles and purposes o f th e U n ite d N a tio n s to w h ich w e have
all subscribed. A n d , b eyon d this, w e are forced to d oub t e v e n if resort to war w ill lon g serve the
p erm an en t in terests o f the attackin g n a tio n s.33

The president was referring, w ithout m uch subtlety, to the opportunity Moscow would take to
enhance its already growing influence throughout the A rab world, which in turn would
jeopardize W estern access to Middle Eastern oil.34
T he Suez Crisis served to sharpen Eisenhower’s Cold W ar concerns in two ways. First,
the rather pathetic withdrawal of France and Britain from the region signaled an end to W estern

32Paterson, M eeting the C om m unist Threat. 168.
33D w ight Eisenhower, as cited in U nited States, D epartm ent o f State, Bulletin N o . 906 (1956),
744-45.
34Yergin, T h e Prize, 484.
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imperialism in the region, and, in turn proved to be a boon to A rab nationalism. Second, the
tripartite attack made Israel appear as an agent of W estern imperialism, which provided Moscow
with the valuable pretext of encouraging the Arabs to think of Zionism and imperialism as one
and the same. In a special message to Congress on January 5,1957, Eisenhower proposed a new
strategy which came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, th a t would assist every nation in
the Middle East, economically, militarily, and politically in order to protect “against overt
aggression from any nation controlled by international Com m unism .”35

T he Eisenhower

Doctrine sought to deter Soviet aggression (which up to this point was non-existent) directly
through the auspices of A m erican power, thus replacing the client-state C ontainm ent strategy
of the Baghdad Pact. T he Eisenhower Doctrine used different means to achieve the same ends,
and proved no more successful in consolidating W estern orientation on the countries in the
region. As Avi Shlaim observed, the Eisenhower Doctrine
help ed turn th e M idd le East in to a jousting ground for th e superpow ers and in tern a tio n a l politics
in to a zero-sum gam e in w h ich o n e player’s gain was se en as th e o th er’s loss. T h e region's hom e
grow n con flicts, b itter en o u g h o n their o w n , b ecam e virtually u n solvab le w ith the in v o lv em en t
o f fiercely co m p etitiv e ou tside pow ers.36

In terms of arms shipments, the Eisenhower D octrine practiced equal treatm ent of the
Middle East Countries in nam e only. W ith the exception of 100 recoilless guns sold in 1958, the
Eisenhower adm inistration refused to sell Israel any arms at all, while providing heavy artillery
to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan.37 In the faulty logic of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the nations

35D w ight Eisenhower, as cited in Stephen J. G enco, “T h e Eisenhower Doctrine: Deterrence in the
Middle East, 1957-1958,” in A lexander L. George and Richard Smoke, D eterrence in A m erican Foreign
Policy: Theory and Practice (N ew York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 312.
36A vi Shlaim, W ar and Peace in the Middle East: A Critique o f A m erican Policy (N ew York:
Viking, 1994), 32.
37M ordechai Gazit, “Israeli Military Procurement from the U nited States,” in Sheffer, ed.,
Dynamics o f D ep en dence. 92.
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that benefitted the most were those seen to be under the greatest pressure to the Comm unist
threat. A lthough the Kennedy adm inistration continued Eisenhower’s tendency to view the
Middle East through the distorting lens of the Cold W ar, U nited States policy in the 1960s
increasingly saw Israel as a pillar against Communism.

T he 1960s. Israel and the “Special Relationship”
The Kennedy adm inistration believed th a t Am erican policy in th e Middle East during the
Eisenhower years lacked the nuance necessary to support Arabs and Israelis under the umbrella
of anti'C om m unism w ithout alienating one of the sides in support of the other. Kennedy hoped
to improve relations with Israel while the honeym oon betw een Nasser and his Soviet patrons was
becoming strained. Kennedy’s task was not going to be an easy one. He viewed the Arab-Israeli
conflict primarily in terms of the Palestinian refugee problem, an issue he thought could be
solved either by Israeli willingness to repatriate them or com pensate their resettlem ent in other
Arab countries. K ennedy’s plan seemed like an outgrow th of his Peace Corps optimism, and
betrayed either bullheaded determ ination or naivete on his part. Repatriation would have
threatened to erode a Jewish majority, and with it, the existence of Israel.
But David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s Prime Minister, also recognized how m uch Kennedy
cherished the cause of global resistence to Communism. T he title of W arren Bass’s study on
Kennedy and the Middle East, Support A ny Friend, referred to Kennedy’s inaugural address, in
which he declared A m erica’s intention to "support any friend...to assure the survival and success
of liberty.”38 David Ben-Gurion heard those words n o t as a departure from official U nited States

38John F. Kennedy, as cited in Warren Bass, Support and Friend: K ennedy’s Middle East and the
Making o f the U .S .-Israel A lliance (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1.
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policy but at the least a willingness to obtain the security assurances and weapons th at had been
absent since Israel’s birth.
Kennedy followed a dual track policy. O n the one hand, he called for a reinvigoration
of the Tripartite Declaration, because, he reasoned, “once the actions of the Middle East have
a firm and precise guarantee, the need for continuing the arms race will disappear....”39 O n the
other hand, Kennedy was determ ined to counter the Soviet flood o f arms into the region. This
was a concern shared by the State and Defense D epartm ents th a t ultimately allowed for the sale
of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles in 1962. The decision shattered the arms embargo in a big way;
the technology was the finest of its kind and required extensive training of Israeli technicians in
the U nited States. W arren Bass argued th at “the Hawk precedent remains perhaps the most
underappreciated milestone in the U.S.-Israel special relationship. ”40 A lthough Kennedy resisted
the idea of granting Israel a security guarantee, he assured th e n Foreign M inister Golda Meir in
December 1962 th a t the U nited States would n o t allow Israel’s destruction by its Arab enemies
who were rapidly arming themselves at the time. Kennedy hoped th a t this promise would induce
Israel to give up its nuclear program at Dimona.41
Lyndon Johnson presided over America’s first overtly pro-Israel administration. Johnson
himself made his Zionist sympathies well known during his days in th e Senate, and the Rostow
brothers Eugene and W alter (Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and N ational Security
Adviser, respectively) strongly encouraged Johnson’s friendly policies toward Israel. U nited

39John F. Kennedy, as cited in Jacob Baal-Teshuva, ed., T he M ission o f Israel (N ew York: Robert
Speller & S o n s, 1963), 12.
40Bass, Support and Friend, 145.
41Kennedy’s reasoning betrayed his spotty understanding o f Zionism and the im portance it
attached to self-reliance. D avid Ben-Gurion had sought to possess a nuclear capability since Israel’s birth
and would not abandon the program for any reason. This is the central thesis o f A vner C ohen, Israel and
the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
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States policy in the M iddle East during Johnson’s tenure tended to downplay the Cold W ar
concerns th a t had shaped the perceptions of previous administrations. T he war in V ietnam
sapped A m erican resources both at home and in other regions of the world. Johnson’s major
contribution to Middle East geopolitics centered on accelerating arms transfers to Israel.
A lthough Kennedy intended his Hawk sale to satisfy Israel’s security appetite - instead this
historic precedent only w hetted it.
T he Israelis were eager to replace France, its major arms supplier, bo th nuclear and
conventional, w ith the U nited States. W arren Bass noted, “Ben-Gurion had made the support
of a G reat Power the central pillar of Israeli foreign policy, and his first choice had virtually
always been the U nited States.

For Ben-Gurion, Am erica was an aspiration, France a

consolation.”42 As France was winding down its brutal war in Algeria, Israeli policymakers
recognized th a t the French would soon enough move to improve relations with the rest of the
Arab world, which essentially m eant th a t it would reduce arms transfers to Israel and supply
Israel’s enemies instead.43 Johnson moved enthusiastically to replace France. In 1965, the
U nited States became Israel’s largest military supplier. W ashington sold 200 P atton tanks and
Skyhawk jet bombers to Israel. As John M iglietta observed, “T he U nited States thus began the
process of providing Israeli military w ith the capabilities to attain military superiority in the
region th a t would become a major com ponent of relations betw een the two countries and a goal
of Am erican foreign policy in the region.”44
By 1967, Israel possessed advanced radar, missile, anti-aircraft and artillery systems

42Bass, Support A ny Friend. 4.
43Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), T h e Arms Trade w ith the Third
W orld (Stockholm: A lm qvist & W iksell, 1971), 530-531.
44Miglietta, A m erican A lliance Policy in the Middle East. 134-
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capable of bo th short-range Blitzkrieg style attacks and long-range “pin-prick” missions against
hostile regimes in Libya and Iraq. Israel’s main security th reat until the crisis preceding the Six
Day W ar in June 1967 were guerilla-oriented incursions - menacing, A m erican policymakers
figured, b u t n o t catastrophic. T he U nited States assumed th a t Israeli military superiority would
effectively deter a major A rab attack - the guerilla incursions seemed to prove th at the Arabs
were willing to go no further.

Abba Eban observed, “T he U nited States had grown so

accustomed to periodic eruptions in the armistice system th a t it had ceased to believe th at any
outburst could destroy the entire structure.”45 This explains why the Pentagon dismissed largescale Syrian and Egyptian mobilization in May 1967. They assumed th a t an Arab attack was
unlikely, because the Arabs knew the Israelis could wipe them out. W ashington thus pressed
Israel to wait out the heightened tensions for a diplomatic solution.46
Lyndon Johnson’s account of the weeks preceding th e Six Day W ar reads like an
extended and desperate plea to the Israelis not to preempt: “I have always had a deep feeling of
sympathy for Israel and its people,” he remembered,
gallantly b uildin g an d d efen din g a m odern n a tio n again st great od ds and against the tragic
b ack grou nd o f Jew ish ex p erien ce. I ca n u nderstand th a t m en m ig h t d ecid e to a ct o n their ow n
w h en h ostile forces g ath er o n their frontiers and c u t o ff a m ajor port, an d w h e n an tagon istic
p olitical leaders fill th e air w ith threats to destroy their n a tio n .

N o n e th e le ss, I h ave never

co n ce a le d m y regret th a t Israel d ecid ed to m ove w h en it d id .47

The toll of V ietnam was persuading Johnson of the lim itations of military solutions, and
he could n o t bring himself to support military action until all other m eans had been exhausted,
which he believed had not happened by June 5. Second, Johnson’s confidence in Israeli military

45Abba Eban, My Country: T he Story o f M odem Israel (N ew York: Random House, 1972), 239.
46A ronson, C onflict and Bargaining in the Middle East. 71.
47Lyndon, B. Johnson, T he Vantage Point: Perspectives o n the Presidency. 1963-1969 (N ew York:
H olt, Rinehart and W inston, 1971), 297.
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superiority was high, b u t n o t absolute. In the event th a t Israel got into trouble, the president
was in no mood to intervene in w hat could become a full blown Cold W ar crisis.48 Finally,
although N asser’s blockade of the Straits of Tiran could n o t be m istaken for anything other than
an act of war,49 Euguene Rostow believed th a t Nasser was exercising his freedom of m ovem ent
within Egyptian territory, thereby breaking no international laws. A n Israeli preemptive strike,
he reasoned, would be “a very serious mistake.”50
Yet, Johnson’s famous injunction to Abba Eban, “Israel will n o t be alone unless it decides
to go alone” and his May 17 letter to Prime M inister Levi Eshkol, in w hich he warned, “I cannot
accept any responsibilities on behalf of the U nited States for situations th a t arise as the result
of actions on which we are n o t consulted,” hardly constituted threats against Israel on par with
Eisenhower’s guarantee in

1957 th a t W ashington would protect Israel's right to access

international waterways.51 The U nited States was in a bind. Meir Amit, head of Israel’s foreign
intelligence agency (Mossad) concluded after a mee ting in W ashington designed to ascertain an
American response to preemption, that, “it became totally clear th a t they were n o t planning to
do a thing.”52 In addition, Johnson was enticed by the prospect th a t a crushing defeat would lead
the Arabs to become disenchanted with the Soviets, which could lead to the downfall of Nasser

48W illiam B. Quandt, Peace Process: Am erican Diplom acy and the Arab-Israel C onflict Since
1967 (W ashington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), 28.
49Even M ichael Walzer notes that Nasser’s actions constituted a “just fear” for the Israelis, thereby
making, in W alzer’s mind, the Six Day War one o f Israel’s few morally defensible conflicts. See M ichael
Walzer, lust and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argum ent with Historical Illustrations. 3d ed. (N ew York; Basic
Books, 1977), 84-85.
50Eugene Rostow, as cited in M ichael B. Oren, Six Days o f War: lune 1967 and the Making o f the
Modern M iddle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 77.
51Johnson, T h e Vantage Point. 293 and 290.
52Meir A m it, as cited in M ichael Brecher, “Eban and Israeli Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, War, and
D isengagem ent,” in Gordon A . Craig and Francis Loewenheim , eds., T h e Diplomats: 1939-1979
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 408.
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and a begrudging acceptance th a t Israel could n o t be destroyed.53 It was under this pretext of
implicit A m erican acceptance th a t Israel launched an attack th a t resulted in w hat Donald Neff
aptly called “one of the most humiliating defeats in warfare.”54
The im mediate U nited States reaction to the Israeli strike came from U nited States
Representative to the UN, A rthur J. Goldberg, who heatedly denied A m erican complicity in the
Israeli attack. His address to the Security Council on June 6 meticulously recounted Johnson’s
efforts to stave off war in the preceding three weeks.55 Israeli hegem ony presented the U nited
States with a problem th a t would not be swept away with im mediate denials. T he Arab-Israeli
conflict would become the preem inent security issue of the Middle East and would divide along
Cold W ar lines. “M any Israelis,” observed the Israeli historian Shlomo Aronson, “developed a
consciousness of ‘the right of the W estern bastion in the Middle East,’ after having defeated a
heavily Soviet-armed A rab world.”56 A bastion Israel had indeed become.

Israel boasted

casualty rates 25 to 1 in its favor, and had decimated nearly all of the A rabs’ war-making
capacity.57 T he Jewish state occupied the Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the W est Bank (thereby
uniting Jerusalem) - 42,000 square miles in total, more th a n tripling the original size of Israel.
In a series of events eerily similar to the Yom Kippur W ar of 1973, the Soviet U nion
issued a warning to Israeli troops marching on Damascus on the last day of the war th a t Moscow
would exert military m eans to save the Arabs. Prime M inister Alexsei Kosygin's use of the

53George W . Ball and Douglas B. Ball T he Passionate A ttachm ent: A m erica’s Involvem ent with
Israel. 1947 to the Present (N ew York: W .W . N orton and Company, 1992), 55-56.
54D onald N eff, Warriors for lerusalem: T he Six Days that Changed the M iddle East (New York:
Sim on and Schuster, 1984), 240.
55U nited States, D epartm ent o f State. Bulletin N o. 1461 (1967), 934.
56A ronson, C onflict and Bargainine in the Middle East. 8457Oren, Six Days o f W ar. 305-306.
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phrase "utmost gravity” was code for a nuclear threat. But it was a desperate threat at the end
of the war. The Soviets could save face by only breaking diplomatic relations with Israel. In a
milestone in the history of American-Israeli relations, Johnson declared after the war th a t Israel
would should not have to evacuate the territories it took by force until a comprehensive
settlem ent was reached.58
N o such negotiation was forthcoming. T he Soviets were rapidly re-arming their Arab
clients, while the Jewish lobby, with solid backing from Congress, pressured Johnson to sell Israel
50 F-4 Phantom s in order to m aintain the balance of power.

T he Republican candidate for

president, Richard N ixon upped the ante in a speech to the B’nai Brith organization, declaring
that
T h e b alan ce o f pow er m ust be tipped in Israel’s favor... [we] support a policy th a t w ould give
Israel a tec h n o lo g ica l m ilitary m argin to m ore th a n o ffset h er h ostile neigh bors’ num erical
superiority. If m ain tain in g th a t m argin sh ould require th a t th e U n ite d S tates supply Israel w ith
supersonic P h an tom F -4 jets w e sh ou ld supply those P h a n to m jets.59

Johnson relented, and Israel came to possess technology available previously only to America’s
N A T O allies. If A m erican foreign policy was easing into the notion th a t an impregnable Israel
would serve W ashington’s interest by deterring Arab/Soviet military plans, th e Phantom sale
represented a flawed logic. Israeli hegemony discouraged neither A rab rearm am ent nor Soviet
deployment of military advisers to the region. As a result, Cold W ar tensions increased yet
again. 60
•

U nder the circumstances it is hardly surprising th a t U N Security Council 242 of

58Aronson, C onflict and Bargaining in the Middle East, 86.
59Richard N ixon , as cited in Robert B. Sem ple, Jr., “N ix o n Stresses C om m itm ent to Israel,” N ew
York Times, 9 September 1968.
60Robert O . Freedman, “T he Superpowers and the Middle East,” in Roy A llison and Phil Williams,
eds,, Superpower C om petition and Crisis Prevention in the Third W orld (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), 124-
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Novem ber 22, 1967 (what Nadav Safran aptly called, “th a t masterpiece of ambivalence”61)
became more a sign of deadlock th an one of settlem ent. T he resolution called for a “withdrawal
of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”; Israel had no intention
of doing so, perhaps ever or until Arabs recognized its right to exist. T he resolution also called
for a “term ination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for an acknowledgment of
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and
their right to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force,” something the Arabs had no intention of doing, perhaps ever, or at the very least until
Israel relinquished the occupied territories.62
“Arab nationalism ,” observed A bba Eban, "drew no...lesson from its failure in war. The
Arab reaction to defeat was not to assume th a t the anti-Israel policy had failed, b u t rather that
it had not been sufficiently applied."63 Nasser proved Eban correct, announcing to his N ational
Assembly, “T h at which was taken by force will be regained by force,” thus managing to defy both
affirmations of the U N resolution in one sentence.64 Nasser spoke w ith confidence, since Israel’s
victory and despised occupation of Arab territory had created a unity unprecedented in Arab
interstate politics. A t the Arab Summit Conference held in K hartoum in Septem ber of 1967,
the heads of state agreed to combine their efforts to push Israel back to its boundaries of June
4. The com munique declared: “This will be done w ithin the framework of th e m ain principles
to which the Arab States adhere, namely: no peace w ith Israel, no recognition of Israel, no

61N adav Safran, Israel: T he Embattled Ally (Cambridge: Harvard U niversity Press), 430.
62U nited N ations. 2004. U .N . Security C ouncil Resolutions. 1967.
< http://w w w .un.org/docum ents/sc/res/1967/scres67.htm > (12 March 2004).
63Abba Eban, A n Autobiography (N ew York: Random H ouse, 1977), 453.
640 r e n , Six Davs o f War, 326.
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negotiations w ith it....”65
U nited States policy supported Resolution 242. Since it was obvious th a t the Arabs and
Israelis would never reach a settlem ent under the 242 rubric on their own accord, the only other
recourse - short of abandoning the resolution entirely and accepting a perm anent state of
belligerency - called for an imposed settlem ent from w ithout. In May 1968, a m emorandum
from D ean Rusk, the Secretary of State, to Johnson, considered the m ethods available to get
this problem o ff o f d ead ce n te r.... O n e possibility w ou ld be t h a t w e a n d th e S o v ie tU n io n discuss
this m atter secretly and in co m p lete detail - p utting to g eth er

a p ackage w h ich th e tw o o f use

w ould th e n try to im pose o n the cou n tries o f the area. I d o n o t b elie v e th a t this w ould work.
I doubt th at w e an d th e S oviets w ould agree sim ply b eca u se their and our interests are in direct
c o n flict.66

By that point, the U nited States gave up hope th a t Israel could be prodded into indirect
negotiations w ith the Arabs, a policy th at Israelis flatly refused because it would allow the Arabs
to avoid recognizing its existence.67 A t the beginning of the U N ’s diplomatic initiative, headed
by Special Envoy G unner Jarring in 1968, Johnson offered his full support b u t hinted at the
futility of any third party solution: “It is the parties themselves,” he declared, "who must make
the major effort...in this m uch needed peacemaking process.”68 Five years later, N ixon repeated
in his foreign policy report to Congress w hat Johnson had believed since the beginning: “A
solution cannot be imposed by the outside powers on unwilling governments. If we tried, the

65Arab Sum mit C onference, 1 September 1967, Com m unique reprinted in U nited States,
Congress, C om m ittee on Foreign Relations: A Select Chronology and Background D ocum ents Relating to
the Middle East. 249.
66D ean Rusk, as cited in U nited States, Departm ent o f State, Foreign Relations o f the U nited
States. 1964-1968. XX, “Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968” (W ashington, D.C .: G overnm ent Printing Office,
2001), 356.
67A n n M. Lescsh and D an Tschirgi, Origins and D evelopm ent o f the Arab-Israeli Conflict
(London: G reenwood Press, 1998), 94.
6SLyndon B. Johnson, as cited in U nited States, President, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the
U nites States: Lyndon B. Johnson. 1968 (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing O ffice, 1970), 947.
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parties would feel no stake in observing its terms, and the outside powers would be engaged
indefinitely in enforcing them .”69
It is impossible to know how Israel would have reacted if the Arabs had abandoned their
belligerence, and accepted Israel’s existence through direct negotiations because no such thing
occurred. It is certain, however, th a t the Israelis, seeing no reason to give up territories in
exchange for nothing were at least strategically satisfied w ith their post-war position. The Israeli
writer Chaim Herzog summarized Israel’s reasoning:
T h e d ep th afforded by th e territories tak en by Israel in the S ix D a y W ar g a v e th e cou n try for the
first tim e in its history a strategic op tion . A ll Israeli cen ters o f p o p u lation w ere n o w rem oved
from the Egyptian forces and a desert barrier som e 150 m iles w id e separated Israel from the Suez
C anal, in itself a barrier o f n o m ea n p ro p o rtio n s....70

The Israelis concluded th at they won a crushing victory w ithout the benefit of buffer zones; their
acquisition thus made Israel far less vulnerable. Israel also found political justification for the
occupation, summarized neatly by H enry Kissinger: “Israel, having never lived within accepted
frontiers, saw no essential difference betw een locating its boundaries in one unaccepted place
and another; condem ned to A rab belligerency, it sought the widest imaginable security belt.”71
Israel’s postwar position had a profound effect on its society. T he Israeli military elite
attained something of a celebrity status. General Ariel Sharon enjoyed telling anyone who
would listen th a t the Zahal (Israeli Defense Forces) could defeat any A rab regime in any location
and th at he would be too old to fight in the next Arab-Israeli war.72 In fact, the 39-year old
Sharon found him self on the front lines in both the 1969 and 1973 wars. T he writer Max Jacobs

69Richard N ixon , as cited in U nited States, President, Report to Congress. “U .S. Foreign Policy for
the 1970s: Shaping a Durable P eace,” (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1973), 136.
70Chaim Herzog, T he War o f A ton em en t (London: W eidenfeld and N icolson, 1975), 3.
71Henry Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 197.
72Safran, Israel: T he Embattled A lly. 257.
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wondered in his travelogue w hether “undue emphasis o n materialism during the six years
between the Six Day W ar and the Yom Kippur W ar produced a softening of Israel’s fiber,
resoluteness, strength.”73 Yitzhak Rabin recalled in his memoirs returning to Israel in 1973 after
his tenure as Ambassador to the U nited States: “T he Israel I came home to had a self-confident,
almost smug aura to it, as befits a country far removed from the possibility of war.”74 Levi Eshkol
bordered on the obnoxious in a February 1969 interview w ith Newsweek: “A fter the Six Day W ar
it is a miracle th a t we are still here - so why should we now crawl on our hands and knees to the
Arabs and say: ‘please do us a favor and take it all back....’ O u r occupation of the territory is the
outcome of war.”75 But no Israeli could best Defense M inister M oshe Dayan’s chutzpah. He
informed Time in an interview conducted in July 1973:
N o b o d y has faith in the U n ite d N a tio n s. First o f all, b eca u se it has n o pow er an d its com p osition
is absolutely against us. It ca n n ev er have any p ositive d ecision s for us. A ll th o se C om m u nist
cou n tries an d A rab cou n tries and A frican cou n tries. It is th e w orst place for us to go and put
our case.

76

In effect, Israel in these years became so confident of its strength th a t it blinded itself to
the Arab perspective. By offering only direct negotiations w ithout any prior conditions, Israel
confronted the Arabs w ith an offer merely to negociate from a position of weakness. This Israeli
policy had the unintended effect of convincing the Arabs th a t launching a general war - even
if they were likely to lose it - was preferable to passive acceptance of a political surrender. Five
years of standstill diplomacy and a pointless “war of attrition” during Richard N ixon’s first term
reinforced the assumption among Israeli and American policymakers th a t the Arabs would never

73M ax W . Jacobs, Day o f A ton em en t (New York: Vantage Press, 1976), 86.
74Yitzhak Rabin, T h e Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 25475Newsweek, “Eshkol: A Reply to Nasser,” 17 February 1969.
76Time, “Israel: W aiting in the W ings,” 30 July, 1973.
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exercise the “third option.” It was this framework th a t ultimately created one of the most
astounding intelligence blunders of the 20th century.

N ixon Inherits and Accepts Israeli Hegemony
As the Republican candidate for the presidency in 1968, Richard N ixon was eager to show the
Israelis th a t as leader of the U nited States, he would view A m erican and Israeli foreign policy
objectives as one and the same. H e informed Israeli Ambassador to the U nited States Yitzhak
Rabin:
I believe it necessary to reach an understanding with the Soviets, and I am convinced that the
only language they respect is the language of force. You can't reach an agreement with them
unless you do so from a position of strength.
Nixon elicited in Rabin exactly the response th a t he wanted: “W e too believe th a t it is vital to
reach an agreement w ith our adversaries in the Middle East,” Rabin replied. “But negotiations
can only begin w hen Israel speaks from a position of strength and has concrete backing.”77
As N ixon understood the situation, Israel’s smashing victory in June of 1967 saved the
Am erican position from collapsing altogether in the Middle East. A victory by Nasser and his
coalition would have m eant a victory of Soviet arms over W estern arms. If Israel remained
strong, N ixon reasoned, the Arabs would eventually becom e disenchanted with Moscow’s
inability to change the situation. Politically, the Soviets were in no position to pressure Israel;
they had after all broken relations with the Israelis during the Six Day W ar. T h at left Moscow
with only one strategy to retain its prestige in the region: arm the Arabs and send Soviet soldiers
to operate the most lethal equipment. In this influence system, A m erican policy would counter

77Richard N ixon and Yitzhak Rabin, as cited in Rabin, T he Rabin M em oirs. 133.
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the Soviet weapon transfers with more sophisticated equipm ent to be used by more com petent
clients. As the option for war would be neutralized indefinitely, the Arabs would agree to direct
negotiations under Am erican auspices.
Like past presidents, N ixon did tend to inflate Soviet capabilities, but his com m itm ent
to Israel, inherited from the past two administrations, could n o t change before the Arabs
abandoned their belligerent policy. N ixon understood perfectly well the implications of his
policies on A rab-A m erican relations, as dem onstrated in his 1972 Foreign Policy Report to
Congress. H e declared th a t the Arab-Israeli conflict was harmful because: “It has draw n the
Soviet U nion and th e U nited States into close military association w ith the com batants, with
all the danger th a t poses to world peace.” And: “It has caused the disruption of norm al U.S.
relations with a num ber of A rab countries. This, in turn, has increased the already excessive
Arab dependence on Soviet support, and therefore their dangerous vulnerability to excessive
Soviet influence.”78
As Harry N. Howard, a former U.S. foreign service officer, observed, N ixon’s frequent
invocation of balance of power in the Middle East “all too often seemed a transparent
euphemism for the m aintenance of Israeli military superiority.... [I] t became clear by 1972 th at
more military and economic assistance had been given to Israel during the N ixon adm inistration
than in those of all his predecessors since 1948.” 79 Such was N ixon’s M iddle East policy. H ad
the Arabs and Israelis found common ground in Resolution 242, N ixon would have gladly

78Richard N ixon , as cited in U nited States, President, Report to Congress. “U .S. Foreign Policy for
the 1970s: T he Emerging Structure o f Peace,” (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1972),
123-124.
79Harry N . Howard, “T h e U nited States and the Middle East,” in Tareq Ismael, T he Middle East
in W orld Politics: A Study in Contemporary International Relations (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1974), 135.
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accepted it. In the m eantim e, Middle East intransigence was best kept at a low boil. T h at is why
Nixon placed the region in the jurisdiction of the State D epartm ent, headed by Secretary of
State William Rogers. This freed the president and his N ational Security Advisor H enry A.
Kissinger to focus on the more pressing problems of how to end the war in Vietnam.
Rogers, an old friend of N ixon’s, had been A ttorney G eneral under Eisenhower. He had
little experience in foreign policy, and his easygoing m anner would n o t likely steal attention from
Nixon, who believed th a t foreign policy belonged to the W hite House. W ith a diplomatic
breakthrough in the Middle East unlikely, N ixon reasoned th a t the inevitable problems could
be blamed on the State D epartm ent.80 T he policy revealed N ixon’s unique conception of
friendship to say the least. Thus, one must refer to two M iddle East foreign policies, which is a
distinction some observers have failed to make.81 N ixon cited the Rogers Plan as evidence contrary to A rab “propaganda”- th a t N ixon sought an even-handed approach to the Arab-Israeli
conflict. In actuality, N ixon did n o t believe an “even han d ed ” approach was possible - a fact
that did not necessarily affect his views on Israel. As Kissinger recalled, rather undiplomatically,
“During the first term N ixon had initially left the Middle East to the State D epartm ent, partly
to placate Rogers, partly because N ixon thought Middle East diplomacy was a loser from the
domestic point of view and sought to deflect its risks from himself.”82
T he State D epartm ent, bo th Arab-leaning and anti-Com m unist, served N ixon’s interest
well. Its officials and the W hite House shared a belief in the M iddle East’s central role to Cold
W ar strategy. Joseph Sisco, the Assistant Secretary of State for the N ear East and South Asia,

80Quandt, Peace Process. 67.
81See, for exam ple, Theodore Draper, “T h e U nited States &. Israel: T ilt in the M iddle East?,”
Commentary, April 1975, 3482Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval. 196.
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explained A m erican interests in the Arab-Israeli dispute, in April, 1969:
In a sh ru nk en , in terd ep en d en t w orld, areas o f instability are to o d angerou s an d co u ld b ecom e
the source o f m ajor pow er co n flict. In this co n n ectio n , w e are k een ly aw are th a t th e exp an sion
o f S o v iet in flu en ce in the area in the past d o zen years, and m ore particularly sin ce th e June W ar,
has added a n ew d im en sion and com p lexity. W e h a v e strategic in terests in th e area.83

T he State D epartm ent, like N ixon and Kissinger, clearly w anted to expel Soviet
influence from the region. T heir strategies parted in how to go about accomplishing th at goal.
Secretary of State Rogers m ade clear his interpretation of Resolution 242. In testimony before
the Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations in M arch 1969, Rogers declared, “There can be no
secure and recognized boundaries w ithout withdrawal.”84 In other words, the State D epartm ent
planned to em bark on its M iddle East initiative w ith the expectation th a t Israel m ust withdraw
from the territories before any meaningful settlem ent could occur. N ixon and Kissinger knew
th a t the Israelis would fight the State D epartm ent’s assumption to a stalem ate, which would
create a delaying tactic th a t the W hite House had w anted.

As N adav Safran observed, the

State D epartm ent’s interpretation of Resolution 242, “considered th a t a complete identification
with Israel n o t only h u rt the A m erican interests in friendly A rab countries b u t was precisely
calculated to give th e Soviet U nion the best opportunities to score against the U nited States.”85
Such were the m ethods used by the State D epartm ent, as plainly evidenced by the first
two articles of the preamble of the 1969 Rogers Plan: I) “As part of a package settlem ent, Egypt
and Israel would determ ine a timetable and procedures for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces
from U AR territory occupied during the conflict of 1967;" II) “T he state o f war betw een Egypt
and Israel would end, and a formal state of peace would be established. Both sides would

83Joseph Sisco, as cited in U nited States, D epartm ent o f State, Bulletin N o . 1558 (1969), 391.
84W illiam Rogers, as cited in U nited States, D epartm ent o f State, Bulletin N o . 1555 (1969), 385.
85Safran, Israel: T he Em battled A lly. 439.
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undertake to prevent all forms of aggressive actions from their territory against the people and
armed forces of the other.”86
Kissinger was never one to let moral scruples get in the way of his personal ambitions.
As his perceptive biographer W alter Issacson noted, “Kissinger had worked to delay any
progress” in the Middle Eastern diplomacy. “His rivalry w ith Rogers m eant th a t he was not
rooting for a quick success, no doubt he would have seen less value in a stalemate if he had been
given the portfolio for the Middle East.”87
Seymour H ersh, one of Kissinger’s harshest critics, may have been correct in his
allegation th a t Kissinger’s need to dominate Rogers was all-consuming,88 b u t the charge does
not diminish Kissinger’s rejection of the Rogers Plan on strategic grounds. “As long as Egypt was
in effect a Soviet military base,” Kissinger observed,
W e co u ld h ave n o in ce n tiv e to turn o n an ally [Israel] o n b e h a lf o f a S o v ie t clien t. T h is is w hy
I was always o p p osed to com p rehensive solu tions th a t w o u ld be rejected by b o th parties and that
co u ld on ly serve S o v iet en d s by eith er d em onstratin g our im p o ten ce or b ein g turned in to a
sh ow case o f w h at co u ld be e x a c ted by M o sco w ’s pressure.89

Elsewhere, Kissinger wrote, the Rogers Plan “never solved the problem of how to persuade Israel
to give up all its conquests w hen Syria rejected any terms and Egypt refused to make peace

86T he Rogers Plan preamble is reprinted in Quandt, Peace Process. 80-81. A s late as O ctober
1971, Rogers was still con vin ced that Israel could be prodded into accepting his interpretation o f Resolution
242: “Both sides to the conflict are com m itted to the fundam ental and reciprocal principles to w hich the
Jarring Mission is dedicated: living in peace with each other and withdrawal from territories occupied in the
1967 conflict as set forth in Security C ouncil Resolution 2 4 2 .” W illiam Rogers, as cited in “Statem ent on
Interim Peace, Before the U nited N ations General Assembly, 4 O ctober 1971,” reprinted in U nited States,
Congress, Subcom m ittee on Europe and the Middle East, Report: T h e Search for Peace in the Middle East:
D ocum ents and Statem ents. 1967-1979 (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1979), 301.
87W alter Issacson, Kissinger: A Biography (N ew York: Sim on &. Schuster, 1992), 511.
88Seymour Hersh, T h e Price o f Power: Kissinger in the N ix o n W hite H ouse (New York: Summit
Books, 1983). Hersh argues throughout his book that Kissinger’s moral deficiencies had grave consequences
on A m erican foreign policy.
89Henry A. Kissinger, W hite House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 1279.
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w ithout Syria or the Palestinians, who were determ ined to destroy Israel.”90
T he pressure to which Kissinger referred came in the form of w ithholding arms from
Israel during its 1969-1970 “war of attrition” w ith Egypt along the Suez Canal. Because Israel’s
defense structures, which relied on reserve units to mobilize quickly and fight w ith fewer, yet
more sophisticated weapons, the State D epartm ent believed th a t it could force Israel to be more
amenable to indirect negotiations in the face of the vicious bloodletting on the Sinai canal
border. As Israeli political scientist Nitza Nachmias noted, the strategy rested on a paradox: It
assumed “th a t Israel was strong enough to deter Arab threats, yet sufficiently dependent on
A merican arms so th a t leverage could be effectively applied w ithout endangering Israeli
security....”91 The strategy betrayed either the State D epartm ent’s profound misunderstanding
of, or disregard for, one of the central historical concerns of Zionism. This “stick” approach,
argued M ichael Brecher, h it “a fear rooted in the Holocaust psychology of the Jewish State and
periodically confirmed by G reat Power behavior.”92
T he Israeli governm ent could n o t understand why th e Rogers Plan accepted the Arabs'
unwillingness to negotiate directly with a state recognized by the U nited N ations. For Israel, this
unwillingness clearly signaled a fundam ental A rab rejection of peace th a t had become bolstered
by Am erican complicity.93 Golda M eir declared as m uch in her D ecem ber 1969 address to the
Knesset:

90Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval. 200 [emphasis Kissinger’s ] .
9'N itza Nachm ias, Transfer o f Arms, Leverage, and Peace in the M iddle East (N ew York:
Greenwood Press, 1988), 50.
92M ichael Brecher, D ecisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (N ew Haven: Yale U niversity Press, 1975),
508.

93A ronson, C onflict and Bargaining in the M iddle East. 113.
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[T h e R ogers P lan does] n o t obligate th e A rab states expressly to recognize Israel’s sovereignty,
they d on't a d v o ca te th e d elin ea tio n o f secu re, n eg o tia ted , and agreed borders by free
n ego tia tio n s b e tw e e n th e parties, they do n o t ob ligate th e A rab sta tes effectiv ely to put a n e n d
to territorial activities from their territories.94

T he Rogers Plan came under heavy domestic criticism as well. Eugene Rostow published
an article in April 1971 warning against excessive concern th a t support of Israel would forever
polarize the Arab world against the U nited States:
M any A rab leaders w ou ld be relieved to m ake p eace w ith Israel. T h e y realize that th e idea o f
reven ge against Israel is sterile and d estru ctive, and th a t its true purpose is n o t the d estru ction
o f Israel, b u t th e radicalization o f A rab politics, an d the e x te n s io n o f S o v iet in flu en ce.95

In a Spring 1971 article, M ichael Curtis, a Cold W ar scholar, employed the ultimate (if
overused) historical analogy of appeasement in his criticism of the Rogers Plan:
T h e U n ite d S tates has vacilla ted in its attitu d e in the M idd le East crisis, an d a policy o f firm ness
is n o w required. Israel c a n n o t b eco m e an oth er M u n ich . T h e 'ev en handed' policy o f Secretary
o f S tate R ogers, w ith its parallel refusal to supply planes to Israel, is ta n ta m o u n t to a cq u iescen ce
in S o v iet d o m in a tio n o f

the area.96

N ixon virtually declared the so-called Four Power talks dead in his 1970 Foreign Policy
Report to Congress, intim ating th a t the guiding assumption of the Rogers Plan - imposed peace
from w ithout - was n o t a viable solution: “W e have gone as far as we believe useful in making
new proposals,” he contended, “until there is a response from the other parties.”97 Hearing (and
expecting) no such response, N ixon declared at a news conference his support for Israel’s
strength, something no State D epartm ent official ever had: “W e will do w hat is necessary to

94Golda Meir, as cited in Bernard Reich, “Israel in U S Perspective: Political Design and Pragmatic
Practices,” in Efrat and Bercovitch, eds., Superpowers and C lient States in the M iddle East. 58.
Eugene V. Rostow, “T h e Middle Eastern Crisis in the Perspective o f W orld Politics,”
International Affairs 47 (April 1971), 276.
96M ichael Curtis, “Soviet-A m erica Relations and the M iddle East Crisis,” Orbis 15 (Spring 1971),
418.
97Richard N ixon , as cited in U nited States, President, Report to Congress. “U .S. Foreign Policy for
the 1970s; A N ew Strategy for P eace,” (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1970), 79-80.
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m aintain Israel’s strength vis-a-vis its neighbors, n o t because we w ant Israel to be in a position
to wage war - th a t is not it - but because th a t is w hat will deter its neighbors from attacking it.”98
T he G unnar Jarring Mission, which was the U N ’s forerunner to the Rogers Plan during
two years of failed diplomacy after the Six Day W ar, and essentially an international extension
of the State D epartm ent’s policy for the next two years, m et its end on February 26,1971. The
UN Proposals never deviated from its support of indirect negotiations as a means to achieving
the im plem entation of Resolution 242, and Israel gave its final reply to Jarring, the well-meaning
Swedish diplomat: “Israel will n o t withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.”99 This was the
response Israel had issued repeatedly since June 11, 1967.
It was a stance Israel had the confidence to make, indefinitely it seemed. Even before
the Six Day W ar, A bba Eban wrote, “T he plain tru th is th a t A rab nationalism emerges from
nearly two decades of uncompromising anti-Israel struggle in total strategic defeat.”100 By the
time the diplomatic initiatives th a t had been based on indirect negotiations had ru n their course,
Israel saw no qualitative evidence of an improved Arab strategic position. Additionally, the
powerfully dem onstrated Israeli strength during the Six Day W ar, observed Shlomo Aronson,
reinforced in the U nited States “Jewish support for Israel and silenced Jewish groups th a t were
anti-Zionist or th at had reservations about Israel.”101 T he post-war period saw an unprecedented
unity among Israel’s Am erican co-religionists which helped to make the Israeli embassy one of
the best funded, organized, and politically influential of any in W ashington. M ost important,

98Richard N ixon , as cited in U nited States, Departm ent o f State, Bulletin N o . 1618 (1970), 112113.
99A s cited in Quandt, Peace Process. 122.
Abba Eban, “Reality and V ision in the M iddle East: A n Israeli V iew ,” in Ihud Olami, ed., Israel
Today: A N ew Society in the M aking (Tel Aviv: Labour Zionist W orld M ovem ent, 1967), 31.
101A ronson, C onflict and Bargaining in the M iddle East, 94.
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Israeli leaders were quickly learning how to tell the “right” policymakers either w hat they w anted
to hear, or to a greater effect, w hat they did not. In a July 1, 1970 letter to N ixon, Golda Meir
raised the tensions of the “war of attrition” along th e Suez Canal by threatening to bomb the
Soviet-m anned SA-2 and SA-3 anti-aircraft missile batteries. By blatantly acknowledging the
possibility of an Israeli-Soviet clash, which could quickly escalate into a dreaded superpower
confrontation, M eir was in effect attem pting to blackmail the Americans into sending more arms
and aircraft.102 T he episode constituted a radical departure from the traditional structure of the
American-Israeli influence relationship. By this point, b o th countries were using the carrot-andstick approach against one another.

Israeli hegemony had clearly evolved from post-war

exhilaration to established reality.

Sadat and the Soviets: Pretext to the Surprise A ttack on Yom Kippur
Egyptian President A nwar Sadat expelled the Soviet advisors in July of 1972.103 “By th at tim e,”
noted N adav Safran, “A m erican policy in the Middle East became completely oriented on Israel,
sharing w ith it n o t only basic goals b u t also an identical evaluation of the situation and a
common conception of means and ends.”104 In hindsight, the first instance th a t exposed the
dangers of this increasingly comfortable relationship can be traced to May 27,1971, a year before
the expulsion. O n th a t day, Soviet and Egyptian leaders signed a Friendship Treaty, the
contents of w hich A m erican and Israeli leaders accepted at face value: the two countries were
intensifying their relationship to challenge American-Israeli predom inance.

102Kissinger, W hite H ouse Years. 582.
103T h e dynamics o f this episode are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
104Safran, Israel: T h e Embattled A lly, 448-449.
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In fact, the

Friendship Treaty was a sign of extremely strained relations betw een Moscow and its Egyptian
clients. Israeli hegemony had succeeded in producing exactly w hat N ixon and Kissinger had
wanted: Arab frustration at the Soviet’s inability to deliver either a military or diplomatic
settlem ent. W here the Friendship Treaty served to camouflage this fact, more alert American
analysis would have picked up its real meaning.

Kissinger was forthcoming about his

interpretation:
N o t k now in g S adat, I h ad to co n clu d e th a t h e w as still playing N a sse r ’s gam e. Furtherm ore,
S ad at’s im p atien ce w as b eco m in g ev id e n t in repeated declaration s th a t 1971 had to be the 'year
o f decisions' in th e M iddle East. O u r strategy had to b e to frustrate an y Egyptian policy based
o n m ilitary threats an d co llu sio n w ith the S o v iet U n io n . T h erefo re S a d a t’s Friendship T reaty
w ith the S o v iets, w h atever its m otives, did n o t g a lv a n ize us to h elp him as h e m ight have
h o p e d .105

W ashington got it backwards. In Sadat’s subtle way, he was telling the W hite House th a t their
support of Israel had succeeded in forcing Arab frustrations. But Kissinger believed that the
Friendship Treaty was another threat of Arab belligerence, and Sadat was not to be rewarded
out of fear th a t the Arabs would attack Israel with full Soviet backing. Subtlety had hardly been
Nasser’s forte; there was n o t yet any reason to assume th a t Sadat was any different.
Predictably, N ixon responded with further staunch support of Israel. Between 1970 and
1972, A m erican military aid to Israel increased ten times over, from $30 million to $300 million,
and the Jewish State was well on its way to becoming the largest recipient of Am erican foreign
assistance.106 T he fourteen m onths between the Friendship Treaty and S adat’s Soviet expulsion
proved to be a particularly bad time for any revolutions in U nited States M iddle East geopolicy.
Kissinger and N ixon were almost totally focused on building d etente w ith the Soviet U nion and

105Kissinger, W hite H ouse Years. 1285.
106Miglietta, A m erican A lliance Policy in the Middle East, 169.
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ending the war in V ietnam - two closely linked projects. M ost significantly, N ixon w anted to
prevent any turm oil in the Middle East during an election year. As Kissinger recalled, “My
principle assignment was to make sure th a t no explosion occurred to complicate the 1972
election - which m eant in effect th a t I was to stall.”107 A ll of this succeeded in frustrating Sadat,
and so he kicked out the Soviets in w hat was widely perceived as the final proof th a t the Israelihegemony policy had worked. It had not; like Egyptian strategy and the Friendship Treaty,
Sadat’s decision to expel the Soviet advisers defied intuition. Now Sadat became set on war, a
decision supported by the fact th a t he would soon become silent on the m atter.
Kissinger claimed in his memoirs th at he considered th e possibility th a t the expulsion
“may well refer to the possible fact th at the presence of Soviet advisors with Egyptian units could
serve as a Soviet break on Egyptian offensive m ovements."108 (In fact, this was Sadat’s principle
motive for the expulsion.)

If this was an honest self-appraisal of Kissinger’s analysis, he

nonetheless deserves only limited credit. The Israelis, on whom the Americans relied for most
of their intelligence, overwhelmingly interpreted the expulsion as vindication for Israel’s massive
deterrent-oriented arms buildup. Abba Eban summarized the Israeli reaction:
T h e gen eral b elie f was th at S adat had ob ta in ed a n em o tio n a l satisfaction at the ex p en se o f his
strategic and political p ow er....T here h ad b e e n an ob sessive fear in Israel th a t W a sh in g to n w ould
exercise pressure for a se ttle m e n t w h ich w ould relieve it o f th e m en a ce o f global war. From n ow
on , this n ightm are seem ed to h ave faded. W ith the departure o f S o v iet troops, th e pow der keg
was d efu se d .109

Senator Frank C hurch reported after his August 1972 study mission to Israel th a t th e Soviets
were happy to avoid a potential strategic nightmare:

107Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval. 196.
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Israel’s military leaders consider that the narrow straits limiting entrance by naval forces to the
Mediterranean presented the Soviet Union with a difficult strategic problem. Every Israeli
official to whom I talked, military and civilian, gave the American F-4 Phantom the credit for
making the crucial difference in the power equation. ‘The F-4 is not just a machine,' one said,
'it has changed the entire strategic picture in the Middle East.’110
This prevailing complacency punctuated Golda M eir’s M arch 1973 trip to W ashington.
Kissinger recalled, “W ith respect to negotiations, Golda’s attitude was simple. She considered
Israeli military impregnable; there was, strictly speaking no need for any change.”111

A n Intelligence Failure: American-Israeli Assumptions Before the Yom Kippur W ar
In the early 1970s Israel treaded a fine line between fantasy and reality. T he collective memory
of Judaism related Israel’s current strength to biblical times. T he scenario was all the more
poignant because of the compression of time between destruction and regeneration. The Nazi
Holocaust destroyed nearly half of world Jewry; by the summer of 1967 Israel controlled the O ld
City of Jerusalem, and Jews could pray at their spiritual home. A nd the U nited States, the most
powerful country in history, had finally become the political, military, and economic guarantor
that David Ben-Gurion had sought since the birth of Israel. Israel was very m uch blinded by its
good fortunes.
Yet, on the day-to-day level the possibility of an A rab attack never faded completely.
T he Israelis thought a good deal more about their response to an attack th an the attack itself.
Kissinger’s biographers, M arvin and Bernard Kalb, quote one of their subject’s constant
admonishments to Israel. “D on’t ever preempt! If you fire the first shot, you won’t have a

110Frank Church, as cited in U nited States, Congress, C om m ittee on Foreign Relations, Report by
Senator Frank Church: Prospects for Peace in the Middle East: T he V iew from Israel. (W ashington, D.C.:
Governm ent Printing Office, 1972), 2.
11’Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval. 221.
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dogcatcher in this country supporting you. You won’t have presidential support. You’ll be alone,
all alone. W e w ouldn’t be able to help you. D on’t preempt! ”112 Kissinger’s crude warning rested
on the same concerns th a t had guided Lyndon Johnson’s failed opposition to preem ption before
the Six Day W ar: the U nited States had no desire to allow the A rab world an opportunity to
associate A m erican arms and assistance with Israeli aggression. A nd while Israel enjoyed the
power it could project, it had lost virtually all of its support from Europe and the non-aligned
world. This added a certain credibility to Kissinger’s threat.
Such was Israel’s strategy: stay armed to the teeth and never preem pt an attack that
would not occur. It was a bizarre defense posture th a t m atched a profound misreading of Arab
intentions.113 Sadat, as the world was about to find out, was n o t Nasser; he and his allies wanted
only to regain the occupied territories. The cherished notion of destroying Israel had, for all
intents and purposes, died on the A rab airfields on June 5,1967. In O ctober o f 1973, they were
fighting for their own dignity, som ething they feared would be lost forever if they recognized
Israel while it occupied Arab lands. T he military historian Lawrence L. W h etten surveyed the
situation:
If in fact the war w as w aged from the A rab side, as w as alleged , o n ly for th e recovery o f A rab
h o n or an d lo st territories, th en Israel was fighting m erely for lan d it h ad b een a ttem p tin g to
ex c h a n g e for security for th e past five years. In this case Israel fough t th e w ron g w ar, at the
w rong tim e, for th e w rong aim s.114

But it was the false sense of security afforded by the occupied territories th a t prevailed over a

112Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 460.
U3T he CIA, for that matter did not do m uch to counter Israeli prejudices. A m erican
investigations into the failure o f the C IA to predict the Arab attack yielded this embarrassing passage from a
1971 CIA handbook: “Arabs lack the necessary physical and cultural qualities for performing effective
military services." C ited in Village Voice, “T he S elect C om m ittee’s Investigative Record - T he Middle East
War: the System Breaks D ow n ,” 16 February 1976.
U4Lawrence L. W h etten, The Canal War: Four-Power C onflict in the Middle East (Cambridge:
T he M IT Press, 1974), 278.
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political understanding of the conflict. Yitzhak Rabin wrote an article in Ma'ariv on July 13,
1973 explaining Israel’s strategy:
O ur p resen t d efen se lin es give us a decisive ad vantage in th e A rab-Israeli b a la n ce o f strength.
T h ere is n o n eed to m obilize our forces w h en ev er w e hear A rab threats, or w h e n th e en em y
co n cen tra tes his forces along the cease-fire lines. B efore th e S ix D ay W ar, any m o v e m e n t o f
Egyptian forces in to S in ai w ould co m p el Israel to m obilize reserves o n a large scale. T od ay, there
is n o n e e d for su ch m obilization so lon g as Israel’s d efen se lin e e x te n d s alon g th e Suez C a n a l.115

“T he concept,” as Israel’s defense posture was simply nicknam ed, held th a t Syria would
not attack from the n orth w ithout a simultaneous Egyptian attack from the south. It was a
reasonable assumption given th a t neither Arab army could m atch the full deployment of the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) - and one th a t ultimately proved true on O ctober 6,1973. But the
problem with “the concept” was th a t it assumed th a t Egypt would only attack w ith a superior air
force. This m eant that, with the introduction of the F-4 Phantom to the Middle East arms race,
Israel discounted the possibility of a two-front war, and accordingly, reduced its annual reserves
call-up from two to one m o n th .116 Israel compounded its faulty strategic considerations with an
operational blunder th a t ultimately compelled the U nited States to airlift supplied to Israel
during the Yom Kippur W ar. Elmo Zumwalt, Jr. C hief of U.S. N aval O perations, observed:
“Israel always had assumed it would defeat the Arabs in a num ber of days, and it had stocked
military ‘consumables’ - am munition, spare parts, all the things th a t get used up fast - on that
basis.”117
Ian Black and Benny Morris made the useful distinction betw een political and statistical
intelligence: “Knowing the Arab war plan or plans was one thing; believing th a t the Arabs

115Yitzhak Rabin, as cited in Eban, A n Autobiography. 488-489.
116U nited States, D epartm ent o f the Army, Israel: A Country Study. 260.
117Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., O n W atch: A Memoir (N ew York: Quadrangle Books, 1976), 432.
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cost an average of $ 10 million b u t also forced the country into a virtually frozen state. T he IDF’s
citizen-soldiers comprised bo th a bulk of the army and a fair size of the country's labor force.
W hile the “crying w olf’ theory holds up generally, it fails to explain several unusual
situations th a t had occurred in the first days of O ctober 1973. O n O ctober 3, three days before
the war began, the Soviet U nion m ounted a major evacuation of its nationals from Egypt,
civilian and military alike. Israel assured the U nited States th a t the move was yet another
rupture in Soviet-Arab relations. As Alexander George, an expert on international relations,
noted, “N othing in the available record indicates th at Kissinger considered asking the Soviets
why they were taking their citizens out of Egypt and Syria and w hether they expected war.”122
Moscow w anted to get its people o u t of the way of a massive A rab troop concentration preparing
for war. Golda M eir recounted in her memoirs th a t the deployments - in fact the largest ever
assembled on Israel's borders - were regarded as no reason for concern. “Nobody,” he recalled,
“at the [Monday, O ctober 3 intelligence] m eeting thought th a t it was necessary to call up the
reserves, and nobody thought th a t war was im m inent.”123
T he CIA essentially parroted Mossad’s interpretation of the A rab concentrations. Nixon
recounted, “T he news of the im m inent attack took us completely by surprise.”124 Kissinger went
one step further in his O ctober 12 news conference, where he basically heaped all of the blame
on the CIA, thus excusing himself entirely:
W e asked our o w n in tellig en ce as w ell as Israeli in tellig en ce, o n three separate o cca sio n s during
th e w eek prior to th e ou tb reak o f h ostilities to give us their assessm en t o f w h a t m ight happen.

122A lexander L. George, “T h e Arab-Israeli W ar o f October, 1973: Origins and Im pact,” in
A lexander L. George, et. al., Managing U .S.—Soviet Rivalry: Problems o f Crisis Prevention (Boulder:
W estview Press, 1983), 147.
123Golda Meir, Mv Life (N ew York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1975), 422..
124Richard M. N ixon , RN: T h e Memoirs o f Richard N ix o n . 2d ed. (N ew York: Sim on &
Schuster, 1990), 920.

T h ere w as the u nan im ou s v iew th a t h ostilities w ere unlikely to th e p oin t o f there bein g n o
ch a n ce o f it h ap p en in g .125

N ixon wrote in his memoirs th a t he was disappointed in the C IA . A more accurate account
would have included a note th a t the CIA, in turn, was disappointed in the W hite H ouse.126
Israel experienced bureaucratic shortcomings of its own. M ichael Brecher observed th a t Abba
Eban’s influence before and during the Yom Kippur W ar had significantly diminished from his
central role in the Six Day W ar.127 Eban’s jurisdiction in 1973 was the UN; for m atters of
national security, Eban’s political gifts were relegated to the periphery. His reduced capacity was
indicative, in fact, of a larger intelligence problem in the U nited States. As Yitzhak Rabin
recalled, “N ixon believed th a t national leaders should m aintain direct and regular contacts
w ithout going through their respective foreign ministries.”128
In short, Nixon, and of course Kissinger, disdained bureaucracies and they paid the price
for it w hen the Arabs launched their surprise attack on O ctober 6. In a dam ning article, Ray S.
Cline, Director of Intelligence and Research at the State D epartm ent from 1969-1973, called
the N ational Security Council an “empty shell” under N ixon and claimed th a t had Kissinger
bothered to ask Cline of the State D epartm ent’s assessment of the A rab buildup, he would have
told the new Secretary of State th a t the chance of a war erupting from O ctober 4 onward were
“better th an even.”129

Congress had long complained th a t Kissinger’s immunity from

l25U nited States, Departm ent o f State, Bulletin N o. 1792 (1973), 534.
126See Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, T he C IA and Am erican D em ocracy 2d ed. (N ew Haven: Yale
University Press, 1989), 176-193, for an excellent account o f the strained relations betw een the W hite
House and the C IA . Jeffreys-Jones contended that N ix o n and Kissinger politicized intelligence for their
own gain, w hich crippled the C IA ’s ability to influence policy and guard against surprises.
Brecher, “Eban and Israeli Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, War, and D isengagem ent,” in Craig and
Loewenheim, T he Diplomats: 1939-1979, 418.
128Rabin, T h e Rabin M em oirs, 154.
129R ayS. Cline, “Policy W ithout Intelligence.” Foreien Policy 17 (W inter 1974-75), 132-133.
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Congressional inquiry - which he cherished and fought to protect - as N ixon’s N ational Security
Adviser had become a danger to Am erican democracy and security.130 If Cline’s charges are to
be believed, Kissinger’s self-imposed insulation as Secretary of State raised im portant questions
of Constitutional propriety. John Lewis Gaddis concluded,
B ureaucracy,

properly

used,

ca n

m onitor

disparate

an d

co m p lex

ev e n ts

w ith o u t

oversim plification , advise ah ead o f tim e o f approaching dangers, and thus redu ce the ch a n ces
o f b ein g ca u g h t o ff guard. A major liability o f th e N ix o n -K issin g er adm inistrative style was that
it virtually p reclu ded using the bureaucracy in th a t w a y .131

T he location of A m erican and Israeli principals at the time of the Arab attack
underscores just how off guard the two countries found themselves. Richard Nixon, Henry
Kissinger, Gold Meir, A bba Eban, and Israeli Ambassador to the U nited States Simcha Dinitz,
were all away from their com mand posts on the morning of O ctober 6 .132 It was the ultimate
victory for Sadat’s long game of disinformation. W illiam Bundy observed, “Essentially Sadat took
advantage of a failure of imagination as m uch in Israel as in W ashington.”133 H aving achieved
his major pre-war objective, Sadat ordered his troops to cross the Suez Canal at 2:00 p.m., in
coordination w ith a massive Syrian forward thrust on the G olan Heights.

130 See, for exam ple, U nited States, Congress, C om m ittee on Foreign Relations, Hearings:
National Security A c t A m endm ent (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing O ffice, 1972), 122-123.
131]oh n Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Containm ent: A Critical Appraisal o f Postwar American
National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 334132T.G . Fraser, T h e U S A and the Middle East Since W orld W ar II (N ew York: St. Martin’s Press,
1989), 99.
133W illiam Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making o f Foreign Policy in the N ix o n Presidency (New
York: Hill and W ang, 1998), 434.
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The Eruption: A Different Kind of Middle East W at
“W e won the war,” Golda M eir wrote in her memoirs.134 T he statem ent is among the best
evidence th a t Israel did n o t win the Yom Kippur W ar. O ne would be hard pressed to find an
Israeli leader make a similar claim about the Six Day W ar; it is n o t necessary to insist upon
something th a t is self-evident.
This is not to say th a t Israel lost the war, either. Israel stayed on the offensive from
O ctober 15 to O ctober 28, rejuvenated by an enormous A m erican resupply effort until all
fighting was halted. By the end of the war, the IDF was in position to strike and occupy Cairo
and Damascus - a show of brute force even greater th an the blitzkrieg of the Six Day W ar, and
restrained only by superpower intervention. But Israel, in any event, lost the war, for two
reasons. First, the Arabs’ surprise attack dem onstrated th a t the occupied territories were a
strategic liability, n o t the crucial buffer zones Israeli leaders claimed them to be. In effect, Israel’s
entire defensive stance since the Six Day W ar was turned on its head. Second, the Arab
victories of the first week of fighting shattered Israel’s invincibility myth, w hich restored some
of the dignity the Arabs had lost in June of 1967.135 Egypt’s gains ultimately set in m otion the
normalized relations betw een these two bitter enemies in later years. For this reason, those who
view the Yom Kippur W ar in technical terms - as a tactical Israeli victory - diminish its larger
diplomatic significance.
O f course, none of this was apparent on the m orning of O ctober 6. H enry Kissinger was
asleep in his suite at the W aldorf-Astoria in M anhattan w hen Joseph Sisco, the Assistant

l34Meir, Mv Life. 420.
135Burton I. Kaufman, T he Middle East and the U nited States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and
Superpower D iplom acy (N ew York: Sim on and Schuster, 1996), 87.
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Secretary of State, shook him awake to warn of an im m inent outbreak of hostilities in the Middle
East. T he groggy, and thoroughly perturbed, Secretary of State had no idea which side had
initiated the crisis, and so he immediately began to work the phones, informing the Israelis,
Arabs, and Soviets th a t the U nited States strongly disapproved of any preemptive actions.136
Golda Meir was well aware of the likely Am erican reaction to any preem ptive strike. Against
the advice of her military advisers, Meir declared, “I know all the arguments in favor of a
preemptive strike, b u t I am against it. W e don’t know now, any of us, w hat the future will hold,
but there is always the possibility th a t we will need help, and if we strike first, we will get nothing
from anyone.”137 T he Prime M inister’s decision was a prudent one from a political standpoint,
but strategically moot. O n the Sinai front, the Egyptians and Soviets had amassed one of the
most fortified air defense systems in the world, complete w ith th e latest surface-to-air missile
(SAM) technology and aircraft housed in bomb-proof hangars. There was to be no repeat of the
June 1967 debacle. As Lawrence W h etten noted, the missiles and fortifications “combined to
make an effective Israeli preemptive attack impossible.”138
Meanwhile, the outbreak ofw ar had n o t ended W ashington’s intelligence blunder. Two
hours after the A rab attack, the CIA remained convinced th a t Israel fired first.139 Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger insisted, “I just don’t see any motive on the Egyptian-Syrian side.”140
T he reality of the situation, however, quickly became apparent, and the Arab advances were
transforming A m erican strategy as the Israelis endured a severe beating. A t first, N ixon and

136Henry A . Kissinger, Crisis: T he A natom y o f Tw o Major Foreign Policy Crises (N ew York:
Simon & Schuster, 2003), 18-19.
137Meir, Mv Life, 426.
138W h etten, T he Canal W ar. 274.
139Quandt, Peace Process. 152.
James Schlesinger, as cited in Kissinger, Crisis, 34.
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everyone else in W ashington assumed th a t the Israelis would deliver another decisive knockout.
T he president believed th a t the likely outcome would be yet another setback to diplomacy. He
told Kissinger, “T he one thing we have to be concerned about...is th a t the Israelis, when they
finish clobbering th e Egyptians and Syrians, which they will do, will be even more impossible to
deal with than before....”141 N ixon’s statem ent speaks clearly to the fact th a t his acceptance, and
encouragement, of Israeli hegemony centered on his confidence in Israel’s deterrent
effectiveness. He and Kissinger did not w ant a negotiated settlem ent any less than the State
Departm ent; they simply remained convinced th a t no such breakthrough was forthcoming. T h at
is why the initial A rab victories, once they became apparent, came as welcome news to the
W hite House.
The prevailing rationale was quickly transformed from staunch support of Israeli strength
to quiet desire to let the Israelis suffer at the hands of the exhilarated Arabs. N ixon recalled: “I
believed th a t a battlefield stalemate would provide the foundation on which fruitful negotiations
might begin.”142 M arvin and Bernard Kalb elaborate on Kissinger’s fundam ental agreement with
N ixon’s strategy:
From th e earliest days o f th e war, it had n ev er b een K issinger’s p olicy to en cou rage the Israelis
to w in a n o th er d ecisive victory, su ch as th ey h ad w o n in 1 9 6 7 . S u c h a victory w o u ld n o t buy
p eace, b u t rather create ten sio n s that w ould trigger still a n o th er war. B esid es, K issinger b eliev ed
th at in the cu rren t diplom atic clim ate, a clea r-cu t Israeli victory w o u ld con trib u te to a further
isolation o f Israel, and, g iv en A m erica ’s clo se ties to the Jew ish state, en cou rage a n ew w ave o f
a n ti-A m erican ism in the M iddle E ast.143

T he fact th a t neither side w anted a cease-fire in the first days of fighting suited the

141Richard N ixon , as cited in Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval. 490.
142N ixon , RN, 921.
143Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger. 487. Kissinger spelled out this line o f reasoning in both his October
12 and O ctober 25 news conferences. S ee U nited States, D epartm ent o f State, Bulletin N o. 1792 (1973),
5 3 9 and U nited States, D epartm ent o f State, Bulletin N o. 1794 (1973), 585.
175

NixoivKissinger strategy quite nicely. T he Security Council m et four times in the first week of
fighting to no effect; the Arabs were enjoying their victories over Israel for th e first time, and
Israel, in a sort of national shell shock, was unwilling to accept a cease-fire with Arab armies
planted in the occupied territories. Both the Arabs and Israelis counted on victory - neither
w anted the U N to spoil their chances.144
Three days into the war, Israel began to understand its dire position, thus overcoming
its faulty strategy of five years in a m atter of days. Abba Eban explained:
For several years th e ex p ec ta tio n had b e e n th a t if war broke o u t at all, it w o u ld be sw iftly en d ed
by th e superiority o f Israeli arms. T h e id ea th a t Israel w ou ld n o t be able to d eal the A rabs a fatal
blow w ith its ex istin g w eaponry had n o t en tered a n y o n e’s h e a d .145

By O ctober 9, Israel had already depleted large portions of its stocks in every category: planes,
tanks, bombs, am munition, even guns. Ambassador Simcha Dinitz informed Kissinger th a t
Golda Meir was willing to come to the U nited States herself to underscore how badly Israel
needed a major A m erican resupply. Kissinger rejected the proposal immediately w ithout asking
N ixon.146 He reasoned:
S u ch a proposal co u ld reflect only eith er hysteria or blackm ail. A visit w o u ld take G old a away
from Israel for a m inim u m o f thirty-six hours. L eaving w hile a m ajor b attle was going o n w ould
be a sign o f su ch p an ic th at it m ight bring in all the A rab states still o n the sid elin es.147

To Kissinger’s likely chagrin, N ixon authorized El A1 (Israel’s commercial jet fleet) to pick up
Sidewinder missiles and am munition. Compared to the Soviet airlift - carried out by the Soviets

144Thom as A . Bryson, A m erican D iplom atic Relations w ith the M iddle East. 1784-1975: A
Survey (M etuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1977), 267.
145Eban, A n Autobiography. 512.
146It was a pattern Kissinger followed throughout the war. N ix o n ’s troubles with the W atergate
scandal were worsening by the day, consum ing nearly all o f his attention. Kissinger essentially directed
U nited States foreign policy o n his own.
147Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval. 493.
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themselves - the A m erican supply was m odest.148

T hus began a major American-Israeli

disagreement th a t would last the course of the war. T he Israelis pushed the idea th a t a major,
and immediate, resupply effort ought to have been as attractive to the Americans as it was to
them. Golda M eir’s O ctober 8 request for a major shipm ent of F-4 Phantom s implored: “The
aims of our fighting are absolutely clear to you. It is our objective th a t the heavy blows we will
strike at the invaders will deprive them of any appetite they will have for any future assault.”149
M eir’s line of reasoning likely would have gained favor in the W hite House before the
Yom Kippur W ar. But she was advocating the benefits of a strong deterrent effect - for which
the Phantom s played a crucial role - after deterrence had plainly failed in preventing the outbreak o f
war. The Israeli Prime M inister could not grasp how and why the A rabs’ successful attack was
quickly producing a revolution in A merican policy, a fact th a t was emphasized by a statem ent
she made at an O ctober 13 news conference: “You cannot imagine w hat would have happened
to us had we moved back to the June 4, 1967 lines, w hen this attack on us took place.”150 In
fact, w hat Meir herself could n ot imagine, was th a t the Yom Kippur W ar was not a war of
annihilation like the Six Day W ar.

T he Airlift: A natom y of a Showdown
Israel’s struggle to obtain war materiel from its unwilling patron reintroduced a basic policy
argument th a t had been going on from the time of Israel’s birth to the beginning of the Yom
Kippur W ar: did a strong Israel facilitate or hinder U nited States interests in the Middle East?

148Bundy, A Tangled W eb. 435.
149Golda Meir, as cited in Kissinger, Crisis. 123.
150Golda Meir, as cited M ichael Brecher, D ecisions in Crisis: Israel. 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley:
University o f California Press, 1980), 175.
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There never existed any consensus in the debate, and domestic pressures had always added an
elem ent th at resisted objective strategic considerations.

In the T rum an and Eisenhower

administrations, Israel was perceived as more of a threat to A rab-A m erican relations th an as an
ally in the Cold W ar. O ver the course of the Kennedy and Johnson adm inistrations, U nited
States policy slowly shifted to emphasize the latter of these two considerations. A fter the Six
Day W ar polarized the radical Arab states and Israel along Cold W ar lines, N ixon moved to
accelerate a trend largely begun w ith Kennedy’s Hawk sale to Israel in 1962.
The fact th a t Israel needed arms so early and so desperately in th e fighting was itself an
intelligence failure: the Israelis simply misread their enemies.

A nd w hen they could not

understand W ashington’s hesitation in uncritically supplying them w ith any and every weapon
they had requested, the Israelis had come to misread their own G reat Power patron. For four
years, Israel nurtured the fantasy th a t their Cold W ar role in the N ixon D octrine existed
independent of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It did not. N ixon and Kissinger correctly perceived
w ithin a few days of the fighting th a t a new opportunity had arisen. If the Arabs could use
Soviet weapons to force the Israelis to the negotiation table (and in doing so regaining the honor
they had lost in the June 1967 debacle), they would likely negotiate under A m erican auspices,
simply because no other country could exert significant pressure on Israel. In short, the Middle
East version of the N ixon Doctrine supported Israel at the exclusion of the Arabs out of
necessity, n o t choice. T he Yom Kippur W ar presented the W hite H ouse w ith the first possibility
of encompassing an Arab-Israeli settlem ent while excluding th e Soviets.

It was not an

opportunity to be missed.
A n exam ination into the details of the delay in th e airlift invariably pits Secretary of
State H enry Kissinger against Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. In imploring Kissinger
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to begin Israel’s urgently needed airlift, Israeli Ambassador Dinitz would hear of bureaucratic foot
dragging at the Pentagon, logistical concerns, and Schlesinger’s “pro-A rab” concern th a t a direct
American airlift would trigger an Arab oil embargo. Schlesinger countered th a t the delay was
part of Kissinger’s M achiavellian design; the Secretary of Defense claimed to do w hat he was
told.
Leonard Garm ent, an aide to Nixon, observed, “to this day I am n o t sure who was
primarily responsible.”151 Essentially, it is a fruitless task to blame one at the expense of the
other, unless one is looking to make a character judgem ent.152 In the first place, as Edward N.
Luttwack and W alter Laqueur have pointed out, m uch of the diplomacy conducted during the
airlift episode was com m unicated verbally; what was recorded was done so selectively for the
simple fact th a t individuals w anted history to judge them favorably.153 Second, and more
important, w hatever the details of who was responsible for what, b o th Kissinger and Schlesinger,
and the institutions they represented, had reason to be less th a n enthusiastic about a major
American airlift. They m ight have shifted blame betw een each other, b u t this does n o t m ean
that Kissinger’s grand schemes or Schlesinger’s bureaucratic logjams had to be mutually
exclusive.
There is no doubt th a t Schlesinger had serious reservations about a resupply. W alter
Isaacson paraphrased his com ments during one strategy session early in the war: Schlesinger
w arned th a t a m ajor rearm ing o f Israel, especially if it h elp ed turn th e war around, w ou ld poison
A m erica ’s relation s w ith th e A rabs. T h ere was a d istin ctio n , h e argued, b etw e en d efen din g

15^ o n a r d Garment, Crazy Rhythm (New York: Random H ouse, 1997), 196.
See W alter Isaacson, Kissinger. 811, N o te 3, for a useful survey o f the divergent accounts.
W hat is clear is that negative portrayals o f Kissinger in general tend to focus o n the “M achiavellian” angle
o f w hich the airlift delay is cited as one o f many examples.
153Edward N . Luttwack and W alter Laqueur, “Kissinger & the Yom Kippur W ar,” Commentary,
(September 1974), 33.
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Israel’s survival and d efen d in g its right to k eep co n tro l o f th e o cc u p ie d territories it had taken
during th e S ix D ay W ar o f 1 9 6 7 .154

The Kalbs’ account (written in cooperation with Kissinger) portrayed Schlesinger as being
excessively concerned th a t an airlift m ight cause an A rab oil embargo. It is a plausible assertion
in that one of the Defense Secretary’s many responsibilities is to ensure th a t U nited States forces
have adequate supplies of fuel. In fact, the ensuing A rab oil embargo did have a detrim ental
impact on the military’s global maneuverability.

Additionally, Schlesinger may have felt

compelled to be especially cautious w ith oil politics to compensate for Kissinger’s lack of concern
on th a t subject.155
Schlesinger’s own account of the airlift (which N ixon him self finally ordered for O ctober
13) lacks any regard for Israel’s own fortunes. His discussion of the airlift in the Defense
D epartm ent annual report of 1975 focused on the airlift as a symbol of A m erican capabilities to
project force elsewhere:
A d ep en dab le U .S . capability to deliver large scale rein forcem en ts to Europe quickly in an
em ergen cy co u ld n o t on ly b e d ecisiv e in p reventin g a N A T O d efeat, it c o u ld also be d ecisive in
deterring the attack in the first p lace. In deed , I ca n th in k o f n o m ore im pressive a deterrent to
a W arsaw P act a tta ck o n N A T O th an a clearly d em onstrab le U .S . cap ab ility to put d ow n in
Europe a fully-equipped com b at-ready d ivision (inclu din g its supporting forces) every few d ays,156

Schlesinger repeated his reasoning twenty five years later in a symposium on the 1973 war:
A m o n g major eq u ip m en t item s, w e flew four M -6 0 tanks to Israel. G iv e n th e im m ense w eig h t
o f th e tank, th a t w as all w e co u ld p ut o n a C -5 A [transport p la n e ]. It w as logistically in sane, but
p sychologically and sym bolically it w as im portant. W e w a n ted to d em on strate that w e co u ld fly
tanks to Israel. 157

154W alter Issacson, Kissinger, 518.
I55Kissinger once remarked to his aides, "Don't talk to me about barrels o f oil. T h ey might as well
be bottles o f Coca-Cola. I don't understand!” Henry Kissinger, as cited in Yergin, T he Prize. 613.
156James Schlesinger, as cited in U nited States, Departm ent o f D efense, A nnual D efense
D epartment Report. FY 1975 (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1974), 157-158.
157James Schlesinger, as cited in Richard B. Parker, ed., T he O ctober War: A Retrospective
(Gainesville: University Press o f Florida, 2001), 158.
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Given his stated concern for an oil embargo, it is n o t improbable to deduce from these
statem ents th a t had Schlesinger failed to see the benefits of the airlift which had nothing to do
with Israel, he would have remained opposed to it by employing w hatever stalling tactics were
available to him.
A lthough Israeli Ambassador Dinitz placed a majority of the blame for the airlift delay
on Schlesinger, his recounting of Kissinger’s strategy makes clear th a t Kissinger saw weapons
transfers as a tool to calibrate the outcome of the war in a way favorable to him. Dinitz quoted
Kissinger:
Egypt sh ou ld suffer th e co n seq u en ces o f its attack en o u g h to realize th a t war does n o t pay, and
that allian ce w ith th e S o v iet U n io n does n o t assure security; b u t Egypt sh o u ld n o t be destroyed
and S adat sh ou ld n o t be hum iliated so th a t h e co u ld b e a party to th e n eg o tia tio n s that w ould
follow the war under A m erica n g u id a n ce.158

W alter Isaacson quoted a more explicit statem ent by Kissinger at the beginning of the conflict:
“T he best result would be if Israel came out a little ahead b u t got bloodied in the process, and
if the U.S. stayed clean.”159 This unseemly statem ent supports Adm iral Elmo Zumwalt’s charge
that Kissinger deliberately ordered Schlesinger to stall in the nam e of the president. Zumwalt,
no great fan o f Kissinger, wrote: “He did not scruple to deceive his allies or besmirch the
reputation of his colleagues.”160 James Reston, the venerable New York Times columnist, based
his famous “H idden Compromise” editorial on the notion th a t because the Arabs have the
manpower for an attritional war and Israel does not, th e n a selective airlift could be used to
effectively intensify Israeli dependence on the wishes of Kissinger and N ixon.161

158Sim cha Dinitz, as cited in P.R. Kumaraswamy, Revisiting the Yom Kippur W ar (London: Frank
Cass Publishing, 2000), 113-114.
159Issacson, Kissinger. 514.
160Elmo Zumwalt, as cited in Ambrose, N ixon , V olum e T h ree, 234161James Reston, “T he H idden Compromise,” N ew York Times, 19 O ctober 1973.
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In sum, the significance of the airlift delay lies n o t in who was responsible for it, but in
the fact th at there was a general consensus th a t Israel should be denied the m eans to defeat and
demoralize the Arabs again - which the Israelis surely would have done if given the opportunity.
Such widespread agreement on this policy was a rarity in W ashington in those days. W hile the
airlift delay may have placed an excessive burden on Israel, no A m erican policymakers were
prepared to see it destroyed, either. T h at would have been as m uch a disaster for American
policy as another smashing Israeli victory. The airlift provided an exam ple of basic Cold W ar
strategy: Soviet arms m ust n o t defeat American arms in battle.

T h a t is the reason that

W ashington quickly assembled one of the largest airlifts in history w hen it believed the time was
right.162
T he first issue impeding the airlift did not even involve th e problems th a t would result
in a direct airlift of A m erican planes to Israel. Golda M eir’s O ctober 10 letter to N ixon did not
hide her panic: “I know th a t in this hour of dire need to Israel I could tu rn to you and count on
your deep sympathy and understanding.”163 Schlesinger apparently w anted to do anything he
could not to offend the Arabs. H e opposed the idea of El A1 planes loading supplies at American
military bases. H e finally agreed after Kissinger absurdly suggested th a t the tail markings could
be painted over, obscuring the Star of David th a t makes El A1 the unm istakable airline of the
Jewish state.
Kissinger’s spray paint solution hardly made him a hero of the Israeli war effort. By
O ctober 12 Israel had contem plated two unthinkable scenarios: a military defeat at Arab hands;

162Quandt, Peace Process. 163.
163Golda Meir, as cited in N ixon , RN, 924.
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and the threat, or even use of nuclear weapons (if indeed Israel had a deliverable capability).164
Schlesinger later recalled, “As Israel began to fall apart H enry began to fall apart.”165 If the
charge was true, Kissinger had n o t yet lost his sense of geopolicy. Even though th e El A1
passenger fleet could n o t possibly handle Israel’s resupply needs, Kissinger rem ained opposed to
A merican planes flying directly to Israel. In essence, Schlesinger’s own hesitation centering on
an Arab oil embargo, dovetailed conveniently w ith Kissinger’s own concern of a Soviet response
and erosion of detente.
Kissinger suggested th a t the U nited States charter commercial transports to Israel - that
way, he assumed, Israel could be saved while the U nited Stats could stay “clean.” T he problem
with this plan was th a t no sane charter executive had any inclination to fly into a war zone.
Kissinger deviously told Ambassador Dinitz th a t the charter plan was being held up by Pentagon
foot dragging - in actuality the foot dragging was his own.
The following day, O ctober 13, N ixon realized th a t the charter scheme - even if it had
worked - would look no different to a hostile Arab world th an a direct airlift. A t a strategy
meeting, the president decided th a t the airlift delay could go on no longer. He yelled, “Do it
now! ” A nd so, a week after the war had erupted, the airlift got underway in full force. Am erican
C-130s and the even larger C '5 A transport planes began landing in Israel th a t evening, loaded
with m ateriel including the crucial F-4 Phantoms.
N ixon recalled the sheer immensity of the mission: it was “an operation bigger th a n the
Berlin airlift of 1948-49.”166 A lthough the Soviet airlift to the Arabs had to cover a m uch shorter

164Safran, Israel: T he Embattled Ally. 483.
165Issacson, Kissinger. 521.
,66N ixon , RN, 927-928.
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distance, and, of course, was n o t hindered by fears of an A rab oil embargo, the American airlift
dwarfed Moscow’s, in the category of efficiency. T he Soviets flew a total 15,000 tons of materiel
in 934 missions; the Americans boasted 22,395 tons in 566 missions.167 U nited States Air Force
pilots often flew 28-hour round trips without relief, and the Israelis did not overlook the sacrifice.
Colonel Donald R. Strombaugh, Com m ander of the airlift mission, nam ed “O peration Nickel
Grass,” received hundreds of letters from Israeli schoolchildren, one of which promised: “T hank
you for helping us in our war. W hen you have a war we will help you.”168 T he sight of the
behem oth A m erican transport planes flying over T el Aviv prom pted drivers to get out of their
cars, cheering “God bless A m erica!” It was the first time in the war th a t Golda M eir cried.
Israel’s rejoicing, however did n o t exactly stem from as clear and present a danger as its
leaders had indicated to W ashington. The real meaning of Israel’s doomsday fears was rooted
in the fact th a t after the first week of fighting, its defense abilities were in an unprecedented
position: Israel did n o t know how m uch longer it could hold out against an enemy with a
seemingly unlimited am ount of soldiers and a steady resupply from th e Soviets.169

The

Am erican airlift did n o t “save” Israel in any real sense; rather, it saved Israel from the potential
that the Arab armies would advance into Israel proper. As of O ctober 13, there was no evidence
to support Israel’s fears. Its forces were clearly fighting to retain the occupied territories. The
airlift, thus, allowed Israel to go on the offensive almost immediately. N o longer constrained by
the possibility of running out of crucial weapons stocks, the Israelis in short order set out to

167Figures cited in D avid A . Brown, “Israel Airlift Flights Underscore C-5 Rapid Deploym ent
Capability,” A viation Space W eek & T echnology, 10 D ecem ber 1973.
168C ited in Chris J. Krisinger, “Operation N ick el Grass: Airlift in Support o f N ational Policy,”
Aerospace Power Journal (Spring 1989),
< http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj89/krisinger.html> (16 March 2004).
169Brecher, D ecisions in Crisis. 206.
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accomplish W ashington’s desire to see A m erican weapons prevail on the battlefield. In the
A m erican strategy, if the airlift triggered an oil embargo (which in fact it did), it would be a
relatively small price to pay in the context of Cold W ar considerations.
In dem anding an airlift, N ixon told Kissinger, “It’s got to be the works. W h at I m ean is,
we are going to get blamed just as m uch for three planes as three hu n d red .”170 It was an astute
observation, predicated on the belief th at an Arab victory would immeasurably heighten Soviet
prestige in the area.

In this scenario, an oil embargo in the short-run - largely seen in

W ashington as a tactical, n o t strategic, penalty against Am erican support to Israel was preferable
to w hat Kissinger called a “concom itant radicalization of the area.”171 T he international affairs
specialist Bernard Reich offered the best summary of A m erican strategy in Congressional
testimony:
Israel’s fall w ou ld very likely in crease S o v iet prestige and pow er in th e M iddle East sin ce the
R ussians h a v e con trib u ted th e k n o w -h o w and m a te r ie l to a ch ie v e th e A rab victory. It w ould
further w ea k en those m oderate A rab states, su ch as Jordan an d S a u d i A rabia, w h ose overthrow
has b een a stated goal o f various guerilla and op p osition m o v em en ts w ith in th e A rab w orld and
w h o w ould n o longer be d iverted from their aim by p reo ccu p a tio n w ith Israel.
It w ou ld probably facilitate A rab radical pressures w h ich h a v e b e e n destabilizing factors
in the Persian G ulf. T h ese a ch iev em en ts w ould, in turn, n eg a tiv ely im pact o n th e U .S . effort
to m ain tain regional stability and p eace, o n A m erica n ec o n o m ic in terests, and o n th e flow o f oil
to the W e s t.172

In other words, the U nited States was glad to endure an oil embargo by its moderate Arab
friends. A n embargo dictated by Soviet whim was unacceptable. A nd so once more Israel
benefitted from W ashington’s Cold W ar concerns.
T he Israelis were making better use of the airlift th an perhaps W ashington had intended.

170Richard N ixon , as cited in Issacson, Kissinger. 522.
171Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval. 531.
Bernard Reich, as cited in U nited States, Congress, Subcom m ittee o n the N ear East and South
Asia, Hearings: The Impact o f the O ctober Middle East W ar (W ashington, D .C .: G overnm ent Printing
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A ttem pting to keep Israel strong enough to defeat Soviet weapons, but n o t so strong as to
humiliate Soviet clients proved to be a difficult balancing act. By O ctober 19, the Soviets, who
urged the Syrians and Egyptians to accept a cease'fire w hen it became apparent th a t Israel would
prevail with fresh A m erican arms, were now beginning to panic themselves. Like W ashington,
the Soviet U nion had come to fear th at its position in the Middle East was under threat. Soviet
Ambassador to the U nited States Anatoly Dobrynin delivered a message from General Secretary
Leonid Brezhnev urgently requesting th a t Kissinger come to Moscow on O ctober 20. N ixon and
Kissinger assumed th a t the Soviets could be dissuaded from taking drastic action (like a
unilateral military intervention) if Kissinger heeded their request.
Kissinger received a bombshell en route to Moscow. N ixon transm itted to Brezhnev a
note through the Soviet Embassy in W ashington, which called for “a firm com m itm ent from
both of us to devote our personal efforts toward achieving th a t goal [a final peace] and to
provide the strong leadership which our respective friends in the area will find persuasive.”173
Kissinger, by his own account, was “horrified.” In effect, N ixon was proposing a joint superpower
effort to impose peace on the region. Kissinger quickly decided to pretend as if the note did not
exist; he made no gesture toward its contents during his visit to Moscow. In doing so, Stephen
Ambrose charged: “T he opportunity was lost. W e cannot know if N ixon and Brezhnev could
have made peace betw een Israel on the one hand, Egypt and Syria on the other. W e do know
that because of Kissinger, the attem pt was not m ade.”174
But Kissinger did n o t attem pt to scuttle a final peace. H e tried to prevent Nixon, in his
distressed state, from throwing away four years of Am erican strategy. O ctober 20, the day N ixon

173Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval. 547.
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sent the note, came to be know n in W atergate lore as the “Saturday N ight Massacre,” when
N ixon fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. It was arguably the m ost tense day of N ixon’s
presidency. H e was looking for something, anything, to halt the im peachm ent process which by
that point was approaching full steam.

A pparently he thought th a t an imposed peace -

something b o th the Arabs and Israelis had bitterly opposed for the past five years - could be
accomplished w ith a partner who had never budged from advocating the radical Arab demand
of withdrawal w ithout recognition or security guarantees. O n top of all of this, Soviet and
American arms were still engaged in a brutal proxy war th a t had showed no signs of abating.
Kissinger fulfilled his objectives in Moscow; he stalled. T he U N passed Security Council
Resolution 338, jointly supported by the U nited States and Soviet U nion, which called for both
sides to “term inate all military activity immediately...in the positions they now occupy.”175 The
resolution was basically a sop to the Soviets, who could use it to dem onstrate to their Arab
clients the effectiveness of Soviet diplomacy. As W alter Isaacson noted, Kissinger’s goal “was
to have step-by-step negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis, w ith the U.S. serving as
the middleman while the Soviets were relegated to the sidelines.”176 Kissinger’s stopover in Israel
after Moscow revealed to him just how m uch the Israelis feared an imposed peace. The
Secretary of State assured them th a t no such thing would happen. If the cease-fire held,
Kissinger surmised, he would begin his shuttle diplomacy almost immediately.
But the cease-fire had almost no effect on the war in the Sinai. W illiam Q u an d t wisely
observed,

175U nited N ations. 2004. U .N . Security C ouncil Resolutions. 1973.
< http://w w w .un.org/docum ents/sc/res/1973/scres73.htm > (12 March 2004).
176Issacson, Kissinger, 525.
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It did n o t m atter w h ich side w as tech n ica lly responsible for firing th e first sh o t after th e cease-fire
w as to h ave gon e in to effect. W h a t w as clear was th a t Israeli forces w ere a d v a n cin g b eyon d the
O ctob er 2 2 cease-fire lin e s.177

The IDF succeeded in surrounding Egypt’s T hird Army Division, w hich was n o t only the jewel
of the Egyptian military, b u t the only force th a t stood betw een advancing Israeli forces and an
undefended Cairo. During the night of O ctober 23, Egypt sent in com m ando and infantry units
in a failed attem pt to break open an escape corridor for the Third Army. M ichael Brecher has
contended th a t Egypt’s refusal to surrender the Third Army was welcomed by the Israeli military,
which used A rab resistance as a pretext to strengthen its grip on the battlefield.178 Israel refused
to allow rescue teams to provide w ater and medical assistance. Basically, Israel w anted to starve
the Egyptians into submission, to dem onstrate their power over Egypt in any future negotiations.
Furthermore, as Ambassador Dinitz argued, Israel would refuse to release the T hird Army until
it had dropped its weapons: “W e will n o t open up a pocket,” he told Kissinger, “and release an
army th a t has come to destroy us. It has never happened in the history of war."179
T he situation was quickly escalating into the m ost dangerous crisis of the war. If the
Americans and Soviets agreed on one thing, it was this: Israel m ust n o t be perm itted to destroy
Egypt. From Moscow’s perspective, this could be the final blow to its credibility in the region,
since millions of dollars of arms, Soviet advisers, and staunch backing of A rab demands at the
UN could end w ith an Israeli occupation of Cairo. In W ashington’s view, a humiliating defeat
delivered to the Arabs would essentially render post-war diplomacy useless. T he radical Arab
states would continue to dem onstrate no inclination to recognize Israel, and worse, the pro-
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W estern Persian G ulf States would likely become more shrill and daring in their objections to
America’s Middle East policy.
T he U nited States m ade clear to Israel in its opposition to further aggression. In a
lecture delivered in late 1974, former Defense M inister Moshe Dayan said:
T h e A m erican s, in order to sm o o th the w ay w ith the A rabs, co n fro n ted us w ith a n ultim atum
to th e effect that, if w e w ou ld n o t enable th e T h ird A rm y to receiv e food and w ater, w e w ould
find ou rselves in a p olitical co n flic t w ith them [the A m erican s] .180

According to Bernard Reich, the U nited States threatened Israel th a t it “would supply the Third
Army themselves if Israel did n o t allow other means of relief.181
T he Israelis believed th a t the Soviet U nion was prepared to do the same. Abba Eban
explained why this action would bring tensions to a dangerously new level: “T he Soviet Union
would then be physically involved in the war against Israel, and it would become necessary for
the U nited States to think long and hard about its own com m itm ent to regional stability and to
Israel’s security.”182 Eban, of course, was referring to the one question A m erican policymakers
hoped they would never have to ask themselves during a proxy conflict: is the situation w orth
a nuclear confrontation?
A t 9:35 p.m., W ednesday O ctober 24, Brezhnev issued a note w hich increased tensions
still further. Moscow w anted the U nited States to know th a t it would n o t passively accept
Israel’s actions. Ambassador Dobrynin read the note slowly over the phone to Kissinger to make
sure there was no confusion. Brezhnev intoned:

180M oshe Dayan, as cited in Draper, “T he U nited States & Israel,” Commentary, 30.
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I w ill say it straight th at if you find it im possible to act join tly w ith us in this m atter, w e sh ould
be faced w ith th e n ecessity urgently to co n sid er th e q u estio n o f taking appropriate steps
unilaterally. W e c a n n o t allow arbitrariness o n th e part o f Israel.183

N ixon later com m ented on the note: “It was very firm and...left very little to the imagination as
to w hat he [Brezhnev] intended.”184 N ixon wanted to convey the m yth th a t he was active in
making policy during this latest episode of the crisis. H e was not; the W atergate affair was
incapacitating him, and he stayed upstairs in his living quarters while Kissinger took full control
of the situation.185
In those tense late night hours, Brezhnev’s note was n o t taken lightly. U nited States
intelligence had detected radioactive emissions em anating from a Soviet ship at Port Said, Egypt.
This alarming news was interpreted at the strategy session th a t night as adding credibility to
Brezhnev’s implied threat. A lthough the source of those emissions was never determ ined, it is
unlikely th at Moscow would have allowed the U nited States to d etect nuclear m aterial so close
to the crisis area if its presence was unrelated to the conflict.
Kissinger understood at the time th a t Sadat proposed th a t a joint superpower force be
sent in to resolve the Third Army crisis or, if necessary, a unilateral A m erican deployment to
accomplish the same thing. W h at Sadat did n o t want - for th e same reasons as Kissinger - was
a unilateral Soviet move, w hich could quickly explode into an Israeli-Soviet confrontation. Put
another way, Sadat did not w ant a nuclear superpower and a regional (and allegedly nuclear)
power confronting each other on Egyptian soil. Kissinger reasoned:
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If th e S o v iets s e n t troops, it w ould be unilaterally, w ith o u t th e sa n ctio n o f eith er th e h o st country
or the U n ite d N a tio n s. T h is w ould be m u ch easier for us to resist, and w e w ere d eterm in ed to
d o so. It sh ow ed - th ou gh w e cou ld on ly guess this at the m o m e n t - th a t S ad at w as staking his
future o n A m erican diplom atic support rather th an S o v ie t m ilitary p ressure.186

Kissinger chose to focus on W ashington’s concerns over Soviet intentions at his news
conference following the crisis: “It is inconceivable th a t we should transplant the G reat Power
rivalry into the Middle East, or, alternatively, th a t we should impose a military condom inium by
the U nited States and the Soviet U nion.”187
T he U nited States expressed its opposition to the unilateral Soviet move by heightening
its worldwide military alert status to Defense C ondition (DEFCON) III.

DEFCON I is

maximum force readiness, or the alert status just before war. Kissinger defined DEFCON III:
it “increases readiness w ithout the determ ination th a t war is likely; it is in practice the highest
stage of readiness for essentially peaceful conditions.”188 In other words, D EFCON III is the
most nuanced of the alert statuses: its function is to convey a stern message w ithout causing the
opponent to panic.189 Coral Bell provided a useful characterization of Brezhnev’s note and the
DEFCON III response:
as an ex c h a n g e o f rather lou d signals - ex cessiv ely loud, o n e m ight hold, an d thus unnecessarily
abrasive to the nerves o f the w orld. B ut they probably n e e d e d to be loud, in order to carry over
certain back grou nd n oises, and to reach oth er ears o th er th a n those o f th e A m erica n and
R ussian policym akers con cern ed , w ho w ere, o f cou rse, perfectly w ell able to co m m u n ica te in
whispers u nless it w as useful that others sh ould h ea r.190

Indeed, the A m erican response could not have been m uch louder, if Kissinger’s only intention
was sabre-rattling. Every U nited States command post around the world heightened its alert
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status, including the Strategic Arms Command, which spearheaded nuclear missions. Between
fifty and sixty B-52 strategic bombers were transferred from G uam to the U nited States, the
aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy m oved W est across the M editerranean from the Straits of
Gibralter, and the 82nd Airborne Division received orders to prepare for deployment.
All of those actions fit with Kissinger’s attitude toward crisis m anagem ent. As Barry M.
Blechman and Douglas M. H art noted, “Rather than m atching Soviet actions ‘tit for ta t,’ the
Secretary believed, it was necessary to do something more dramatic, som ething which would get
the attention of Soviet decision makers because it was several times more alarming than their
own action.”191
Kissinger w anted the Israelis to be as alarmed as the Soviets. Lawrence W h etten argued
that Kissinger’s threats were “aimed against Israel as m uch as they were aimed against the Soviet
U nion.”192 N o t only did W ashington w ant Israel to understand the gravity of its insubordination,
but Kissinger w anted to freeze the situation before Israel pushed th e Egyptians back from the
sliver of land west of the Suez Canal. This was the land they had won in their short-lived glory
days of the war, before the A m erican airlift turned the tide against them .193 Raymond Gartoff
took this line of reasoning one step further. He interpreted the public meaning of Kissinger’s
DEFCON III alert as an opportunity to dem onstrate th a t the U nited States would n o t bow down
before the Soviet ultim atum . T he real use of the alert, G arthoff argues, was “as leverage in
pressing the Israelis into stopping their advance - and not because the Soviets wanted them to
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stop, b u t because the United States w anted them to .”194 G arthoff dismissed N ixon’s “farfetched”
reference to the C uban Missile Crisis as a lame attem pt to characterize himself as a strong
president capable of making the right choices in times of crisis.195 G arthoff s argum ent is all the
more dam ning in light of a telephone conversation betw een Kissinger and C hief of Staff General
Alexander M. Haig an hour after they had received Brezhnev’s O ctober 24 note. Kissinger
wondered, “I don’t think they would have taken on a functioning president.” Haig replied,
“They couldn’t.”196
T he D EFCON III episode was certainly bizarre. Israel had received its harshest rebuke
in the history of its relations with the U nited States, and from an adm inistration th at was its
staunchest supporter. T he DEFCON III alert proved to the Egyptians th a t A m erican diplomacy
could guarantee their wishes where Soviet weapons could n o t - in effect, the alert crisis became
the first stage in a quick resumption of diplomatic relations betw een Egypt and the U nited
States. President A nwar Sadat proved to be a flexible and enthusiastic participant in Kissinger’s
post-war shuttle diplomacy.
Israel, over a series of painful steps, began to accept the fact th a t its bitter enemy, Egypt,
would come to yield its own considerable influence in W ashington. Shortly after the DEFCON
III alert, Israel yielded to UN Security Council Resolution 340,197perm itted resupply of the Third
Army and begrudgingly recognized Egypt’s military presence west of the Suez Canal. The
situation was such th a t Egypt and Israel could sit down in the next few days for direct
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negotiations, a first w ith an Arab nation in the history of the Jewish state.
It is to Kissinger’s credit th a t events turned out they way they did. A lthough the crisis
did not nearly approach the danger of the Cuban Missile Crisis eleven years earlier, the Secretary
of State, N ational Security Adviser, and for all intents and purposes, executor of U nited States
foreign policy, took a nuclear gamble. As John Lewis Gaddis observed: “O ne resorted to
escalation to prevent escalation, and so ran the risk, if the other side did not back down, of
bringing about precisely w hat one had sought to avoid.”198
W h at of the implications of American actions for detente? If detente sought nothing
more than to institutionalize a fundam ental agreement betw een the superpowers - th a t nuclear
war was an unacceptable response to an ongoing Cold W ar - how did th e DEFCON III alert
affect the detente? T he paradox of the alert itself was th a t Kissinger sought to avoid nuclear war
by threatening it. A n answer to this question must reflect the ambivalence of the alert strategy.
T he lead editorial in the O ctober 26 edition of the Washington Post observed of the DEFCON
III alert:
T h e result w as, in our view , perhaps th e single m ost sign ifican t v in d ica tio n o f th e w ord ‘d e te n te ,’
that m u ch abused word, w h ich th e w orld has se en to date. It w as a v in d ica tio n all th e more
valuable for p reven tin g an extrem ely serious disruption o f G reat P ow er rela tio n s.199

T he corresponding editorial in the New York Times weighed in on th e other side: the DEFCON
III alert served as a rem inder of how
ten uou s d eten te really is....If it is su rm oun ted successfully, th e M idd le East W ar o f 1973 w ill h ave
b een useful as a rem inder o f the reality ‘partners and adversaries’ really im plies. S in ce it is
e v id e n t that su ch a relation ship ca n still be carried to the brink o f n uclear war, th e U n ite d
S tates, th e S o v ie t U n io n and the w orld n eed so m eth in g b etter an d m ore secu re.200

19*Gaddis, Strategies o f C ontainm ent. 313.
199Washington Post, Editorial, “...A nd the M eaning for D eten te,” 26 October, 1973.
200N ew York Times, Editorial, “From Cuba to Suez,” 26 O ctober 1973.
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D etente, it seemed, existed very m uch in the eye of the beholder. If the choices of interpretation
have the alert either as proof th a t detente either prevented nuclear war, or was a smokescreen
that could not prevent the superpowers from approaching the brink, th e n the wisest conclusion
must lie somewhere in the middle.
If one clear lesson emerges from this convoluted episode, it is th a t w hatever ambiguous
effect the Yom Kippur W ar exerted over Soviet-Am erican relations, those betw een the United
States and Israel underw ent a drastic change. Am erican policies toward Israel in its early years
had always taken A rab concerns into primary consideration.

This framework had not

disappeared by the time of N ixon’s first term; instead it was necessarily m uted in order to grapple
with an intractable situation th at underscored the fascinating relationship betw een force and
diplomacy.
T he Yom Kippur W ar abruptly offered U nited States policy th e chance to contain the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and in doing so, enlist both Egypt and Israel as anti-Com m unist friends in
a bipolar, Cold W ar world. W ith the Egyptians back in the Sinai and a shaken Israel stripped
of its interwar hegemony, the stage was thus set for an A m erican-brokered peace, which, in the
Middle East theater, proved to be the m ost potent weapon in A m erica’s Cold W ar arsenal.
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Chapter V
American Diplomacy at the Expense of the Soviets:
Kissinger’s Step-by-Step Approach to Managing the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict,
October 1973-January 1974

The end of the Yom Kippur W ar of October, 1973, produced a revolution in the political order
at both the regional and global level.

In the Middle East, Israel could no longer equate

occupation of A rab territories (most notably the Sinai and the G olan Heights) with national
security, as it had since the end of the Six Day W ar of June, 1967. Likewise, the Arabs, led by
Egypt, dem onstrated military prowess and a new political unity based on a com mon anti-Zionist
platform. Though the Yom Kippur W ar was concluded technically as an Israeli victory, Egyptian
President A nwar Sadat successfully executed the political objectives of his war aims; th at is, he
forced the Israelis to the negotiating table after a major and largely balanced military
confrontation stripped Israel of its supposed regional invincibility.
As one theater of the global Cold W ar system, the Yom Kippur W ar dem onstrated to
the U nited States th a t stability along the eastern rim of the M editerranean could no longer be
guaranteed by A m erican-supported Israeli hegemony. Effective crisis m anagem ent in the final
days of the conflict achieved the twin Am erican goals of avoiding nuclear war and ending the
war as a stalem ate, which, in turn, effectively diminished the relevancy of any Soviet
involvement in postwar negotiations. In this sense, A m erican crisis m anagem ent assumed a
strategic, as well as diplomatic, posture. By refusing to allow Moscow to unilaterally deploy
troops to the Sinai (in the form of the DEFCON III nuclear alert), the U nited States
simultaneously reduced the potential for G reat Power conflict, and proved to Egypt th a t
Am erican-brokered diplomacy could m aintain Arab security far more effectively th an Soviet-
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brokered violence.
W hen the war ended, the N ixon adm inistration’s M iddle East foreign policy, largely
formulated by Secretary of State H enry Kissinger, redefined the U nited States vision of stability
as a negotiated peace betw een adversaries willing to make the necessary concessions. Massive
Soviet arms shipments enabled Egypt and Syria to m ount a successful surprise attack on O ctober
6, which produced exactly the opposite of Moscow’s wishes. As M alcolm H. Kerr, a scholar
observed,
S in ce 1970, S ad at has b e e n at h o m e an d abroad. It seem s to m e th a t S a d a t’s lau n ch in g o f the
O ctob er W ar, and his diplom acy sin ce th en , ca n b est be ex p la in ed in this light. T h e war gave
him a ch a n ce to n eg o tia te in a w ay th a t h e co u ld n o t d o before, w ith th e tw in ob jectives o f
settlin g o n resp ectab le term s w ith Israel and lo o sen in g his d ep en d e n c e o n the S o v ie t U n io n .1

In the three m onths th a t followed the war, Kissinger’s extraordinary diplomatic efforts set in
m otion a policy long in the making, yet requiring innovative means. Through th e revolutionary
use of “shuttle diplomacy,” the relatively new U.S. Secretary of State effectively managed an
unforseen political-strategic situation in which the Soviet position was increasingly irrelevant.
A t its most basic criterion, detente was successful in preventing a nuclear conflict between the
superpowers, b u t this fact did n o t signal a new confluence of Soviet-A m erican interests. The
Yom Kippur W ar allowed the U nited States the opportunity to redefine its regional influence
to encompass b o th Israel and its A rab adversaries.

By the time of the Egyptian-Israeli

disengagement on January 18 1974, Am erican Middle East diplomacy, as embodied by Henry
Kissinger, was at its apex.

'M alcolm H. Kerr, as cited in U nited States, Congress, H ouse, C om m ittee on Foreign Affairs,
Hearings: T he Middle East. 1974: N ew Hopes. N ew Challenges (W ashington, D .C .: G overnm ent Printing
Office, 1974), 39.
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T he A m erican goal of stability in the Middle East was n o t affected by the course and
consequences of the Yom Kippur W ar. The N ixon A dm inistration’s objective of regional
stability had rem ained unchanged; w hat the war revolutionized was the means necessary to
m aintain it. President N ixon’s Foreign Policy Report to Congress of May 3, 1973, outlined the
basic Am erican position regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.

A lthough the U nited States

supported U.N. Security Council 242, which called for Israeli withdrawal of occupied territory
in exchange for peace, a real settlem ent could not come from w ithout. N ixon wrote,
a solu tion c a n n o t be im posed by the o u tsid e powers o n u nw illin g go v ern m en ts. If w e tried the
parties w ou ld feel n o stake in ob serving its term s, and th e o u tsid e pow ers w ou ld be en gaged
in d efin itely in en forcin g th em . A so lu tio n ca n last o n ly if th e parties co m m it th em selves to it
directly. Serious n eg o tia tio n w ill be possible, h o w ever, o n ly if a d ecisio n is m ade o n ea c h side
th at th e issues m u st be finally resolved by a n eg o tia ted se ttle m e n t rather th an by the w eigh t or
threat o f force.2

In fact, Arab force was w hat finally pushed Israel into serious negotiations under the 242 rubric,
where the diplomatic efforts of the American-sponsored Rogers plan and the U.N .-directed
Jarring mission had failed before. Nixon, of course, could n o t foresee the Yom Kippur W ar in
May 1973, b u t he understood th a t the war produced the necessary conditions for a settlem ent.
Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy rested on the m utual willingness of the Egyptians and Israelis to
negotiate in the wake of the fighting. In the quest to m aintain Middle Eastern stability,
Kissinger’s diplomatic m ethod did not attem pt to impose A m erican interests on either side. T he
particularities of the disengagement, though hotly contested betw een Egypt and Israel, were
minor in the A m erican view so long as its two major objectives were m aintained: th a t the U nited
States was doing the mediating, and thus denying the Soviet U nion its regional prestige.

2Richard N ixon , as cited in Report to Congress. “U .S Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a
Durable Peace,” (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), 136.
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In Kissinger’s view, A m erican ascendancy in the region was of vital im portance. By the
1970s, he argued, the Cold W ar order had m atured from a Europe-centered bipolarity to a global
multipolarity in which “equally grave risks are likely to arise in trouble spots outside Europe.”3
W hen Kissinger wrote, “the challenge of the seventies will be to forge unity with political
measures,” he was referring to the strains in the trans-A tlantic relationship, although, as his
diplomatic efforts after the Yom Kippur W ar illustrated, his sentim ent was realized most
dramatically in the Middle East.4 Shuttle diplomacy represented a synthesis of Kissinger’s global
perspectives: he devoted his greatest diplomatic efforts outside of Europe by means of a basic
shared objective of all concerned parties. In the framework of detente, Kissinger was afforded
greater latitude to negotiate a settlem ent between Egypt and Israel. Because the superpowers
m aintained reduced tensions at the global level, the Secretary of State took full advantage of the
fact th at Moscow would n o t precipitate another crisis during the shuttle diplomacy.
Kissinger’s position was formulated as a response to the consequences of the war. After
the Six Day W ar through Septem ber 1973, Israel’s leadership regarded its occupation of the
Arab territories as a superior guarantor of security over th a t of political concessions. Yitzhak
Rabin’s overview o f the new geographic barriers afforded by territorial occupation reflected
Israel’s policy during the interwar period:
T h e present borders run alon g natural barriers: Egypt - th e C anal; Jordan

- th e Jordan

R iver...an d w ith Syria, there w ill n o longer be a n eed to clim b up m o u n ta in s. T h e d istance from
th e Egyptian border to T e l A v iv was o n c e 130 kilom etres and o n ly 8 0 kilom etres from th e Gaza
Strip. B ut th e d istan ce from our border o n the C an al today to C airo is o n ly 130 kilom etres. T h e
d istan ce from our border to C airo was o n ce som eth in g over 4 0 0 k ilom etres. T od ay the distance

3Henry Kissinger, A m erican Foreign Policy. Expanded Edition (N ew York: W .W . N orton & Co.,
1974), 67.
4Ibid., 71.
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from the Egyptian border on the Canal to Tel Aviv is 400 kilometres.5
In other words, the Israeli leadership held th a t while security through political agreements was
fleeting, a buffer zone carved from natural barriers was not. T he great irony of the interwar
period is th at because the Arabs were forced to recognize Israel’s military strength (but never its
sovereignty), the aims of the Yom Kippur W ar were decidedly more limited th a n the strategy of
annihilation in 1967. Sadat in 1973 was fighting to regain the Sinai, n o t to destroy Israel. The
Egyptian president w ent to war for a territory, the occupation of w hich Israel, ironically,
presumed made war less likely. Thus, the outcome of the Yom Kippur W ar finally betrayed the
untenable character of the Israeli position, thereby ensuring the beginning steps to negotiation
through the auspices of H enry Kissinger. T he U nited States would no longer have only one
client in the region, which m eant th a t Moscow would have trouble m aintaining influence with
Sadat, whose need for Soviet weapons was now significantly reduced.
The “war of attrition,” led by Egyptian President Gamel N asser in 1969, falsely
dem onstrated to W ashington th a t Israel was immune from war. Sadat took advantage of Israel’s
security policy, w hich had become lax during the six years of Israeli dominance. As one observer
has argued, Sadat dem onstrated th at W ashington’s special relationship w ith Israel was not an
effective deterrent to war - on the contrary, the political nature of the Yom Kippur W ar was
partially a function of the influence U.S. policy could potentially exert over Israel after the
fighting.6 A t the launch of Yom Kippur W ar, which com m enced w ith a massive bom bardm ent
on Israeli positions, the U nited States m aintained the policy it had developed in the preceding

5Yitzhak Rabin, as cited in M ichael Brecher, D ecisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (N ew Haven: Yale
University Press, 1975), 447.
6Leon T . Hadar, Quagmire: Am erica in the Middle East (W ashington, D.C.: C ato Institute,
1992), 79.
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years should another general war begin.
T he initial attack was apparent to the Israelis and Americans only hours before the first
launch, at which point W ashington quickly moved to ensure the stalem ate for which they had
generally planned. T he fighting dem onstrated to bo th Egypt and Israel th a t neither could get
everything it wanted. For the former, total defeat of Israel was impossible; for the latter,
territorial occupation failed to m aintain a shield from attack. Finally, for both, negotiations
would supplant force as the key to their diminished objectives.7 As one specialist observed, only
after the Yom Kippur W ar and the beginning of Kissinger’s m ediation did bo th sides stop viewing
their relations as a zero-sum game bound for “rigidity, fatalism and despair.”8
Yet the policy of shuttle diplomacy was not a spontaneous reaction to a surprise war,
rather, its principles were p u t in place long before O ctober 1973, w hen war was only a
hypothetical possibility. As one scholar paraphrased U.S. policy in the pre-war period, “when
and if hostilities betw een the two sides should again occur, it was crucial th a t they be ended on
terms and under conditions th a t allowed, so far as possible, successful negotiations afterward.”9
As the war unfolded, it was obvious to Kissinger th at meaningful negotiations could only occur
if the U nited States m aintained a military stalemate, which in tu rn required a carefully restrained
arms flow to Israel th a t would ensure both its safety, yet deny another crushing defeat of the
Arab nations, after which negotiations would be impossible.10 T here has been m uch debate
around the reason for the arms delay to Israel during the war, w ith Kissinger and Secretary of

7Nitza N achm ias, Transfer o f Arms. Leverage, and Peace in the M iddle East (N ew York:
Greenwood Press, 1988), 57.
8N adav Safran, “Engagement in the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs 53 (October, 1974), 48.
9W illiam Bundy, A Tangled Web: T h e Making o f Foreign Policy in the N ix o n Presidency (New
York: Hill and W ang, 1998), 442.
,0Ibid.
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Defense James Schlesinger sharing various portions of the blame, b u t w hat is im portant is that
the decision to hold back arms deliveries - irrespective of the bureaucratic, political, and
strategic difficulties a massive arms airlift would engender - was a deliberate expression of U.S.
policy designed to ensure a military balance throughout the fighting.11 T he Yom Kippur W ar
thereby reduced Israel’s standing; it became one among several roughly equal players in the
larger framework of A m erican objectives in the Middle East. Israel, to be sure, received a
massive am ount of materiel throughout the war. But the staggering quantity and value of the
airlift (so great th a t U.S. forces were actually in a diminished capacity due to depleted weapons
stocks) m ust be understood in the context of the Arabs’ own arms shipments of roughly equal
value.12 T h a t is, the airlift itself did n o t underscore the special character of the AmericanTsraeli
relationship.
W h at was especially striking about the American steps toward a negotiated peace was
th a t Kissinger was able secure political influence in Egypt only shortly after the U nited States
had supplied its adversary. As one expert argued in terms of military support to its client, toward
the end of the Yom Kippur W ar, “the U nited States had gained in influence in the Arab world
at the very time th a t it was most supportive of Israel.” In his memoirs, N ixon observed th a t “for
the first time in an Arab-Israeli conflict the U nited States conducted itself in a m anner th a t not
only preserved b u t greatly enhanced our relations with the Arabs— even while we were massively
resupplying the Israelis.”13

n John P. M iglietta, A m erican A lliance Policy in the Middle East. 1945-1992: Iran. Israel, and
Saudi Arabia (N ew York: Lanham Books, 2002), 141.
12D ale R. T ahtinen, T he Arab-Israeli Military Balance Since O ctober 1973 (W ashington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974), 32.
13Richard M. N ixon , RN: T h e Memoirs o f Richard N ix o n . 2d ed. (N ew York, Sim on & Schuster,
1990), 941.
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A lthough the cease fire to end the Yom Kippur W ar was im plem ented on O ctober 22,
Israel had encircled Egypt’s Third Army, beyond which lay an undefended Cairo. O n O ctober
24, Soviet G eneral Secretary Leonid Brezhnev sent a note to President N ixon urging for a joint
superpower task force to m aintain the cease fire. (This crisis period is exam ined in detail at the
end of chapters 2 and 3.) T he U nited States responded w ith a D EFC O N III world-wide military
alert - an unambiguous signal to the Soviets th a t direct superpower intervention in the region
was unacceptable. T h e DEFCON alert was supposedly a strategy primarily designed as a form
of nuclear deterrence, in w hich nuclear war would be avoided, ironically, by threatening it, as
W ashington believed th a t direct contact between superpower forces could expand into a general
war. Kissinger offered another reason th a t fits within th e U.S. policy toward a negotiated
settlem ent on which shuttle diplomacy depended.

H e outlined the “w hat if ’ had N ixon

accepted the terms of Brezhnev’s note:
Either w e w ou ld b e th e tail to the S o v iet k ite in a jo in t pow er play against Israel, or w e w ou ld
en d up c la sh in g w ith S o v iet forces in a cou n try th a t w as b o u n d to share S o v iet ob jectives
regarding th e cease fire or co u ld n o t afford to be p erceiv ed as op posin g them . B u t the im pact
w ou ld go far b eyon d Egypt. If S o v iet forces appeared dram atically in C airo w ith those o f the
U n ite d S tates - and e v e n m ore if they appeared a lon e - o u r trad itional friends am ong A rab
m oderates w ou ld b e profoundly u nnerved...E gypt w ou ld be draw n b a ck in to the S o v iet orbit,
[and] th e S o v iet U n io n an d its radical allies w ould em erge as th e d o m in a n t factor in the M iddle
E ast.14

Kissinger’s reasoning - in light of recent studies th a t argue th a t the Soviet U nion was
totally unprepared for a military intervention - provides a credible story for explaining U.S.
interests.15 A basic stalem ate betw een Egypt and Israel emerged as the war neared its end. Both
sides had trapped forces th a t were vulnerable to destruction, and U.S. policy, put in place since

l4Henry Kissinger, Crisis: T he A natom y o f Tw o Major Foreign Policy Crises (N ew York: Sim on &
Schuster, 2003), 348.
15See, for exam ple, Viktor Levonovich Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 190; and A natoly Dobrynin, In
Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents (N ew York: Random House, 1995), 296.
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the beginning of the war, could now proceed as sole arbitrator betw een adversaries more or less
equally in ten t on disengagement. As Malcolm H. Kerr noted, “It was the O ctober W ar which
enabled Sadat to come o u t as a certified leader of his people. It therefore enabled him to begin
to talk about peace in a way n o t possible prior to th a t tim e.”16
Sadat’s political success rested on the fact th a t he forced the Israelis to make a stark
decision, as one writer outlined, “betw een contested frontiers some distance from the main
centers of Jewish population, and negotiated frontiers close to Israel’s heartland, w ith some form
of external guarantee.”17 T he contested frontiers no longer afforded Israel security, and the
Prime M inister, G olda Meir, begrudgingly had little choice b u t to retool Israeli policy around
negotiations with the U nited States as external guarantor.18 As the international relations
expert Coral Bell described it, the cost for Israel to m aintain a defense of the occupied territories
against com petent and concerted Arab forces would have been “intolerable.”19 Additionally, as
I. William Zartman, a scholar, noted, Israel’s “military successes [at the end of the Yom Kippur
War] had n o t been sufficient to make its neighbors sue for peace, and the more it conquered of
their territory, the more it would be burdened with an unassimiliable A rab population.”20
Egypt recognized th a t Israel had no other options b u t to defer to Kissinger’s
reorientation, which they turned to their advantage for political leverage th a t Soviet arms had

16M alcolm H. Kerr, as cited in U nited States, Congress, T h e Middle East. 1974: N ew Hopes. N ew
C hallenges, 1974, 42.
17Sydney D . Bailey, “T he Prospects for Real Peace,” in From Wars Toward Peace in the ArabIsraeli Conflict. 1969-1993, vol. 4, Ian. S. Lustick, ed., (N ew York: Garland Publishing, 1994), 337.
18N adav Safran, Israel: The Embattled A lly (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 509.
19Coral Bell, “T he O ctober Middle East War: A Case Study in Crisis M anagem ent During
D eten te,” International Affairs 50 (October 1974), 541.
20I. W illiam Zartman, “Explaining D isengagem ent,” in Dynam ics o f Third Party Intervention:
Kissinger in the M iddle East. leffrev Z. Rubin ed., (N ew York: Praeger, 1981), 149.
204

failed to provide. Kissinger believed th a t it was precisely A m erica’s special power - not a
sentim ental connection - over Israel th at would oblige Egypt to follow A m erican mediation
toward a negotiated peace.21
Thus the stage was set for an American-sponsored settlem ent betw een two willing
adversaries. Kissinger summarized U.S. policy throughout the war at a news conference on
O ctober 25 :
T h ro u g h o u t th e crisis th e president w as co n v in ce d th a t w e h ad tw o m ajor problems: first, to en d
h ostilities as q uickly as possible— but secondly, to e n d h o stilities in a m ann er th a t w ou ld enable
us to m ake a m ajor con trib u tio n to rem oving th e co n d itio n s th a t h a v e produced four wars
b etw e en A rabs an d Israelis in the last 25 years.22

His statem ent was n o t totally truthful; the arms delays were primarily intended to induce a
stalemate, which would have had the opposite effect of ending the hostilities immediately.
A dm itting this, however, would have been impolitic. In any regard, U.S. policy after the war was
sincerely aimed at solving the conflict once and for all. All parties, save the Soviet Union, would
benefit from the results. N ear the end of the war, Moscow denounced Israeli aggression, which
was little more th an a reflection on their own perceived irrelevance in th e region.23 Indeed, what
would soon be called “shuttle diplomacy” could just as well have been term ed “solo diplomacy”
as Kissinger equated direct negotiations with the Arabs as the most effective way of shutting the
Soviets out of the conflict resolution framework.”24
Perhaps the greatest beneficiary of the ensuing negotiations was Kissinger himself, whose

21W illiam B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplom acy and the Arab-Israeli C onflict
Since 1967 (Berkeley: U niversity o f California Press, 1993), 184-185.
22Henry Kissinger, as cited in U nited States, Departm ent o f State, Bulletin N o. 1794 (1973), 585.
23Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet U n ion and the M iddle East Crisis (London:
Cambridge U niversity Press, 1977), 147.
24A n n M. Lesch and D an Tschirgi, Origins and D evelopm ent o f the Arab-Israeli C onflict
(London: Greenw ood Press, 1998), 26.
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decisions were always a unique mixture of Cold W ar Realpolitik and concern for personal glory
th at would be gained as supreme peacemaker of the Middle East. T he W atergate scandal had
reached a fever pitch by the end of O ctober, and N ixon hoped th a t a successful Middle East
settlem ent could offset his domestic woes. Kissinger benefitted from W atergate in two ways.
First, a domestically weakened N ixon gave his Secretary of State unparalleled authority to
represent U nited States foreign policy abroad.25 Second, Kissinger’s time spent flying all over the
world to shore up support for Am erican peace initiatives allowed him to distance himself from
an adm inistration th a t was coming apart at the seams.26 Kissinger grasped the opportunity with
astonishing vigor. Golda Meir characterized Kissinger’s efforts as “superhum an;” he conducted
shuttle diplomacy “as though he had never heard of the word ‘fatigue.’”27 T he word that
Kissinger did keep in mind, of course, was detente. Unbridled by the fear of Soviet nuclear
blackmail, Kissinger was able to pursue his objectives in full force as described by Golda Meir.
T he im pact th a t Kissinger’s diplomatic initiatives had on detente will be discussed shortly.

O pening Moves Toward Disengagement
O n Saturday, O ctober 27, the cease'fire was holding, and the D EFCO N imbroglio betw een the
superpowers had ended. Moscow refrained from a unilateral troop deployment and the Israeli
military allowed a resupply of the Third Army - all w ithout either superpower resorting to
anything more th a n bluffs and threats. Kissinger was thus able wrote to the Egyptian President
to inquire about a proposed trip to Cairo on N ovem ber 6. Sadat agreed n o t only to Kissinger’s
overture but also to direct talks with the Israelis at the rank of major general at Kilometer 101

25Quandt, Peace Process. 183.
26A natoly Dobrynin, In C onfidence. 306.
27Golda Meir, My Life (N ew York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1975), 443.
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(on the Suez road where the Israelis were entrenched), which, as Kissinger noted, constituted
“the first direct talks betw een Israeli and Arab representatives since the independence of
Israel.”28O n the following day Israeli and Egyptian military representatives m et at the Cairo-Suez
road, which effectively ended the war in the Sinai. Shortly thereafter, Sadat announced th a t he
planned to award the A m erican Bechtel Corporation a $345 million contract to build an oil
pipeline th a t from the G ulf of Suez to the M editerranean. H e seemed to intend to dem onstrate
to the Americans just how ready he was to do business.29 Kissinger reflected th a t the U nited
States became “the pivotal factor in the diplomacy.”30 W alter Issacson, a largely sympathetic
biographer of Kissinger, outlined the mom entous A m erican victory the direct talks had
engendered:
H en cefo rth , n ego tia tio n s w ould replace arm ed co n flic t in th e A rab-Israeli dispute. It was, for
Kissinger, a m ajor d iplom atic su ccess. H is strategy, w h ich had seem ed foolhardy during the war,
h ad p rod uced just w h at h e had desired: a m ilitary sta lem a te th a t w ou ld require intricate
n egotiation s. T h e S ov iets h ad lost their in flu en ce, an d A m e rica ’s h istoric difficulty in forging
ties w ith A rab n atio n s had b een o v erco m e.31

Formidable problems, nonetheless, lay before Kissinger. A m utual willingness on the
part of Egyptians and Israelis to negotiate did not m ean th a t the ensuing shuttle diplomacy was
going to be easy. Before Kissinger embarked on his historic Middle East trip, he recognized the
fragile nature of the cease-fire. T he Egyptian T hird Army was still cu t off, and their situation
would likely become more dire so long as Israel did n o t get back its POW s.
T he Arab oil embargo, com menced during the height of the fighting in protest of
Am erican support to Israel, was wreaking havoc on the industrial alliance of W est Europe, J apan

28Henry Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1982), 610.
29Joseph Kraft, “Letter from Cairo," N ew Yorker. 17 D ecem ber 1973, 132.
30Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval. 612.
W alter Issacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Sim on & Schuster, 1992), 537.
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and the U nited States. T he former two - entirely dependent on foreign oil sources - were clearly
shifting their policy to a more pro-Arab stance, thus dem onstrating to the Persian G ulf states
that oil could be an effective tool of coercive diplomacy. Israel, always conscious of its own
survival, realized th a t its intransigence could dam pen A m erican support, as evidenced by
W ashington’s refusal to allow the destruction of the T hird Army. In fact, only after the U nited
States linked further aid to Israel with cooperation in allowing a U N task force to m onitor the
Third Army did M eir relent.32 In the Israeli view, there was no other country in the world on
which it could count. If A m erican policy would n o t be formed in lockstep with Israeli wishes,
they wondered where the concessions would end.33
T o make m atters worse, Kissinger had never conducted diplomacy w ith an Arab nation
before. U ntil the Yom Kippur W ar, the Cold W ar had, in recent times, effectively sealed off the
U nited States from the A rab world. Kissinger’s first significant contact came on O ctober 29.
T he acting (soon to be perm anent) Foreign M inister Ismail Fahmy paid Kissinger a visit at the
State D epartm ent in preparation for Kissinger’s upcoming trip to Egypt. Fahmy’s mission, as
Kissinger recalled, was removed “the tensions th a t had characterized Egyptian-American
relations for nearly twenty years.”34 T he Foreign M inister reported exactly w hat Kissinger
wanted to hear. Sadat, he reported, was n o t interested in destroying Israe. In Middle East
politics, this was a small step toward official recognition of th e Jewish state.

D etente and the New A m erican Position
Between the time of the war’s close and his departure for the M iddle East, Kissinger had

32Safran, Israel: T he Embattled A lly, 510.
33Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval. 620.
34Ibid., 617.
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successfully laid the groundwork th a t would ensure American leadership in, and Soviet expulsion
from, the peace process betw een the Arabs and Israelis. Soviet influence in the Middle East was
based n o t on socialist-fraternal ideology but on the special geo-strategic characteristics th a t the
dependent Arab states afforded Moscow. T he diplomatic efficacy of Soviet weapons had run its
course during the war, and now Kissinger was prodigiously attem pting to deny the Russians a
meaningful role in the negotiation process - a relatively easy task for the Egyptian-Israeli
disengagement, given th a t Sadat had little to no interest in Soviet involvement.
As W ashington understood the new system of relaxed superpower tensions th a t had
developed in recent years, it is w orth asking: Did Am erican diplomacy after the Yom Kippur W ar
run counter to d eten te principles? Melvin Laird, former Secretary o f Defense under Richard
Nixon, described A merican-Soviet relations in the detente period w ith these words:
T h e true q u estio n con fron tin g us is n o t w h eth er it is possible to h a v e in sta n t revolu tion in our
relations w ith th e S o v iet U n io n . It is, rather, w h eth er w e ca n b e p eacefu l adversaries w ith o u t
b ecom in g b elligeren t an tagonists, w h eth er w e c a n resolve w h a t c a n b e resolved and co n trol w hat
ca n n o t. T h a t is w h at th e sta tem en t o f Basic Principles o f M u tu a l R elation s b etw e en th e U n ited
S tates an d the U .S .S .R . agreed to in M oscow o n M ay 2 9 , 1 972, is all a b o u t.35

As Laird’s characterization of the 1972 summit - the pinnacle of d eten te politics - makes clear,
detente was in no way an idealistic p ath toward superpower solidarity, b u t merely a recognition
that a continuing adversarial relationship ought never to devolve to the point of nuclear war.
A contemporary State D epartm ent brochure quoted Kissinger’s conception of detente: “W e will
react if a relaxation of tensions is used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble
spots. T he events in the Middle East during O ctober 1973 dem onstrated th a t this...principle
cannot be disregarded w ithout endangering the entire U.S.-Soviet relationship.”35

35M elvin R. Laird, T h e N ixon D octrine (W ashington, D.C.: A m erican Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1972), 6.
36U nited States, D epartm ent o f State, The Meaning o f D eten te, Publication N o . 8766 (1974), 2.
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Kissinger em barked on the A m erican-m ediated Egyptian-Israeli disengagements on a
basis th a t worked w ithin the framework of detente in two ways.

T he Cold W ar system

continued to be defined as a superpower com petition for influence in th e Third W orld, of which
the Middle East was one vital region. T he adversarial U.S.-Soviet relationship was based largely
on this basic determ inant, which, after the Yom Kippur W ar, tipped in favor of th e U nited
States. In W ashington’s view, it was actually Soviet actions before the war th a t violated the
spirit of detente, w hen Moscow failed to alert the Americans of an im m inent A rab attack. T he
Soviet U nion’s longstanding opposition to an Arab attack was effectively neutralized when
Moscow realized th a t its A rab clients had received sufficient arms to ignore th e Soviets’ will.
Rather th a n risk another loss of influence on par with Sadat’s famous expulsion of Soviet
advisors in the summer of 1972, Moscow decided to support its A rab clients’ determ ination to
go to war. T he A rab battle plan required a surprise attack, at which point the Soviets decided
to sweep detente politics in favor of Moscow’s influence in the M iddle East.
Because the Soviets had no political sway over Israeli foreign policy, arms supplies to
their Arab clients constituted their only viable m ethod of m aintaining prestige in the region.
Moscow’s lack of political influence in the Arab-Israeli conflict explained, as one expert noted,
their “interest, n o t in peace in the Middle East, but in a low-burning, continuing conflict which
[gave] them leverage in the A rab world.”37 As Kissinger’s diplomatic efforts began the path to
a true negotiated peace, Moscow denigrated A m erican policy not because A m erican influence
in the region violated detente politics; quite the opposite. U nited States policy following the
Yom Kippur W ar sought to supplant the faulty and newly excluded Soviet policy for

37U nited States, Congress, House, C om m ittee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings: D eten te (W ashington,
D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1974), 145.
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W ashington’s own interests in peace and political regional influence. As one expert concluded
of the new post-war situation, “ [Moscow] understands th a t nothing could assure a dim inution
of its role or its attractiveness to prospective regional clients th an the developm ent of peace and
stability in the area.”38
Kissinger’s efforts produced exactly the effect th a t Moscow feared, as exemplified by
Sadat’s meeting w ith the Soviet ambassador to Egypt Sergei Vinogradov to inform him - only
in passing - of the Six-Point process toward disengagement w ith the Israelis, as brokered by
Kissinger.39 Indeed, Moscow was truly relegated to the periphery of the peace process. Perhaps
most stunning of all U nited States diplomatic efforts cam e w hen Kissinger visited C hina on
November 10, w hen Premier Zhou Enlai congratulated the Secretary of State for his role in
reducing Soviet prestige in the Arab world.40 Zhou’s response was exactly the kind that
Kissinger’s linkage policy had aimed to elicit. W ith Sino-A m erican relations on the upswing,
Moscow found itself further isolated on the international stage, and was thus sufficiently unable
to protest meaningfully W ashington’s new position amid the Arab-Israeli conflict.41
N ot only was U.S. diplomacy bringing bo th sides of the protracted Middle East conflict
within its sphere of influence, the recent loss of the Soviet U nion’s regional prestige was taking
on global proportions. Moreover, all of this happened w ithout any significant threat of nuclear
war. Before Kissinger began his historic Middle East trip, he declared, “W e must prove to the

38U nited States, Congress, T h e Middle East. 1974: N ew H ones. N ew C hallenges. 1974, 42. 76.
39Golan Yom Kippur and A fter, 137.
40Kissinger,

Years of U pheaval. 683.

4lIt is telling that Pravda and Izvestia. the two major news organs o f the Soviet Com m unist Party,
gave almost no attention to the Arab-Israel conflict in the m onths following the Yom Kippur War. For a
news summary that typically avoids any honest appraisal o f M oscow ’s dim inished position, see “T he W ar in
the Middle East - III,” reprinted in T he Current Digest o f the S oviet Press 43 (Columbus, OH: American
A ssociation for the A dvan cem ent o f Slavic Studies, 1973), 7.
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Arabs th at they are better off dealing w ith us on a m oderate program th a n dealing with the
Russians on a radical program.”42 Kissinger embarked on his Middle East trip w ith the in tent to
exploit the benefits of detente: the superpowers were to rem ain adversaries, b u t the unlikelihood
of nuclear war helped to ensure the success of his diplomatic goals.

Dr. Kissinger Goes to the Middle East
Kissinger’s goals were relatively plausible, at least w ith A nwar Sadat. O ne scholar goes so far as
to argue, “only the failure of the U.S. to respond to Sadat’s overtures prevented a policy
transformation prior to the O ctober W ar.... A m erican m ediation was w hat he w anted all along.”43
Ironically, the Saudis, who were th en engaged in coercive diplomacy, in the form of a major oil
embargo th a t am ounted to economic warfare in protest of pro-Zionist A m erican policies, were
instrum ental in guiding Sadat to seek a political solution under U.S. auspices.44 As the war
ground to a halt, Sadat sought desperately for a political solution th a t would finalize a military
disengagement betw een Israeli and Egyptian forces. T h e Egyptian economy was in ruins, and
Sadat was eager to reopen the Suez C anal to attract foreign capital to the region - a feat that
could only be accomplished with a durable peace in hand.45 Kissinger’s step-by-step approach,
which dem anded increm ental concessions from both sides, offered the most promising delivery
for a rapid disengagement. T he Egyptian leader was all too eager for Kissinger’s arrival.
As one observer noted, w hen Kissinger landed in Cairo, he established “something the

42Ibid., 616.
43Raymond A . H innebusch, Jr., Egyptian Politics U nder Sadat: T he Post-Populist D evelopm ent o f
an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), 55.
44Kirk J. Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years (N ew York: Palgrave, 2 0 0 0 ), 148.
45A lvin Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile: T he Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the
lune W ar (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 290.
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U nited States had never really possessed before - an Arab policy.”46 Kissinger’s simple formula
stated th at the U nited States was com m itted to a new even-handed role in the Middle East
peace process th a t promised a balance of Arab territorial dem ands w ith Israeli security. Kissinger
was greeted at the Cairo airport warmly and m et Sadat betw een a whirlwind tour of th e Egyptian
M useum and the G reat Pyram ids. Perhaps these visits were m eant to overwhelm the American
with Egypt’s long history and power. As one scholar noted, the diplomatic objectives of Kissinger
and Sadat were so similar th a t at their meeting, “they rushed in to each other’s arms.”47
Kissinger, always the consumm ate diplomat, flattered Sadat by asking him how he managed to
pull off the brilliant surprise attack th a t made the Yom Kippur W ar possible. Afterwards,
Kissinger recalled his basic message to Sadat:
N a sser’s policy o f trying to ex to rt co n ce ssio n s by m obilizing th e T h ird W orld against us w ith
S o v iet support had n o t w orked in th e past and w ou ld n o t be p erm itted to w ork in the future.
P eace in the M idd le East co u ld n o t co m e ab ou t by the d efea t o f A m erica n allies w ith S o v iet
arms— as w e h ad just sh ow n . B u t an Egypt pursuing its o w n n a tio n a l p olicy w ou ld find us ready
to coop erate. W e sou gh t n o p reem in en ce in Egypt.48

Kissinger’s narrow definition of “preem inence” in th e co n tex t of Arab politics attem pted to
contrast U.S. aims w ith Soviet aims. W hereas Moscow had armed m uch of the Arab world as
a tradeoff for regional influence and prestige, the U nited States indeed sought “preem inence”
in the sense th a t A m erican diplomacy would replace Soviet weaponry as the grand peacemaker.
Kissinger was n o t telling Sadat anything the Egyptian president did n o t know or believe, but he
wanted to make sure th a t Sadat was under no illusions about Kissinger’s goals and expectations:
Look, I am a serious person. I shall keep w h a t I ca n prom ise, b u t I sh a n ’t prom ise w h at I c a n ’t

46Edward R.F. Sheehan, “H ow Kissinger Did It: Step by Step in the Middle East,” Foreign Policy
22 (Spring, 1976), 1747John Waterbury, T h e Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: T h e Political Econom y o f T w o Regimes
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 401.
48Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval. 638.
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keep. If you ex p ec t from m e broad and sw eeping d eclaration s, th e n I’m n o t your m a n ....W e m ust
put aside irreconcilable differences for the m om en t. W e m u st b uild co n fid en ce; co n ce iv e a
n egotiatin g dynam ic. W e m ust set in m o tio n sm all agreem en ts. W e m u st p roceed step by step .49

T he m eeting ended w ith S adat’s acceptance of w hat came to be known as the Six-Point
Agreement, which m andated strict observance of the cease-fire, free transfer of nonmilitary
supplies to be m anaged by U N checkpoints (especially im portant for the T hird Army, which was
facing certain ruin at this point), and an immediate transfer of all PO W s.50 Egypt’s acceptance
of the plan thus officially set in m otion th at country’s acceptance of th e U nited States as post
war mediator. As W illiam Bundy, an expert on the foreign policy of the N ixon administration,
characterized the meeting, Kissinger convinced Sadat to accept the A m erican position “as an
act of faith: if Egypt and other Arab nations could make Israel confident of its own security, he
could persuade it to make territorial concessions.”51 T he peace process was only in its infancy;
at the end of the m eeting w ith Sadat, he reminded the Secretary of State, “never forget, Dr.
Kissinger. I am making this agreement with the U nited States, n o t w ith Israel.”52
Nonetheless, bo th the Egyptians and Israelis were quickly moving toward a settlem ent.
For the Israelis, the Yom Kippur W ar turned their entire defense strategy on its head and
exposed a gravely flawed intelligence system. W ith Egypt’s crossing o f the Suez, the Sinai had
become a strategic liability - not an ideal buffer zone. A disengagement, in Israel’s view, would
give the country sufficient “breathing space” to recover from the multiple traum as created by a
bloody, unforseen war. Meanwhile, the Egyptian military was exhausted, and since both sides
basically agreed th a t A m erican diplomacy would pick up where the fighting left off, there was

49Sheehan, “H ow Kissinger D id It,” 16.
50See Safran, Israel: T he Embattled Ally. 511 for full text o f the agreement.
51Bundy, A Tangled W eb. 447.
52Anwar Sadat, as cited in Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval, 643.
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little need for continued military engagement. Golda M eir accepted the proposal after some
initial protests from the Israeli cabinet about the supposedly pro-Arab characteristics of the SixPoint Agreement. O n N ovem ber 11, Israel and Egypt signed the agreement at Kilometer 101,
with General M ohamed Abdel Ghany el-Gamasy representing Egypt and General A haron Yariv
representing Israel. As the political scientist Nitza Nachmias observed: “T he direct negotiations
signified a de facto recognition of Israel, and the representatives n o t only negotiated issues
relevant to the im plem entation of the cease-fire, b u t they also exchanged ideas informally about
broader and more far-reaching disengagement agreements.”53
By the end of Kissinger’s trip, he had visited many countries of th e Arab world,
effectively sm oothed over U.S.-Arab tensions (although the oil embargo would rem ain in place
for m onths to come), and stabilized the cease-fire.

O n N ovem ber 15, Egypt and Israel

exchanged POW s. The Egyptian-Israeli war was over, under tight A m erican m anagem ent with
no meaningful Soviet contributions to the process, aside from Moscow’s noble refusal to escalate
the crisis. T he stage was thus set for a negotiated peace.

Toward Geneva
O ne of Kissinger’s aims for the Geneva Conference, to be held sometime in mid-December, was
to slow down the bilateral talks at Kilometer 101, which threatened to preem pt W ashington’s
interest in m ediating the conflict. In Kissinger’s view, G eneva would formalize the pivotal
U nited States role in the peace process, and luckily for him, Egypt withdrew from the Kilometer
101 talks on N ovem ber 29 after repeated frustrations in negotiating w ith the Israelis. The
Egyptian Third Army was still cut off, Israel w anted a formal opportunity to dem onstrate its

53N achm ias, Transfer o f Arms. 64.
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willingness to negotiate w ith Arabs, and Kissinger w anted rem ain centrally associated with all
negotiations - in part because of his vanity, a determ inant never too far from his decisions.54 A t
a news conference on Decem ber 6, Kissinger outlined his expectations for Geneva:
W e b elieve th a t o n c e th e [G en eva] co n feren ce starts, a n eg o tia tin g process w ill be underway,
w h ich , d ealin g first w ith issues o f a m ilitary nature and th en turning to th e o verall settlem en t,
will bring about a se ttle m e n t in accord ance w ith R eso lu tio n 2 4 2 . A n d the U n ite d S tates, as I
h ave stated repeatedly, w ill use its in flu en ce to bring ab ou t su ch a se ttle m e n t.53

O n Decem ber 7 Israeli Defense M inister Moshe Dayan visited W ashington, D.C., to
discuss the plan for Geneva. Dayan stated th at the full disengagement need n o t wait until after
the Israeli national elections scheduled for December 31. Kissinger, tellingly, warned against
excessively swift actions, lest the A rab world assume an exaggerated A m erican leverage over
Israeli foreign policy. Dayan proposed a disengagement th a t would ultimately be based on a
return to the Israeli borders prior to the Six-Day W ar, which would be commenced by a
withdrawal approximately 30 miles east of the Suez Canal in retu rn for Egyptian demilitarization
and a pledge to reopen the Canal.56 Sadat, w ith some minor haggling, agreed to Dayan’s
proposals, which formed the basis of the full disengagement on January 18. So as n o t to appear
as if he were conceding to Israeli plans for force limitations on A rab soil, Sadat stipulated that
he would make agreements only through Kissinger, to w hich the Secretary of State happily
agreed.57
W arm relations betw een the Egyptians and Israelis were far from being realized, and in early
December, full participation at G eneva remained highly uncertain. Military skirmishes had not

54Issacson, Kissinger. 542.
55Henry Kissinger, as cited in U nited States, D epartm ent o f State, Bulletin N o. 1800 (1973), 755.
56Safran Israel: T he Embattled A lly. 515.
57Tad Szulc, T h e Illusion o f Peace: Foreign Policy in the N ix o n Years (N ew York: Viking
Press, 1978), 758.
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yet completely subsided between the Egyptian and Israeli forces. U.S. policy was determ ined to
halt Egypt from destroying the Deservoir pocket, where an Israeli division was vulnerable to
destruction. Kissinger arrived in Cairo on December 11, partly to warn th a t an Egyptian attack
on Deservoir m ight bring a direct attack with U.S. forces. Referring to the heavy military losses
sustained by Israel at the beginning of the war, Kissinger threatened Sadat: “T he Pentagon will
strike at you. T he Pentagon will strike you for one reason: Soviet weapons have once before
defeated U.S. weapons and, in accordance w ith our global strategy, we can’t allow it to happen
again.”58 Meanwhile, Israel threatened to boycott the G eneva Conference if the thorny
Palestinian issue were to be raised there. N ixon’s subsequent direct threat to Golda Meir, which
was a textbook utilization of coercive diplomacy, underscored the determ ination of U.S. policy
to keep the peace process on track under its own management:
I w a n t to say to you in all solem n ity th a t if Israel n o w fails to take a favorable d ecisio n to
participate in th e con feren ce o n th e basis o f th e letter th a t w e h a v e w orked o u t, this w ill n o t be
u nd erstood eith er in the U n ite d S tates or in the w orld an d I w ill n o t b e able to justify th e support
w h ich I h ave con sisten tly rendered in our m utual interests to your g o v er n m e n t.59

In other words, the Israelis would not be able to co u n t on future A m erican support if
they did n o t come to Geneva. T he main reason for U.S. insistence for attendance at G eneva
under a stable military situation was because W ashington was poised to take full advantage of
the diminished Soviet position in Egypt.

As Kissinger recounted, Sadat was planning to

“gradually eliminate the last vestiges of the Soviet presence....He would let the Soviet-Egyptian
Friendship Treaty slide into desuetude or cancel it.”60 Sadat could n o t carry out his plans until
negotiations were settled. O n December 14, Kissinger expounded on the since-ended Kilometer

58Henry Kissinger, as cited in Anwar el-Sadat, In Search o f Identity: A n Autobiography (New
York: Harper & Row, 1977), 268-269.
59Richard N ixon , as cited in Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval, 759.
60Ibid., 768.
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101 talks, which, along w ith the Dayan plan, would form th e basis for the January 18
disengagement: thinned-out Egyptian and Israeli forces with the former firmly planted on the
Sinai, and a UN buffer force placed in the middle.
T he following day, the UN released Security C ouncil Resolution 344, titled “Peace
Conference in the Middle East.” Article 2 read:

“ [The Security Council] expresses its

confidence th at the Secretary-General will play a full and effective role at the [Geneva]
Conference, in accordance w ith the relevant resolutions fo the Security Council, and th a t he will
preside over its proceedings if the parties so desire.”61 T he hopes expressed in the U N resolution
may as well have been intended for Kissinger, not the Secretary-General. T he Secretary of State
arrived in Damascus th a t same day to attem pt to convince the Syrians to join the conference.
Kissinger’s objective ultimately failed, although Syria’s boycott was not necessarily a protest
against the entire peace process per se, b u t reflective of their negative attitude to Geneva in
particular. In any event, U.S.-Syrian relations did not blossom after the war - Syrian leader
Hafez al-Asad was n o t nearly so interested as Sadat in reorienting his foreign policy toward the
W est. Moscow responded by redirecting m uch of its efforts to exert influence on Damascus once
Sadat made the Soviets unwelcome in Egypt.62 Kissinger’s trip to Israel on December 16 and 17
proved more fruitful; Israel accepted the invitation to G eneva on the condition th a t there would
be no m ention of the Palestinians.63
Despite significant problems, Israel and Egypt agreed to atten d the conference. O n
December 20, in Geneva, one day before the start of the conference, Kissinger dined with Soviet

61U nited N ations. 2003. U .N . Security C ouncil Resolutions. 1973.
< http://w w w .un.org/docum ents/sc/res/1973/scres73.htm > (9 N ovem ber 2003).
62Richard C. T hornton, T he Nixon-Kissinger Years: Reshaping Am erica's Foreign Policy (New
York: Paragon House, 1989), 253.
63Quandt, Peace Process. 196.
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Foreign M inister A ndrei Gromyko, who expressed frustration at the growing Soviet irrelevance
during the peace

process.64

Moscow’s participation at G eneva would satisfy (if only

symbolically) the Brezhnev-Nixon agreement of O ctober 21, w hich guaranteed the Soviets a role
in the post-war negotiating process.65 T he Soviet U nion’s rather perfunctory presence at the
conference was basically a necessary function of detente policy, (in this formal setting,
W ashington deferred to the Basic Principles A greem ent of May, 1972, a docum ent th a t opposed
unilateralism) and was in no way a reflection of Moscow’s position in post-Yom Kippur W ar
period.

The Calculation of G eneva
The Israeli leaders were skeptical of the G eneva Conference from the m om ent it was put forth
as a negotiating forum. As Golda M eir recounted,
N eith er I nor m ost oth er Israelis really b eliev ed , in our h eart o f hearts, th a t w e w ould Q a n e v a
w ith p eace treaties in our hands, and w e d id n ’t go there w ith m any illusions or in a state o f
euphoria. Still, the Egyptians an d Jordanians had agreed to sit in the sam e room w ith us, and
that, in itself, was som eth in g th a t th ey had n ev er co n se n ted to do b efore.66

The Israeli position was reasonable enough; as one scholar noted, Kissinger’s real in ten t was to
finally eliminate Moscow from the negotiations during a conference th a t would only perpetuate
the failure of solving the Arab-Israeli dispute under formal circum stances.67 T he real peace
process would be conducted during Kissinger’s famous shuttle diplomacy, characterized by
informal one -on-one contacts with all sides.

64Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval. 794.
65Ishaq I. Ghanayem and A lden H. V oth, T he Kissinger Legacy: A m erican-M iddle East Policy
(New York: Praeger, 1984), 126.
66Meir, Mv Life. 454.
67Bundy, A Tangled W eb . 448.
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A fter a m inor problem concerning seating arrangem ents, the conference began on
December 21.68 Kissinger’s opening speech managed to erase any remaining political credibility
the Soviets may have retained with Sadat, who had found in the Secretary of State a new ally
in delivering exactly w hat he hoped the Yom Kippur W ar would force. Kissinger declared: “O ur
final objective is the im plem entation in all its parts of Resolution 242. This goal has the full
support of the U nited States.”69 T he Am erican goal of realizing Resolution 242 was not new, of
course, b u t after six years of failed UN attem pts to secure its own policies, Kissinger effectively
assumed the central m ediating position under UN auspices. A t Geneva, the Secretary of State
managed to solve the self-defeating Arab and Israeli positions th a t had made negotiation before
the war impossible.70 Israel had always sought direct negotiations w ith A rab leaders before
considering any territorial concessions, and the Arabs refused direct negotiations as long as Israel
was occupying A rab territory. Kissinger appealed to bo th sides, n o t by scolding their positions,
but through flattery. H e was a natural mediator, which is exactly how the U nited States wanted
to contrast its position with th a t of the Soviets. Kissinger declared: “T he great tragedies of
history occur not w hen right confronts wrong, but w hen two rights face each other.”71
Israeli Foreign M inister A bba Eban told the Arab delegations w hat would am ount to the
first major Israeli pledge to trade land for security - the very bargain Jerusalem shunned because
of the security they assumed th at the occupied land would guarantee: “W e are ready for a
territorial compromise which would serve the legitimate interests of all signatory states. In this

68T he final position had the U nited States betw een Egypt and Jordan. T he Soviet U nion sat
between Israel on one side and an empty table for the Syrians, in case they decided to attend later on.
69Henry Kissinger, as cited in U nited States, D epartm ent o f State, Special Report: U.S. Policy in
the Middle East Decem ber 1973-Novem ber 1974, Bureau o f Public Affairs Publication N o. 8799 (1975), 12.
70U nited States Institute o f Peace, Making Peace A m ong Arabs and Israelis: Lessons from Fifty
Years o f N egotiating Experience (1991), 8.
71Henry Kissinger, as cited in U nited States, Departm ent o f State, Special Report. 13.
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m atter, as in others, there m ust be a basic readiness on all sides to make such concessions as do
not threaten vital security interests.”72 Egyptian Foreign M inister Fahmy, for his part, advocated
sovereignty for all nations of th e Middle East - of which Israel, by implication, was one. Fahmy’s
subtle delivery was yet another h int from Egypt th a t his country was ready to move toward
normalized relations with a nemesis of 25 years th a t had never before enjoyed political
recognition from the Arabs.
T he Geneva Conference ended after two days, despite th e impressive political
exchanges. As one observer characterized the conference, “the only result was th a t Egypt and
Israel were urged to begin discussing the disengagement of their forces on b o th sides of the Suez
Canal.”73 G eneva ended exactly as Kissinger had hoped: promising rhetoric betw een Egypt and
Israel w ithout any immediate substance th at could be linked to Moscow’s presence.

Toward the Shuttle
A December, 1973, article in Egypt’s semi-official Al-Ahram newspaper outlined the connection
between the war and the ability to negotiate: “Before the war the Arabs had no cards to play in
negotiation...it had become fixed in the world’s mind th at they would never fight...after the war
all th a t had changed.”74 T he Arab “cards" were crucial for the successful execution of Kissinger’s
diplomacy, which required b o th sides to be in a position of relative strength so th a t concessions
would be tolerable. Israel, after enjoying six years of unchallenged hegemony, was now amenable
- at least in principle - to negotiations th a t could eventually lead to full realization of Arab

72Abba Eban, A n Autobiography. (N ew York: Random H ouse, 1977), 550.
73Szulc, T he Illusion o f Peace, 749.
74Raymond W illiam Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution U nder Nasser and Sadat (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1978), 138.
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demands in exchange for the regional recognition th a t had always eluded the young country
since its creation in 1948. M ost im portant, all m ediating rested in the hands of the U nited
States. As Alvin Rubinstein, a scholar, colorfully noted,
W ith stu n n in g alacrity, S adat p roceed ed to plum p all it-s eggs o sten ta tio u sly in K issinger’s
basket, leavin g th e S o v iets em pty hand ed and furious. T h e y had p rovisioned Egypt, sh ielded it
from certain d efeat, and im periled their d eten te w ith th e U n ite d S tates, o n ly to find their
relations w ith S adat w orse th an ever and th e S o v iet g o v ern m en t relegated to the sidelines in the
n egotiation s th a t w ere under way for a M iddle East s e ttle m e n t.75

The term “shuttle diplomacy” was coined by Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, as a
Boeing 747 more or less became an airborne United States D epartm ent of State th a t flew back
and forth betw een Egypt and Israel during m uch of January 1974- W hereas the formal setting
of the G eneva Conference mirrored the bureaucratic style of the failed Rogers and Jarring
missions, under U nited States and UN auspices, respectively, the face to face nature of shuttle
diplomacy would deny Moscow any meaningful influence and allow both Israel and Egypt to offer
increm ental concessions to each other through the personal m ediation of Kissinger.
As Israeli Foreign M inister Eban noted, there was no precedent for shuttle diplomacy,
which was truly a one m an show, whose leader “showed a candid lack of reverence for the
professional skills at the disposal of the State D epartm ent.”76 W h en Kissinger wrote in a 1974
essay th at “a scientific revolution has, for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from
the exercise of power in foreign policy,” he may very well have had his Boeing in mind.77
Kissinger’s plane was fully equipped for all incoming and outgoing com munication, and rather
than delegate other diplomatic assignments to subordinates back at Foggy Bottom, (concern with
the rest of the world quickly took a back seat to M iddle East affairs, which monopolized

75Rubinstein, Red Star on the N ile. 288.
76Eban, A n Autobiography. 558.
77Kissinger, A m erican Foreign Policy. 54.
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Kissinger’s attention for the next several months) the State D epartm ent and its responsibilities
followed Kissinger around the Middle East.
Kissinger defined the objectives of shuttle diplomacy at a S tate D epartm ent news
conference on December 27: “W e are n o t approaching the problem of negotiations by drawing
up a list of concessions th a t either side should make. W h at we have attem pted to do is discover,
as honestly as we could, in these trips through the Middle East, w hat the minimum requirements
of each side were and th en attem pt to bring these into some relation to each oth er.”78 Kissinger
believed the Rogers Plan of 1969 failed precisely because it was based on a sweeping and final
agreement - something neither side was willing to accept th en or in late 1973.79 As I. William
Zartman put it, the idea of the step-by-step process is “eating bit by bit w hat cannot be swallowed
all at once, and it is the idea of building both m utual concessions and m utual trust upon the
previous partial agreem ent.”80 Kissinger believed th a t the com m itm ent to peace in both Egypt
and Israel was fragile - the p ath m ust be forged incrementally. W hile Moscow’s radical policy
of maximum demands for Israeli evacuation of the occupied territories had failed, sweeping
diplomatic gestures could shatter the balance and bring the Arab-Israeli conflict back to its pre
war deadlock.
Additionally, Kissinger’s m ethod carefully abstained from pressing A m erican wishes on
either side. As N adav Safran, a Middle East specialist put it, “Such a role would have brought
about the end of negotiations the m om ent one of the parties refused to go along w ith a position
of his, and would have put the U nited States under the obligation to side actively with the party

78
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Henry Kissinger, as cited in U nited States, D epartm ent o f State, Bulletin N o .1 8 0 4 (1974), 55.
W illiam B. Quandt, D ecade o f D ecisions (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1977), 209.

80Zartman, “Explaining D isengagem ent,” in Rubin, ed., Dynam ics o f Third Party Intervention,
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that had agreed w ith it or to risk losing credibility and usefulness.”81 W here Egypt and Israel
haggled over kilometers and force strengths as the major foreign policy issues, the American
interest was far broader and implicit throughout.82 So long as Kissinger was doing the mediating
at the exclusion of th e Soviets (and keeping the peace process moving forward), the centrality
of the A m erican position was W ashington’s interest. T he U nited States was happy to see real
progress made in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which had been at a standstill during the entire
interwar period. Kissinger’s opposition to the Rogers proposals (and for th a t m atter, all forms of
sweeping diplomacy) was finally vindicated, as his claim made throughout N ixon’s first term that peace was impossible so long as the Soviets advocated all A rab dem ands - came to fruition,
when Egyptian and Israeli officials negotiated directly for th e first time in history, w ithout any
input from Moscow.
In sum, Kissinger’s step-by-step m ethod in the Middle East was in keeping with his larger
conception of international relations. As Kissinger biographers Bernard Kalb and M arvin Kalb
noted, Kissinger based his foreign policy on the concept of linkage, which ‘‘was an up-to-date
application of Kissinger’s theories about the balance of power.”83 T he post-war situation in the
Middle East offered the Secretary of State a microscopic application of his grand theory: after the
Yom Kippur W ar Israel and the Arabs mutually recognized their rough balance of power. As
Kissinger’s conception of linkage held, a balance o f power was required for the basis of
negotiations, which in turn would provide lasting stability. As G. W arren N utter, a former
Assistant Secretary of Defense, noted, Kissinger’s application of shuttle diplomacy could not

81Safran, “Engagem ent in the Middle East,” 59.
82U nited States Congress, Senate, Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: Priorities for Peace
in the Middle East (W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1975), 144-145.
83Bernard Kalb and Marvin Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 102.
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succeed, “unless a stable order is achievable, the quest for peace is bound to be self-defeating.
H ence the statem ent has the param ount duty of creating and preserving stability.”84 Kissinger
saw himself as the crucial link in a series of Middle East events th a t was on a clear progression
toward peace - all of which was happening at the exclusion of Moscow.

It was not an

opportunity to be missed.

From the Shuttle to the Disengagement
Israeli Defense M inister Moshe Dayan visited W ashington on January 4 to present Jerusalem’s
plan for disengagement. He proposed th a t Egypt would keep the land it had won, while Israel
would move back approximately 20 kilometers from the Canal and a UN force would separate
the two forces. O n a map, the Israeli governm ent was offering a few kilometers - quantitatively
a barely significant am ount. In symbolic terms the offer was m om entous. Egypt was about to
receive a firm hold in the Sinai and all of the Suez Canal area, thus fulfilling a small portion of
Sadat’s major war objective. T he offer, however, was more a reflection on Israel’s internal
turmoil th an anything else.

Jerusalem needed a quick disengagem ent as badly as Cairo.

W hereas Sadat was eager to reopen the Suez Canal, as m entioned above, the reservists currently
serving in the Israeli military had cut the domestic work force by a quarter, thus ensuring severe
decline in the gross domestic product which was further harm ed by Israel’s increased defense
expenditures.85 Like Egypt’s own position, Israel’s eagerness to disengage boded well for
Kissinger’s plan.
Kissinger began his famous shuttle on J anuary 11. His first stop was Aswan, the town

84G. W arren N utter, Kissinger’s Grand Design (W ashington, D.C .: A m erican Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1975), 2.
85Safran, Israel: T h e Embattled A lly, 522.
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where Sadat was currently residing. The Egyptian leader was so keen on disengagement that
he offered Kissinger a self-imposed deadline to travel around the region to convince other Arab
leaders of A m erica’s good intentions, which, he hoped, would end the oil embargo and
strengthen N ixon’s precarious position in W ashington. Remarkably, Sadat assured Kissinger that
Egypt’s desire for disengagement stood irrespective of the Syrians’ intransigence. As Kissinger
recounted, “Sadat was convinced th a t unless Egypt proceeded alone, President Hafez al-Asad
would always find some pretext for delay or put forward impossible demands. A Sinai agreement
would thus, in S ad at’s view, help Syria face its realities.”86
Kissinger’s m ost difficult task for the disengagement centered on force reduction levels.
By the middle of January, Israel and Egypt agreed to positioning, acceptable weaponry, and the
presence of a U N buffer zone. Kissinger managed to convince Sadat, against the advice of his
senior military officers, to reduce Egypt’s manpower on the front from 70,000 to 7,500. As Abba
Eban recalled, “It was this decision by Sadat th a t led me, for the first time, to reflect that a
substantive change of direction might have taken place in Egyptian territory.”87 O n January 13,
Kissinger sensed th a t the disengagement was close to completion. H e proposed th a t three letters
should be drafted to formalize the process - one each for Egypt, Israel, and the U nited States.
T he lack of any Soviet involvem ent was striking, especially since there was no attem pt on
Kissinger’s part to m aintain a low-level atm osphere about the negotiations.88 A fter some
relatively minor quibbling about force positioning, both Israel and Egypt agreed to the essence
of what Moshe Dayan had proposed in W ashington earlier in the m onth. Each side pledged to

86Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval. 815.
87Eban, A n Autobiography. 561.
88Sheehan, “H ow Kissinger D id It," 32-33.
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reduce its strength to an identical level: 7,000 troops, 36 artillery pieces, and 30 tanks.89 In four
days of shutttling betw een Aswan and Jerusalem, Kissinger managed to secure an agreement
between two hostile b u t willing adversaries. U pon S adat’s January 14 com m itm ent to proceed
w ith the disengagement, Kissinger summarized (and n o t w ithout a tinge o f gloating): “T he
disengagement, above all, would mark Egypt’s passage from reliance on the Soviet U nion to
partnership (in Sadat’s phrase) w ith the U nited States; and it would give us a major stake in the
peace process th a t would be further magnified by having it be seen to emerge from an American
proposal.”90
During a W hite House speech announcing the disengagement, N ixon declared:
In th e past gen eration there h ave b een , as w e know , four wars in th e M id east, follow ed by uneasy
truces. [T h e d isen g a g em en t], I w o u ld say, is the first sign ifican t step tow ard a p erm an en t p eace
in th e M id ea st...[o ]u r role has b een o n e o f b ein g o f assistan ce to b o th parties to bring them
together, to h elp narrow d ifferences...I thin k th a t w e co u ld probably say th a t the area o f the
w orld that p oten tially is the o n e in w h ich th e great powers ca n b e b rou ght in to co n fro n ta tio n
is th e M ideast, th a t area m ore th a n any o th er is in th a t category, as re ce n t ev e n ts have
in d ica ted .91

It is perhaps too cynical to interpret N ixon’s triumphal tone merely in terms of his need to seek
respite from W atergate. T he significance of the disengagement, and for th a t m atter the concept
of “perm anent peace,” is open to debate. But the Yom Kippur W ar would be th e last between
Egypt and Israel.
O n January 19, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko predictably declared th at the
disengagement was the result of the G eneva conference. H e gave no m ention of Kissinger’s

89U nited States Institute o f Peace, M aking Peace A m ong Arabs, xxii. For the full text o f the Sinai
D isengagem ent see U nited States Congress, H ouse, T he Search for Peace in the M iddle East: D ocum ents
and Statem ents. 1967-1979, report prepared for a subcomm ittee on Europe and the M iddle East. 1979, 1.
90Kissinger, Years o f U pheaval. 825.
9lRichard N ixon , as cited in U nited States, Departm ent o f State, O ffice o f the Historian, The
Q uest for Peace: Principal U nited States Public Statem ents and Related D ocum ents on the Arab-Israeli
Peace Process. 1967-1983 (W ashington, D.C.; G overnm ent Printing O ffice, 1984), 51
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efforts in the Middle East. 92 T he messages between A nwar Sadat and Golda Meir, as relayed
by Kissinger on the day of the disengagement, belie a m uch more honest assessment. M eir’s note
to Sadat read, “I, for my part, will do my best to establish trust and understanding between us.”
Sadat’s response bordered on the sublime: “I am today taking off my military uniform - 1 never
expect to wear it again except for ceremonial occasions. Tell her [Golda] th a t is the answer to
her letter.”93
Even if leaders found little reason to trust one another, it was in the interest of both to
commit fully to a disengagement. Sadat was now in the vitally im portant position to rebuild the
cities along th e Suez Canal, which would virtually guarantee th a t Egypt would n o t launch
another war.94 Israel was on track to reformulate its security policy, w hich would now rest on
something other th a n military force. A reporter for the N ew York Times observed on Januaray
18: “It is the first time th a t Israel has placed her faith in something other th at her own
strength.”95 As opposed to the A m erican weapons airlift to Israel during the war, and the Six
Point A greem ent shortly thereafter, the January 18 disengagement, as one scholar argues
“represented the first real attem pt on the part of the two [countries] since the beginning of the
Yom Kippur W ar to accommodate mutually their interests and aims”96 T he disengagement thus
boosted the level of trust the Israeli leadership placed in Kissinger, which would be crucial for
the upcoming (and far more difficult) Syrian disengagement.
T hroughout the peace process, Kissinger displayed his famous realpolitik, which was best

92Golan, Yom Kippur and A fter. 170-171.
93Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval. 844.
94Szculc, T he Illusion o f Peace. 759.
95“Israel Approves A greem ent to Separate Israeli and Egyptian Armies," N ew York Times, 18
January 1974.
96Safran, Israel: T h e Embattled A lly. 527.
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exemplified at the Geneva Conference on December 21: “Today there is hope for the future, for
the conflict is no longer looked upon entirely in terms of irreconcilable absolutes. T he passionate
ideologies of the past have, in part at least, been replaced by a recognition th a t all the peoples
concerned have earned, by their sacrifice, a long period of peace.”97 T he Secretary of State was
speaking explicitly of the m utual hatred and fear th a t had characterized Arab-Israel relations
since 1948. But he was also implicitly declaring th a t Soviet influence in Egypt - which could not
exist w ithout perpetual tension - would begin its decline as Moscow had no natural presence in
the peace process. As one scholar observed, the Middle East events of late 1973 and early 1974
dem onstrated a profound shift from Professor Kissinger of the 1950s to Secretary Kissinger of the
1970s. In A World Restored, Kissinger argued “diplomacy, the art of restraining the exercise of
powers, cannot function in [a revolutionary] environm ent.”98 W ith the Egyptian-Israeli
disengagement of January 1974 - the first step on a long and shaky p ath from revolution to peace
- Kissinger proved himself wrong. His was a remarkable performance in a region th a t measured
success incrementally.99 Comprehensive and lasting Middle East peace rem ained elusive, and
Kissinger understood th a t as well as anyone.
As far as A m erican policy was concerned, Moscow’s exclusion from the peace process
was at once a victory for U nited States interests, and a requirem ent for peace itself. If detente
is to be judged by its fundam ental criterion, the avoidance of nuclear war proved to be a final

97Henry Kissinger, as cited in U nited States, D epartm ent o f State, Special Report. 12.
98C ited in A m os Perlmutter, “Crisis M anagement: Kissinger’s Middle East N egotiations
(October 1973-June 1974),” International Studies Quarterly 19 (Septem ber 1975), 340.
" E v e n John Lewis Gaddis, a prom inent critic o f Henry Kissinger, singled out his impressive record
in Middle East diplomacy amid an otherwise questionable - even morally reprehensible - tenure as de facto
head o f A m erican foreign policy in the N ixon and Ford administrations. See John Lewis Gaddis, “Rescuing
C hoice from Circumstance: T h e Statecraft o f Henry Kissinger,” in Gordon A . Craig and Francis L.
Loewenheim, eds., T he Diplomats: 1939-1979 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 584.
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vindication of the viability of relaxed superpower tensions. Yet, beyond this determ inant,
Kissinger made clear th a t d etente was n o t tantam ount to political cooperation. W h en Anwar
Sadat reestablished diplom atic relations with W ashington, Kissinger grasped the opportunity
finally to diminish Soviet prestige in the Middle East. It had been his strategy long before the
detente summits of 1972 and 1973.
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Chapter VI
Conclusion

As the first superpower proxy conflict to follow the Soviet-Am erican summits of 1972 and 1973
(which collectively constitute the high point of the Cold W ar detente), the Yom Kippur W ar
inevitably put, as the title of this thesis suggests, detente to “the test.” T he criteria used in this
thesis to judge superpower behavior in the Middle East were a construct of detente summitry.
As the historical record clearly indicates, neither the U nited States nor the Soviet U nion
held fast to the guarantees each country made to the other. A n objective reading of the
agreements to emerge from the Soviet-American detente, studied against the backdrop of the
policies of each nation toward their Middle East clients in late 1973, revealed, to the author, an
astonishing lack of regard of the value of an international promise. This yields im portant lessons
for understanding international relations.
Diplomatic agreements do n o t always enjoy the backing of a third party guarantor.
Those signed by the superpower rivals depended upon an unreliable mixture of incentive and
fear. Each superpower took every available opportunity to improve its own standing at the
expense of the o th e r w hen incentive of advantage appeared to outweigh the fear of
confrontation. A lthough leaders of both countries declared detente to be something greater
than it actually was, the shared impetus to relax tensions and to avoid possible catastrophe
clearly succeeded in downgrading the threat of nuclear war. Consequently, bo th the Soviet
U nion and the U nited States perceived an increased latitude in continuing the political conflict
that remained at the heart of the Cold W ar.
For the many reasons discussed throughout this thesis, the Middle East offered an
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unparalleled strategic advantage to the superpower th a t enjoyed the m ost influence there. It
was, in the Cold W ar system, the jewel of the non-aligned world. T he Arab-Israeli conflict though mostly indigenous in nature - conveniently served the superpowers’ interests as a vehicle
to win friends in the region. As H enry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy dem onstrated, there was
nothing inevitable about the evolution of the client-patron relationships th a t had added a global
character to a regional conflict. American-Israeli and Soviet-Arab relations were far rockier than
the positive, problem-free appearance of public diplomacy. Americans spoke of an “unbreakable
bond” and a “moral com m itm ent” to protect Israel; Soviets declared th a t “socialist fraternity”
impelled Moscow’s support of the Arabs. All were ideological window dressing designed as a
veneer for strategic self-interest.
T he Arabs and Israelis, likewise, proved to be unwilling participants in the superpowers’
designs, w hen doing so did n o t immediately satisfy their own particular goals. Each resented, and
resisted, being treated as pawns in the Cold W ar. T he cycle of violence between Israel and
Egypt, crudely abetted by the arms/influence policies of their superpower patrons, was finally
broken in the afterm ath of the Yom Kippur W ar. As a result, the stalem ate between Israel and
Egypt caused both to emerge as winners - a rarity in the history of conflict.
Moscow ultimately lost m uch of its investm ent in building Soviet prestige in the region.
The U nited States, in fulfilling the Cold W ar objective of reducing Soviet influence, would feel
the aftershocks of its expanded and largely unwelcome M iddle Eastern presence in later years.
Yet the superpowers, too, emerged from the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflagration as winners, and for
this they had detente to thank. If the policy of relaxed tensions had failed to stave off the Yom
Kippur W ar, the sincere, and shared aversion to nuclear confrontation - as codified by the
fundam ental purpose of detente - prevailed. Even strategic self-interest had its limits.
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